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ABSTRACT 
Against a backdrop of substantial institutional change in Chile over the last 40 years, this 
research assesses the challenges faced by the main actors in the corporate governance arena. 
Chile has embarked on a unique experiment, since it became the first country in the world 
to elect a Marxist president in 1970, which led to a deep national institutional crisis. The 
chaotic situation was ended with the military coup d´état in September 1973. The Military 
Regime soon began applying shock treatment, opening a closed and protected economy and, 
despite some deep crises along the way, achieved an impressive growth rate, which made 
Chile a success story. Pinochet’s authoritarian government kept a tight political grip and 
repressed its opponents. However, after losing a key plebiscite it peacefully handed over 
power to a democratic government in 1990, so ending 17 years of rule. The following five 
democratic governments maintained the economic model and over 20 years led the country 
to sustained economic and social progress. This has positioned Chile as a role model for 
emerging markets around the world aspiring to reach development and its experience in 
public and institutional policy are widely studied. However, paradoxically since 2010 Chile 
has experienced an explosion of corporate scandals and ensuing social rights rebellions, 
which have been challenging the model, questioning the national institutions.  Public trust 
has fallen to historically-low levels. 
Unsurprisingly, these events have systematically confronted the corporate elite’s governing 
practices. Qualified observers, such as MIT professor Ben Ross Schneider, report that these 
elites have played a key role in the progress of Chile, but, by the same token, are likely also 
an obstacle to achieving the goal of becoming a fully developed country (Guzmán, 2016). 
Therefore, a process of Action Research was adopted to gain access to the elite’s inner 
worlds, questioning their perceptions, beliefs and understandings, and encouraging them to 
explore options and imagine new ways and solutions to throw light on the key levers that 
determine the Chilean governance system - with the added benefit – should they accept the 
conclusions and challenged posed by this research, that these actors are well placed to make 
change happen in their arenas of professional practice. 
Consistent with this setting, this research looks to explore the evolution of governing in Chile, 
as viewed by members of the governance elite.  It does so through Institutional Theory lens, using 
inductive qualitative methods derived from Grounded Theory. 
The research finds that the concept of corporate governing has adapted to three successive 
institutional logics during the research period. Through a time-line, I show how each institutional 
logic has superseded the previous one, but without nullifying them – so adding increasing layers 
of complexity. This investigation allows us then to identify and delve into these sources of 
institutional change and associate them with path-dependent transformations at the societal level.   
Finally, this research helps crystalize the new corporate governing imperatives and extract 
managerial and theoretical lessons, so contributing to both professional practice and academia. 
The main contribution can be synthesized as the proposition that corporate governance is not just 
a matter of business, but a social construct in development, which implies a continual process of 
minding the corporate governing gaps derived from a country’s changing institutional logics.  
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PREFACE	
This is an academic account of a long journey of professional exploration, scholarly research and 
reflection and conceptual and practical learning. It all began at a board meeting in early 2014 when 
I noticed my own hesitation at raising a subject with my fellow board members.  My concern was 
to asses just how exposed the company was on finding itself included in the growing list of 
corporate governance scandals besetting the Chilean business community. Might such a question 
be taken as a political critique of the system of private enterprise so cherished among Chilean 
businessmen? Would I be offending some of their friends and colleagues as directors on 
other interlocking boards? Would I be letting an evil genie out of the bottle? Would I be seen as a 
Cassandra, foretelling an evil future? What if any or many of these questions turned out to be true?  
To my relief, my colleagues reacted positively and expressed similar concerns. They were also 
perplexed; disappointed to learn of the actions of friends; surprised to have discovered that other 
well-known directors and industrialists, with hitherto impeccable reputations, were also being 
accused of wrongdoing; and, overall, they expressed similar concerns over their own positions on 
the various boards they sat, and for the companies themselves. More than anything, they appeared 
lost and keen to find answers. However, their questions (and mine) were far from coherent.  We 
all had doubts about; what to think; what was really going on; what to do about it, and; where to 
start. 
Discussing the issue in abstract terms with one of my colleagues at my family business consulting 
firm, we soon realised that the matter was fascinating, relevant and quite a hot topic. A real-world 
governance problem that would merit further investigation and a unique opportunity for me to 
apply the rigour and practical approach of my pending doctoral thesis. My partner and I saw the 
value of investigating the answers to our consulting clients – leaders in medium-sized and large 
family firms - who were increasingly asking for help in making their boards of directors more 
professional. Most of what I knew of the literature reflected the “usual suspects” of good corporate 
governance: a separation of the CEO and the chairmanship role, the importance of independent 
directors, boards of an appropriate size and the role of committees (Huse, 2007; Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004), but this “programmed knowledge” hardly respond to 
the issues raised about board professionalization. However, at the outset, I did not have a specific 
question in mind beyond trying to understand what was going on in the governance arena. 
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Although I understood things very generally and intuitively as, a priori, I did not want to affect or 
limit the subjects, issues and the possibility of finding out not only the answers, but also to 
formulate interesting questions – given the inspiration derived from the previous three years’ 
reading, all of which should so lead to concluding my Action-Learning (AL)/Action-
Research (AR) professional doctorate. 
The first idea was to contact high profile directors and industrialists sitting on boards of prestigious 
local corporations, with long experience, forming part of top business circles with ready access to 
Chile’s Who’s Who. But, the doubt remained: where to start? Another colleague turned up and, 
hearing about our hesitations, immediately suggested: “I am well acquainted with high profile 
industrialist, former head of one the national business associations, ex-chairman of a leading 
pension fund.  I believe he would be keen to participate, as he is outspoken, having made the 
headlines with critical questions of our business class”. That was enough to set the ball rolling. I 
met with him a couple of weeks later and, to my surprise, he was eager to share his views. Before 
the end of the interview he volunteered the names of other possible candidates, who in turn then 
confirmed and suggested further names. In no time I had compiled a short list of confirmed 
participants. And then I added two more individuals, based on my own perception of certain 
governance angles, not fully covered by the list to-date. So, I found myself conducting fifteen short 
interviews with very high-profile directors, politicians, lawyers, former regulators, financiers, and 
entrepreneurs, fourteen of whom, to my surprise, committed to meet me three times over the 
coming year, to “reflect on what was going on in the governance arena in Chile, given the emerging 
corporate governance scandals”. More importantly, these individuals were also prepared to reflect 
on the current governance issues within their own respective professional worlds. Finally, I ended 
up with a rich assortment of perspectives from a dozen highly qualified participants  
Thus, my investigation began without a set of specific research questions, but more with a focus 
on problem areas.  The group of committed, well-informed and active participants were willing to 
share their personal views on the status of the local governance arena. What, you might ask, was 
in it for these generous participants? I cannot be sure, but I’d say it probably had to do with their 
desire and, maybe even concern, to gain and understanding of what was really going on - to work 
out their own answers and, in some cases, to have a forum; to voice their discomfort with the 
current status quo; the actions of close colleagues and antagonists and; perhaps in one or two cases 
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even, to confess to their own past or current behaviours before a respected and neutral academic, 
like myself. 
Interestingly, despite being extremely busy people, each of the 12 participants honoured their 
commitment - although the timetable extended well beyond the original 12 months and eventually 
took 19 months. This was as largely due to our demanding work schedules and travel 
commitments. What is revealing is that most of my participants had cause to publicly acknowledge 
corporate governance issues - some quite serious - within their particular spheres of activity during 
my period of research. 
I met with each participant to talk candidly and in broad terms about “the corporate governance 
scandals in Chile, their background, the recent past, the present, and their expectations for the 
future”. I quickly made it clear that, given the practical approach of my thesis, I expected them “to 
share their thoughts on a governing challenge of their own and how they would plan to deal with 
it”. 
This thesis is therefore an account of my extraordinary journey, in which I developed a unique 
understanding of prevalent governance theories, research methodologies and, through the 
exchanges with my participants, a glimpse into the inner-workings of the Chilean elite. However, 
the most rewarding aspect of this project came from the insights it gave me into Chile’s 
institutional logic, namely in deciphering how the country is ruled and gaining privileged 
knowledge on the practicalities of how organizations are really governed.  As a reflective scholar–
practitioner, this conferred great insight in my attempt to balance business acumen, social 
sensitivity, and the rigours of scientific research.  
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CHAPTER	1	-	INTRODUCTION		
As with many emerging countries, Chile experienced a series of profound institutional changes in 
the last half century. Indeed, its pioneering structural reforms have caught the attention of the 
world, particularly due to the sharp turns in its political and institutional setting and its social and 
economic results, which are generally perceived to have been very successful. 
Chile first moved from deep political and economic crises into a military dictatorship in September 
1973, which paradoxically combined harsh political control with one of most open economies in 
the world. Against a backdrop of systematic violations to human rights and restricted political 
activity, the military government introduced and encouraged a process of economic liberalization 
the dominance of free-market policies. Then, in March 1990, the military peacefully handed over 
power to a democratically elected government formed by a coalition of its opponents. After a 
delicate and successful transition, the country has gradually increased the level of democratization 
and globalisation accompanied by one of the most extended period of prosperity in history (see 
Appendix F for details on the Chilean context). 
Despite been recognized for its low levels of corruption, which compare favourably with those 
found in advanced economies, since 2010 Chile has suffered from an increasing number of 
corporate governance scandals. The roots of such high-profile events are not clear; public trust in 
private enterprise and other institutions is at an historically low level and business leaders are 
struggling attempting to control the damage. In consequence, it is not “business as usual” and in 
my professional practice – as a consultant to family-owned business - I see a generalised sense of 
volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity among leading actors.  
This makes Chile a natural laboratory to research the corporate governance strategies being 
considered by directors and owners of leading large organizations in a context of continuous 
institutional change. In consequence, my research questions (further developed in Chapter 4) are: 
• What have been the challenges to the main actors in the corporate arena deriving from socio-
political-economic institutional changes in the period 1973 to 2016? 
and; 
• How have they addressed these challenges and what have their corporate governance strategies 
been?  
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In answering these questions, I am looking to throw light on personal and organizational responses 
to institutional change and, through informed testimonials, flag the reactions to increasing 
institutional complexity. I am also looking to reveal the social influences in corporate governance 
and so postulate explanations to the evolutionary behaviour patterns followed by individuals and 
institutions and the effects such processes have had in an emerging market. 
The contributions to practice are many and centre on providing explanations, interpretations and 
suggestions to practitioners searching for answers in the midst of action. Deriving insights for 
public policies is another source of outcomes. Recycling such ideas as part of my multiple roles as 
a board member and then adviser to boards and large business groups represents the direct 
application of the knowledge-creation process; benefitting not only myself but also the 
organizations I work with. This learning process might also serve in a practical and, hopefully, 
ethical manner my graduate and undergraduate students, who make up an important part of the 
elites ruling big business in Chile. 
In formulating the research question, I resorted to “pattern-inducing” (Reay & Jones, 2016, p. 449) 
techniques, flowing from interpretivist conventions based on the implicit hypothesis that sense is 
directly associated with context. This implies that the best way to capture a meaningful socio-
cultural experience fully is to observe it from the “inside” (Myers, 2013, p. 38). 
Capturing meaning naturally requires willing participation of senior individuals, developing a 
level of mutual trust with each participant through the mutual investment of time to develop the 
necessary rapport and flexibility in the application of research methods. Therefore, I privileged a 
methodology that promoted a continual and fluid interaction with my participants. Action Learning 
(AL), taken as a broad ethos (Bourner & Simpson, 2005), was ideally suited. In addition, AL 
corresponds to my doctoral preparation and training as business consultant. My status as professor 
could also help generate the necessary trust. 
The lens I selected through which to observe both institutional change and response was Chilean 
corporate governance scandals. It is well established that scandals provide an extraordinary (out 
of the ordinary) opportunity to question the assumed objectivity and apparent inexorability of 
“normality”, fostering a critical assessment and a probing attitude towards formal and informal 
rules (Fiss, 2007). In addition, in my direct experience, scandals tend to arouse strong emotions by 
uncovering the hidden horrors of daily reality, promoting a human need to process and share some 
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of these vivid feelings. Concordantly, Fiss (2007) proposes studying governance scandals, given 
the fact that they offer a chance to observe that when such fictions vanish, fractures are revealed; 
existing systems are objected to and transformed; how corporations and regulators act under such 
circumstances; and how events are interpreted by diverse institutional players and observers. 
Thus, scandals naturally become, both the subject and the stratagem to unlock closed doors of the 
main actors, to stimulate an on-going dialogue and to retain the actors’ attention throughout the 
research process. 
With the research “site” now in place, the next step was choosing the right instruments to both 
process the data collected and to formally identify the patterns, given Action Learning’s limitations 
in terms of theoretical creation (Rigg & Coghlan, 2016). The inductive work was developed using 
Grounded Theory techniques, which provided rigorous tools to develop the pattern-inducing 
process, while offering an appropriate theoretic background for AL and other methodologies 
within an interpretivist paradigm (Zuber-Skerritt, 2001). This implied a mixed-methods approach 
(Creswell, 2013) that did not imply assuming the whole “package” of either GT nor AL, but 
borrowing and applying carefully several of its components (see Chapter 4).  
The main findings of the research are the following: 
1. The three macro-changes in socio-political-economic institutions in the period, namely, the 
forceful, teleological, imposition of free markets; the natural derivation associated to a 
transitional democracy; and the organic effervescence derived from explosive community 
involvement, have implied successive, superimposed and diverse institutional logics. These 
three logics can be characterised as economic maximizing, political understanding, and social 
partaking, respectively.  
2. These changing logics have brought major institutional challenges for actors and organizations, 
given their differing implications in terms of sources of legitimacy, authority, and identity, as 
well as the implied norms, perceptions, expectations, and values implicit in formal and 
informal structures; 
3. Institutional understanding has become distinctly more challenging, given that the subsequent 
institutional logics have not replaced one another, but have added layers of challenge resulting 
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in increasing institutional complexity and volatility, given that on occasion some might shadow 
one or more of the others; 
4. As a consequence, the bases of corporate attention have been continuously expanding: adding 
market, political coalition, and more recently stakeholder perspectives. Likewise, the bases of 
strategy have been changing from narrower market issues into broader political, and more 
recently, social challenges; 5. Therefore, the understanding, scope and practice of corporate governance in Chile have 
evolved. It began with relatively static and narrow systems, processes and structures to direct 
and control organizations for the sake of shareholders, as defined in official reports and 
textbooks (OECD, 2004; Tricker, 2012). At some point the concept incorporated the challenge 
of managing resource-dependencies vis-a-vis powerful state agencies and political coalitions 
à la Pfeffer (2003). And, according to this research, it might better be defined as governing, a 
gerund capturing its dynamic condition as well as its complexity, involving a set of 
mechanisms, socio-scientific knowledge-bases and related capacities to lead human groups 
with the aim to direct and control increasingly complex organizational, socio-economic and 
environmental processes, as originally proposed by	Foucault	(2000).	
The research concludes with a series of theoretical propositions that capture the personal and 
organizational responses of actors and corporations, which contribute to both practice and 
research. Thus, this investigation is distinctive in the following aspects: 
• Systemizing the evolution of corporate governance in the context of an emerging market – an 
under-researched topic; 
• Linking different institutional governance logics to diverse theories-in-use, which are practised 
implicitly (or explicitly) by the main actors in processing their governance problems; 
• Recognizing the interpretive task of these main actors in addressing the increasing complexity, 
and consequences of prospective institutional responses; 
• Proposing governing as a set of tasks: including interpreting, learning and activating 
institutional complexity;  
• Providing empirical evidence of the evolution of the corporate governance process; 
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• Incorporating the role of institutional entrepreneurs as interpreters, learners, promoters and 
proponents of new governance practices; 
• Discerning the macro and micro links between institutions, logics, organizations and main 
actors; 
• Exploring the non-linear interconnections between global events and local occurrences 
affecting a small emerging country; and 
• Illustrating through empirical evidence just how diverse institutional logics interact, dominate 
and heighten the complexity of the governance function. 
In summary, the main contribution this research makes is in demonstrating the social construction 
of corporate governance in Chile, placing governance as a subject that goes well beyond any 
particular business theme and linking it directly to societal processes.  Such conception implies 
not only path-dependent and context-specific processes but carries the prospect that corporate 
governance will evolve in line with changes in the prevailing institutional logic. 
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CHAPTER	2	-	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
The questions guiding this chapter relate to corporate governance in literature with a focus on the 
following questions: 
a) What are institutions? And how do they work? 
b) How do they come into existence, change and evolve? 
c) What interrelations occur between institutions and governance? 
d) How institutions influence actors and organizations? 
e) How actors and organizations respond to institutional changes? 
f) Which theories take account of such dynamics? 
In this chapter I take stock of the main streams of literature, adopting a broad and critical 
perspective in an attempt to incorporate what is relevant in the conceptual framework of my 
research. 
2.1		 Theoretical	Building	Blocks.		
I herein review what I consider to be the three theoretical building blocks within which this 
research is developed, namely, the concepts of governance, stakeholders, fields, and institutions. I 
also review different perspectives taken in extant literature to analyse the concept of governance. 
The Chilean context within a Latin American setting is also reviewed as part of the existing 
corporate governance literature. 
2.1.1	Governance:	Kinds	and	Principles.	
Governance is a human function that has existed since the beginnings of time. However, despite 
its antiquity it is still difficult to define precisely or generally, as it tends to be captured by diverse 
disciplines (Bevir, 2011). Governance can be intuitively understood as making sense of what is 
going on, identifying a key theme, transforming such a theme into a vision, developing a strategy 
to achieve that vision, and using this insight to direct, control, empower and make people 
(including rulers) accountable on an on-going basis, while maintaining the capacity of self-
questioning motivations, processes, roles and outcomes. Dean (2010) in fact makes self-
governance a central aspect of his re-reading of Foucault (Foucault & Burchell, 2011).  
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However, understanding governance as a function in itself requires further elaboration. Rosenau 
(1992, cited by Davies, 2002) affirms: “to presume the presence of governance ... is to conceive 
of functions that have to be performed in any viable human system”. Davies (2002, p. 59) 
following Rosenau’s lists among governance functions: “setting goals, developing strategies and 
policies, procuring resources necessary for 'preservation and well-being', preventing conflict 
among its members or factions from tearing it apart, etc., and more generally, as a measure of 
effective functioning, coping with environmental uncertainty and external challenges”. Adding 
that: “those functional needs are ever-present if a system is to persist intact through time” (ibid.). 
The governance functions proposed by Rosenau and Davies, while useful and valuable, seem to 
restrict governance to its fiduciary and strategic modes, associated with identifying problems and 
developing plans to deal with them, respectively (Chait et al., 2011). However, they seem to miss 
a generative perspective implying key processes such as making sense of a situation, framing a 
problem and focusing on learning and reflection (Chait et al., 2011); such aspect, while 
cornerstone, might easily be neglected in amid day-to-day business concerns. 
Thus, given the many intangible facets of governance, it seems natural that some aspects might 
tend to become invisible in normal times and consequently, ignored or forgotten. That is why it 
should be no surprise that the ‘question of governance’ comes systematically to haunt us after 
every major crash, as concludes Banner (1997) after studying “300 years of evidence”. 
And although the focus on guilt and recrimination tend to be put in the breach of fiduciary 
responsibilities – the most visible aspects of any crisis -, a more in-depth analysis should point 
towards faults in generative governance. Indeed, it is symptomatic that a common aspect of many 
scandals is the fact that nobody was able to question on time the raison d’être of their 
organizations, and how practices-in-use were opposite to espoused visions and values. And even 
more sinister, how the strategic governance in place might just have been particularly efficient 
ways to achieve evil purposes in many cases. Thus, it could be speculated that organizations might 
be responding to invisible mechanisms, such as to its culture and intrinsic values and/or to some 
external institutional influences, powers or logics. 
The usual ex-post responses in dealing with such difficulties and questions at the corporate 
governance level, tend to emanate from three major flanks: 
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• Governance	understood	as	best	practice	that	can	be	exemplified	by	Carter	and	Lorsch	(2013, p. 1)’s call to go “back to the drawing board”, that is, back to basics: recover forgotten 
(or learn unknown) practices of good governance;  
• Governance interpreted as setting incorruptible values capable of overcoming individualism 
and unhealthy systemic interrelationships – the ultimate drivers of corporate governance 
scandals (Coglianese & Michael, 2006); and  
• Governance seen as regulation: “to rectify perceived governance weaknesses in […] legal 
systems”, especially after corporate collapses (Hill, 2012, p.367). 
However, such standard responses have all been tried at some point and have fallen short in the 
face of the vast and amorphous dimensions of the challenge. Thus, a holistic governance 
perspective might prove more useful. In this context, Bevir (2011)’s propositions appear to 
incorporate the generative aspect mentioned above and to be useful to look at both the past and 
the future: 
 
Unfortunately, governance is an overly common term in a wide variety of fields, such as 
economics, finance, management, geography, political science, sociology, public administration 
and development studies (Bevir, 2011) and what’s more: “[e]ach discipline sometimes acts as if it 
owns the word and has no need to engage with the others.” (Bevir, 2011, p. 1). Thus, governance 
is frequently studied from diverse perspectives and tends to focus – sometimes narrowly - on 
mechanisms and rules, such as: principles, policies and practices (Tricker, 2012), key concepts 
(Bevir, 2010, relationships (Coglianese & Michael, 2006), social coordination issues and the 
practices of rule (Bevir, 2011), regulation (Horn, 2012), structures, roles and influence (McNulty 
et al., 2011), managerial incentives (Bos, Pendleton & Toms, 2013), and inducements associated 
with economic institutions (North, 1990). 
“I	suggest	that	‘governance’	refers	to	new	theories	of	social	coordination	and	new	worlds	of	collective	action,	and,	more	controversially,	I	suggest	that	the	new	worlds	arose	in	part	because	people	acted	on	formal	and	folk	versions	of	the	new	theories.	This	latter	suggestion	reflects	my	commitment	to	interpretive	theory.	If	we	are	fully	to	
explain	a	form	of	governance,	we	have	to	refer	to	the	meanings	and	stories	that	are	
embodied	in	it;	we	have	to	interpret	the	beliefs	and	theories	that	have	led	people	to	act	
so	as	to	create	and	maintain	it.	I	hope	…[to]	improve	people’s	understanding	of	the	world	in	which	we	live,	the	ideas	that	have	made	that	world,	and	alternative	ideas	by	which	we	might	remake	the	world”	(p.1,	emphasis	added).	
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However, the silo mentality, whilst functional to knowledge development in terms of focus and 
efficient reductionism, misses important insights from neglected disciplines. And hence a different 
mode of knowledge is required in which knowing is not limited by artificial boundaries, allowing 
different streams of knowledge to be integrated around a common challenge. 
Henry & Lee (2004) identify three generic and more holistic approaches to governance: 
organisational, systemic, and political governance, framed as follows: 
• Organisational Governance: ethical standards of behaviour by managers associated with 
principles of corporate governance–conceptualised by Jiang (2013) as good governance, 
prescriptive of how organisations should be governed; 
• Systemic Governance: concerned with the main competitive and/or cooperative interactions 
among key stakeholders – as analytical/heuristic perspective oriented to explain how 
governance occurs in practice (Jiang, 2013); 
• Political Governance: addresses the exercise of influence – instead of direct command - by the 
state or its agencies to mobilize a system in a given direction as a “mixture of 
analytical/heuristic and of normative or prescriptive accounts of how states seek to obtain 
outcomes without direct control…” (Jiang, 2013, p.286). 
Organizational Governance includes Corporate Governance, a concept capturing the leading role 
boards of directors are expected to play as ultimately responsible for an organisation’s direction 
and control and accountable to stakeholders. As such, it represents a prescriptive, principled, 
normative account of good board practice. 
This research straddles corporate governance and the above mentioned systemic and political 
aspects, given its primary focus on the responses of the former to changes in the latter. Therefore, 
while corporate governance is my principal interest, I maintain an openness to systemic and 
political issues attempting to capture the evolutionary aspects of institutional change. This explains 
the interchangeable usage of both terms in this work. 
The previous distinctions put in central place external actors and the governance function, thus we 
need to ask who are the stakeholders participating in the governance function and processes, and 
what is the purpose of governance? I now turn to these aspects. 
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2.1.2	Stakeholders,	Institutions	and	Fields.		
Stakeholder theory proposed by Freeman (1983) appeared as a conceptual response to the 
perceived amoral ethics of capitalism and business reasoning, counter-arguing the value of moral 
conceptions like relationships, teamwork, trust, reliability, fairness and care for survival and 
prosperity (Freeman, Harrison & Wick, 2010). Since its origins, Stakeholder Theory has evolved 
into full-fledged Stakeholder Capitalism (Freeman et al., 2010) in opposition to the traditional 
capitalistic models anchored around workers (Marx & Engels, 1967, government (Keynes, 1937), 
managers (Berle & Means, 1991), entrepreneurs (Schumpeter, 1951) and investors (Friedman, 
1970; 2009). It is based on; freedom, protection of rights, and positive consensual obligations, 
which carry as principles: cooperation, engagement, responsibility, recognition of social 
complexity, continuity in relationships, and emerging competition; all of them designed to create 
value for stakeholders. 
Stakeholders were originally defined by Stanford Research Institute investigators as the groups 
required by organizations to continue existing, and over time the definition mutated into all the 
people having a “stake” in the organization, being affected by it, depending on it and/or 
contributing to its success (Freeman et al., 2010). Hence, relevant stakeholders include a wide 
array of actors, social bodies and organizations, including: state authorities and agencies, markets, 
networks, and organisations, as well as shareholders, board members, managers, communities, 
suppliers, clients, competitors, regulators and the media, among others. 
To try to make sense of such a variety of entities we look to the terms proposed by Douglass North 
(1990). Thus, we could differentiate between organizations and fields. The former have been 
conceptualised by North as political, social, economic or educational bodies bonding individuals 
around a common purpose. According to North (1996), organizations are produced by the matrix 
of institutions. 
Fields, on the other hand, are situations in which groups of actors get together, align and organise 
themselves around common frameworks, allowing them to act in a consistent manner in their 
interrelations with others (Colglouh, 2005). Fields can be understood as rules governing actions, 
systematic patterns of interactions, and practices (ibid.).  
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Organizations have members and identifiable boundaries. Institutions do not (Ménard y Shirley, 
2005). They are the outcome of conflicts, commitments, power struggles, and interactive games 
within fields of action, that are in permanent flux, given systematic questioning, challenge, and 
power games, which eventually help these institutions “survive, reproduce or [be] destroyed” 
(Colclough, 2005, p.14). 
Actors can be characterised à la Jessop (1998) by their consciousness, reflexivity and strategic 
approach as well as purposeful in terms of their intentions and preferences, especially in terms of 
their interactions with state agencies making decisions binding members of a society on behalf of 
their common interest or a generalized will. 
2.1.3	Governance	Theoretical	Streams.	
Several theories have been advanced to try to explain and model the behaviours and mutual 
interactions of shareholders, board members, managers, as well as their interrelationships with 
stakeholders and financial entities. The dominant theories can be organised in nine main pastures, 
namely:  
1. Financial-Economic theories, such as Agent-Principal Theory, and Transaction Cost 
Economics and New Institutional Economics (North, 1990; Ménard & Shirley, 2005) assumes 
self-interest of managers within the framework of firm contracts, and a search process for 
efficient governance mechanisms, respectively, to achieve value creation for external 
shareholders (Huse, 2007; Nordberg, 2010, Tricker, 2012); 
2. Legalistic-Fiduciary theories, like Stewardship Theory, assume, on the one hand, a 
recognition of duty and responsibility by directors and managers, and on the other hand, the 
disciplining role derived from external forces (Tricker, 2012), in which the focus is more on 
value-protection (from expropriation or destruction) for the legal owners (shareholders) than 
value-creation;  
3. Strategic Management theories, like Resource-Dependence Theory and Resource-based 
View, founded in identifying and exploiting strategic, scarce and relevant value-chain resources 
to achieve value-creation for the firm (Nordberg, 2010; Huse, 2007; Tricker, 2012)  
4. Pyscho-Sociological theories, like Managerial and Class Hegemony Theory (Tricker, 2012) 
criticising the passiveness of non-independent boards, benefitting powerful CEOs (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989), and Paternalistic Theory (Huse, 2007) considering family politics and 
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emotions (Huse, 2007); 
5. Institutional theories, such as the sociological Institutional Theory, incorporating the 
constructs of Institutional Logics and Institutional Entrepreneurship (DiMaggio, 1998), and 
closely linked theories like Social Capital, Social Networks, and Interlocking Directorships 
(Huse, 2007) based on understanding the impact of embeddedness, social norms, group 
cohesion and favoured relationships, and determining how such links allow capturing key 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003);  
6. Interactive theories such as Game Theory (Aoki & Jackson, 2008; Huse, 2007) featuring both 
cooperative strategies and negotiation and the Strategic Relations Approach (SRA) proposed 
by Jessop (1998), offering a framework incorporating strategy, structure and agency in which 
actors design, apply, and revise from the results of their strategies to learn how to fit with 
context selectivity; 
7. Pluralistic theories like Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, 1983,	Freeman et al., 2012) that take 
an external perspective that may encompass social, political and ethical views, by taking “an 
ecological perspective, viewing the company as part of an organic system” (Nordberg, 2010, 
p.41) in which the board takes into consideration all those who have stakes (interests) in the 
organization; 
8. Systems view proposed by Systems Theory and Cybernetics (Tricker, 2012; Stokes, 2004; 
Turnbull, 1997) helping identify the boundaries of systems, considering different levels of 
abstraction, that is, macro, meso and micro systems, and specifying the system functions, in 
term of inputs and outputs; and 
9. Behavioural Theory of Corporate Governance: positioning governance within a socially 
situated context enacted by elites, who interpret the environment, informed by their social 
understanding, thus constituting a socially influenced agency. This theory draws on insights from 
empirical research by Westphal and Zajac and several colleagues (Westphal & Zajac, 2013; 1994) 
As made clear by Tricker (2012), corporate governance theoretical bases are fragmented, as there 
is no single shared integrative paradigm. We therefore must take bits and pieces of the existing 
theories to make better sense of how organizations and people are governed. 
Given such diversity, I focus next in three particular theories from this long list, which are the most 
directly relevant to this investigation. These theories arguable are the most encompassing of both 
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macro and micro governance effects of direct interest to this research, namely, New Institutional 
Economics, Resource-Dependence Theory and (New) Institutional Theory. 
2.2	 New	Institutional	Economics	(NIE)	
Institutional economics studies the effects of economic, social, and political institutions on 
economic behaviours and the performance of markets. Institutions are defined as “the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990, p. 3). Institutions “structure 
incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic” (ibid.) and therefore 
institutions are key drivers of economic performance and development. Institutions are thus, 
basically the rules of the game that economic agents play. Institutions are in permanent evolution 
and change due to the influence of external shocks and/or the action of institutional entrepreneurs; 
proactive, resourceful and self-interested actors (North & Thomas, 1970) as a consequence, 
countries achieve either virtuous or vicious cycles of development or stagnation (North, 1990) 
NIE humanizes traditional economic theories, relying on under-socialized, highly rational actors 
pursuing their individual goals, directed by self-interest and personal risk inclinations, who are 
subject to information constraints and driven by incentives. The main governance mechanisms are 
formal incentives and monitoring arrangements channelling behaviours in the direction of 
organizational and/or social goal. Failures of governance systems, might lead to calls for greater 
regulatory attention, including contract-enforcement institutions and/or coercion-constraining 
institutions (Greif, 2008; Menard & Shirley, 2005). 
NIE’s main contributions to this research are the following:  
1. Institutions reflect the rules of the corporate governance game played by actors and 
organizations; 
2. Rules might include both enforcing and coercion-constraining aspects, and virtuous or vicious 
cycles might derive therefrom; and 
3. Institutions change and evolve due to the action of institutional entrepreneurs. 
However, I continue to problematize the (still) under-socialized nature of actors, their narrowly 
defined self-interested incentives and the implicit fixed set of preferences given that the own 
institutional evolution might transform incentives, broaden preferences and mutate social attitudes, 
propelling a drive towards new, unintended and unanticipated equilibriums. A process that might 
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be better explained by informal mechanisms and socially embedded practices, beliefs and attitudes 
(Pacheco et al., 2010). 
2.3	 Resource	Dependence	Theory	(RDT)	
Originated as an explicit alternative to Agency Theory’s economic efficiency presuppositions, 
Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) proposed by Jeffrey Pfeffer and colleagues (Aldrich & 
Pfeffer, 1976;  Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) combines an organizational theory of how organizations 
deal with their social environments with a reflection about both intra-organizational and extra-
organizational power and an insight about how organizations develop strategies to deal with their 
resource dependencies (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). RDT has been characterized with the phrase: 
“when it came to explaining strategy, power often trumped profits” (Davis & Cobb, 2010, p.5).  
Therefore, RDT might explain why certain organizations are able to harness more power than their 
counterparts as a result of different degrees of interdependence deriving from their positioning in 
socio-political networks, including the government and other social actors (Pfeffer, 2003).   
The main application of RDT is seen in hiring decisions, the conformation of boards of directors 
and the formation of strategic alliances, as well as the relationships with political powers.  Despite 
RDT’s wide potential applicability and its common-sense appeal, empirical studies over the last 
30 years have not been very supportive of its tenets, perhaps due in part to widely changing socio-
economic circumstances (Davis & Cobb, 2010), and RDT has had a subsequent transition from 
source of falsifiable empirical projections to its widespread usage as metaphor of organizational 
dynamics (Pfeffer, 2003).  
RTD’s main contributions to this research are the following: 
1. Environments affect organizations (and actors); 
2. Organizations (and actors) attempt to actively manage the external constraints of their 
environments; and 
3. External environmental constraints impact organizational dynamics (Pfeffer, 2003). 
The implication of these ideas is that as Pfeffer (2003, p. 287) says: “corporate behaviour can be 
more readily explained by resource dependence ideas than by ideas of efficient markets or even 
investor capitalism.” 
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However, I still problematize the relatively micro perspective of external environments under 
RDT, as it leaves some level of indeterminacy or ambiguity in its interpretation of the macro-
sources of resource dependence – in particular vis-à-vis institutional environments. For instance, 
Pfeffer (2003) cites the studies by Fligstein (1997) and Thornton & Ocasio (1999) of the financial 
and publishing industries, respectively as evidence supporting the search to secure external 
resources as proposed by RDT, but he does not assume in his argumentation the crux of 
Institutional Theory at the heart of these studies: the evolution of the macro-institutional logics 
determining most other properties in these industries.  
Pfeffer (2003), in stating that resource dependence varies over time and that, in consequence, 
environmental contexts should be systematically researched, taking a longitudinal perspective to 
make sense of them, is nevertheless illuminating for this research, in so far as it attempts to capture 
the institutional evolution and its influence in the governance paradigm, as explained in Chapter 
7. 
Finally, I also retain RDT’s proposition of paying attention to non-market strategies, including 
active links developed by organizations with political, economic and social activities. This last 
aspect points towards the role played by power in business and society. 
2.4	 Institutional	Theory	
In so far as is sees institutions as socially constructed, informal rules or cultural norms, which 
generate practices, behaviours, and belief systems, Institutional Theory posits that cultural 
meanings encompass organizational structures, policies, and practices. 
The heart of modern Institutional Theory is the prevailing institutional logic (Friedland & Alford, 
1991), that is the “organizing principles that furnish guidelines to actors as to how to behave” (Rao, 
Monin, & Durand, 2003, p. 797), which offer the basis for the formation of the social identity of 
actors, including the systems of incentives, and so providing meaning to individual endeavours. 
Thus, existing theories of corporate governance, such as Agent-Principal Theory, could be seen as 
corresponding to “institutional logics” containing culturally meaningful social directions 
(Thornton & Ocasio, 2008; Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012; Westphal & Zajac, 2013).  
Neo-institutional theorists have given a stronger emphasis to the role of individual agency and 
purposeful action in the generation and abandonment of institutions (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 
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1997; Oliver, 1991). New Institutional Theory (NIT) assumes that individuals are self-interested 
and act to transform their institutional environment by re-aligning it with their individual goals. 
Thus, the distinguishing factor of NIT is introducing the concept of the institutional entrepreneur 
as an actor, managing and mobilizing resources to change or create institutional structures 
(DiMaggio, 1988; Pacheco et al., 2010). 
While Institutional Theory takes a broader macro-perspective on theories of corporate governance, 
proposing that firm-actor relationships are embedded in a larger socio-cultural context (Westphal 
& Zajac, 2013), Behavioural Governance researchers have contributed to this institutional 
perspective by suggesting how organization-level social and political processes moderate the 
institutional influences on governance structures and policies (ibid.). 
According with Westphal & Zajac (2013) in general there is a lack of studies on institutional 
change in corporate governance. They compare Friedland & Alford (1991), who define such an 
evolution as a transformation at the societal-level, affecting the institutional logics of 
organizations, with a more stringent definition by Fiss (2007), who includes transformations in the 
“institutional status” or in the social legitimacy of specific policies, structures, or forms. And they 
add that most research does not satisfy Fiss’s more constraining definition, as most researchers 
focus in institutionalization or de-institutionalization processes of particular governance 
procedures and configurations. An exception is Fligstein (1993)’s study of changing conceptions 
of control in the corporate field – a conceptualisation going further than the traditional industrial 
setting.  They also affirm that, even more scarce has been the study of the sources of institutional 
evolution (Westphal & Zajac, 2013).  
I retain the following as relevant for this research from Institutional Theory: 
1. The relevance of cultural and meaning systems to guide social actions, structures and policies, 
and the resulting impact in legitimacy of achieving a coherent alignment with such informal 
rules; 
2. The role of institutional entrepreneurs as proactive actors, generating institutional change; and 
3. The relevance of institutional logic as the cultural matrix defining appropriate organizing, 
behaving and governing collective practices. 
I also consider the value of the concept of field as a unit of analysis in facilitating the study of 
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processes of institutional change, expanding the traditional perspective on industrial analysis, so 
including meaning systems as part of the examination. 
However, I argue that Institutional Theory tends to assign an overly generic perspective to the role 
of institutional entrepreneurs, and that the discipline of entrepreneurship might further enrich our 
understanding of entrepreneurs’ roles, strategies and their own logics, as argued by Pacheco et al. 
(2010). In addition, given the increasing role being played by social movements, their insights 
should be allied to the conceptualisation of institutional entrepreneurs (Lounsbury, 2007). 
2.5	 Chilean	Corporate	Governance	Literature.	
In Latin American countries, corporate governance is heavily influenced by the intervention of the 
State that, independent of how well-meant or populist-driven it might be, typically ends up creating 
additional distortions, due to the brisk pace of change in policies and cases of public-private 
collaboration; often with some degree of corruption. And this situation is complicated by the 
common and influential presence of large, family-owned, diversified business groups, with their 
own agendas (see Colpan et al., 2010, for the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico). 
In Chile the corporate governance debate is still in its early days of development. Studies have 
covered the relationship between governance practices and value (Leal & Carvahal Da Silva, 2005; 
Lefort & Walker, 2005; 2007), economic shocks and governance (Lefort & Walker, 2000), pension 
funds and corporate governance (Iglesias-Palau, 2000), and comparative governance between 
countries (Aguilera et al., 2008), but more holistic perspectives are missing to capture behavioural 
governance at the societal level, in particular the kind of research work done by Westphal & Zajac 
on Germany, the US and other countries (2013). 
Lefort & Walker (2000) find that Chilean corporate governance regulation has been mainly shaped 
by reactive actions in response to crises or major incidents. However, a systematic analysis of 
corporate governance failures and exploring the origins of such events, options on how best to 
manage them in practice and areas of improvement are still lacking. Therefore, there are 
opportunities to exploit the learning opportunities offered by the natural experiment provided by 
recent crises, and, on the other hand, to take advantage of the insights derived from such events to 
sponsor a research project involving practitioners reflecting in action, with an action-learning bent.  
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Aguilera, Judge & Tejersen (2018) in a study covering the realities of emerging and transition 
markets highly relevant for this research, provide a bridge between Institutional Logics and 
National Governance Logics. They define Institutional logics as the “socially-constructed 
assumptions, values, beliefs, formal and informal rules, and practices that equip organizations with 
a toolkit to interpret their experiences, direct their attention towards specific choices, define future 
goals, and limit their potential organizational choices” (p. 5).  
Aguilera et al. (2018) affirm that social institutions at the national level influence the process of 
categorisation and attention configuring at the organizational level. This has been demonstrated 
by early research about industrial policy changes during the Great Depression as outcomes of 
changes in cultural paradigms about industrial rationales (Dobbin (1993), and more recent 
investigations by Vasudeva, Alexander, & Jones (2015) and Bundy & Pfarrer (2015). 
The authors postulate four idealised kinds of national governance logics concerning how corporate 
resources and authority are generated, preserved, and allocated within diverse national settings, 
assuming that society, state and market influence each other historically in path-dependent ways, 
producing singular, national-level institutionalized logics. Following O’Riain (2000), Aguilera and 
her colleagues define these as a liberal model, defined by the dominance of the market, a social-
rights model in which social claims predominate over market policies, a developmental model, in 
which the state and society are in coordination with the market dynamics, and, finally, a socialist 
model, in which the state has the power to dominate both market and society. 
The explicit assumption of Aguilera et al. (2018) is that all countries comprise a multiplicity of 
logics, but that a single logic ends up dominating the others. This dominant governance logic 
delineates firms’ behaviour in obtaining legitimacy determined by both their inner corporate 
governance practices (e.g. the responsibility of the board, management incentives, and internal 
control systems), and the external governance influences they are subject to (e.g. the market for 
corporate control, the influence of media, and external auditing) (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & 
Lee, 2015).  
However, dominating does not necessarily mean an absence of the other logics. Thus, the 
contributions of Aguilera and colleagues begs the question just how the different institutional 
logics might be combined and constitute layers of influence at a certain moment in time? The 
taxonomy of interactions between different logics proposed by Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 
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(2012), which attempt to categorize the different combinations, is valuable conceptually, but still 
requires further grounding, particularly in the context of fast-changing, emerging markets. 
From the previous sections flows the need to work under as broad as possible an integrative 
theoretical umbrella, given the interdisciplinary aspects related to the concept of governance, as 
well as the transition process Chile has experienced, as most emerging countries. 
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CHAPTER	3	-	PHILOSOPHICAL	POSTURE	&	CHOICE	OF	RESEARCH	APPROACH	
In this chapter I introduce my philosophical posture, present the reasons for doing a qualitative 
study and explain my selection of mixed-methods as methodology, integrating aspects of both 
Action Learning and Grounded Theory.  
3.1	 Philosophical	Posture.		
Johnson & Duberley (2010) offer a clear matrix map of ontological and epistemological 
perspectives, in terms of their objectivist or subjectivist character, that, although somewhat 
generic, is useful to project the researcher’s own philosophical posture. In the context of this 
research, an objectivist ontology would imply assuming that the social and economic world is 
concrete, factual and in existence, independent of human cognition (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & 
Jackson, 2008) and not constructed by “human cognitive processes”, as presupposed by a 
subjectivist ontology (Johnson & Duberley, 2000, p.180). Meanwhile, a subjectivist epistemology 
would imply presupposing that we cannot thoroughly access this collective societal world through 
completely neutral, unbiased approaches, as assumed by an objectivist epistemology. 
In my case, I feel interpreted by a combination of an objective ontology and a subjective 
epistemology, which, according with Johnson & Duberley (2000), would be compatible with three 
different schools of thinking: Pragmatism, Critical Realism and Critical Theory. These three 
perspectives, share an emancipatory sense-making and problematisation of “taken-for-granted 
social constructions of reality” and their differences seem more a matter of degree than kind (p. 
185).  
However, each theory has its own particularities: Pragmatism prioritises the evaluation of theories 
in use through their practical achievements or breakdowns. Creswell (2013) recollecting diverse 
perspectives around Pragmatism, affirms that it goes beyond specific philosophies and focuses on 
whatever works, taking research as situated in social, historical, political and economic contexts. 
Corbin & Strauss (2008) then adds, “action and interaction are crucial to Pragmatists” (p. 5). 
Critical Theory is a social theory concerned with critiquing and changing society - not only 
understanding or explaining it. Critical Theory emphasizes how an epistemic reflexivity enables 
constructing new understandings and attaining cooperation, compromise and consensus (Johnson 
& Duberley, 2000). 
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Both philosophies share the possibility of “thinking about thinking … [a process] socially and 
historically conditioned” [ibid.]. In this way, these schools of thought allow practitioners and 
researchers alike to recreate alternative interpretations and justifications, propelling a drive to the 
transformation of socio-economic reality. And, as Johnson & Duberley (2000) state, an epistemic 
reflexivity is, in of itself, a valuable resource for researchers and participants to access their own 
creative contributions and clarify their main ethical concerns.   
Anchored in the writings of Bashkar (Johnson & Duberley, 2000), Critical Realism is a scientific 
social methodology which aims at identifying the mechanisms generating social occurrences, 
while recognising that these events are in a state of flux, conversely to those of the material world, 
that are much more invariable in their status. In terms of the social world, Critical Realism 
proposes that individual agency occurs within social structures, which are recursively reproduced 
through actors’ actions. However, those actors can also reflect on their own actions, and so adjust 
their actions to reproduce social structures. Critical Realism has been re-interpreted by researchers 
such as Jessop (2005), who argue that social effects derive from exchanges between “strategically 
selective contexts” and determined “strategic reflexive actors”, searching to realize their strategic 
objectives, so giving way to a dialectical relationship between actors and context. 
In consequence, my implicit assumptions can be summarised as follows: 
• Ontology: The existence of reality does not depend of our consciousness. 
• Epistemology: Objectivist / Subjectivist, as realities can be, either scientifically perceptible or 
not directly observable. 
• Methodology: Multiple methods can help us make sense empirically and might offer genuine 
explanations and some capacity of prediction. 
• Research: Science aspires to explain and predict, which can be achieved by identifying the 
connections between facts and grasping the fundamental configurations and implicit 
connecting mechanisms. 
• Application: To identify the paradigm underlying the interrelationships between institutional 
contexts (including political, economic, social, and cultural settings) and actors’ behaviours. 
The Institutional Construction of Corporate Governance in Chile – G. Jiménez-Seminario 	
	 25	
• Substantive area-problems: Who are the main actors in the governance arena? Who are the 
key stakeholders? What processes are they involved in? What is going on? What is the situated 
context? What is the implicit paradigm guiding actors’ actions and their interactions? How can 
such paradigms be expressed? Why is a given paradigm dominant? What can be done about 
it? How is the institutional context evolving? What determines change processes? 
Comparing this philosophical positioning with the methodologies introduced below, there is a high 
degree of compatibility. The Action Learning method is coherent and even encourages a pragmatic 
outlook (Pedler, 2011; Bourner & Simpson, 2005; Bradbury, 2015), and Grounded Theory, in its 
classic version, is trans-epistemological (Loy, 2010), i.e. “epistemologically and ontologically 
neutral” (Holton, 2007, p.268), so it might readily accommodate different philosophical postures. 
3.2	 Choice	of	Qualitative	Research	
The main reason for using a qualitative research methodology was the intention to take advantage 
of the privileged and confidential access conferred by my profession as a family business strategic 
consultant – an aspect rarely available to researchers investigating corporate governance actions, 
which occur behind closed doors (Carter & Lorsch, 2013) - to explore the world of the main actors 
in the Chilean corporate governance arena.  The purpose of doing so was to gain insights into the 
world from their perspective, and by the same token, to attempt to make a contribution in 
developing an empirical knowledge-base on the trajectory of corporate governance and its 
evolution in the context of an emerging economy. 
The foundations of my analytical aim were designed to capture emerging concepts embodying the 
main experiences and interpretations of high-level participants. Naturally, this could not be 
achieved through quantitative research. 
Given the well-recognised difficulties of translating ““home” culture for audiences of others” 
(Karra & Phillips, 2008, p. 545) - particularly when such a challenge relates to the reality of 
corporate governance in emerging markets, this researcher’s home-base (Hayano, 1979) - the 
experiences shared by participants were analysed in a larger institutional context in which they are 
derived. Thus, again, a qualitative approach permitted conveying the particularities and a richness 
of what risked being viewed as peripheral realities to readers situated in the central hubs of global 
knowledge. 
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In addition, this thesis aimed at exploring a particular process of institutional change in corporate 
governance in Chile, deriving from of a series of successive and persistent events and systematic 
problems, taking the form of corporate scandals. Although the focus of the research was not 
scandals per se, these events were nevertheless the triggers to enable an opening-up of 
conversations with some of the main actors who have been central to the processes governing in 
Chile over the period under review. In consequence, the insights arising from these conversations, 
interactions and the actions of the participants could and should definitively be apprehended 
through qualitative methods to extract their richness in depth. 
3.3	 Action	Learning	Ethos	of	the	Thesis	
The University of Liverpool DBA Thesis Handbook provides the openness and flexibility 
associated to Action Learning (AL) and Action Research (AR) philosophy, which can be 
interpreted as an AL ethos, leaving the researcher the option and responsibility of choosing a 
specific methodology fitting the issue at hand. 
Although there is a major debate about what AL is, Rand (2013, p. 231) proposes six “irreducible 
elements of AL”: 
1. Action as the core of the learning process; 
2. Focusing on actual, situated problems; 
3. Using questioning, oriented to accomplish goals and to promote reflection to foster learning; 
4. Emerging learning process; 
5. Collaborative questioning and learning; and 
6. A developing aim. 
However, according with Zuber-Skerritt (2001, p. 4) AL researchers might be criticised for not 
creating “‘scientific research and theory”, as they mainly intend generating action and improving 
their own practices. Therefore, I required a complementary methodology to fulfil the requirements 
of rigor and knowledge-creation of the DBA programme. 
A related question was AL or AR? These schools run in parallel from very similar origins, 
associated with authors Reg Revans and Kurt Lewin (Zuber-Skerritt, 2001), respectively. 
However, researchers in other arenas will often tend to ignore the literature in the other (Rigg & 
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Coghlan, 2016).  However, some researchers like Coghlan and Raelin straddle both, as does the 
Australian AL, AR Association. And in fact, those active in both fields tend to agree that the 
distinction between both schools is similar to the distinction between learning and research: the 
emphasis in problem solving of the first and in disseminating knowledge of the latter (Zuber-
Skerritt, 2001). Rigg & Coglan (2016) go on to conclude that the term ‘AL research’ proposed by 
Coghlan and Coughlan (2010) reflects the triple commitment “to learning, to action and to the 
generation of ‘actionable knowledge’ (Argyris 2003). Thus, I respond to such convergence by 
using indistinctly AL or AR in the rest of this study. 
Fortunately, the AL/AR ethos offers the openness and plasticity of accommodating AL with other 
research methods. Thus, while respecting AL’s distinctive character, I next turn to the choice of 
Grounded Theory as the complementary theory generating methodology as recommended by Rand 
(2013). 
3.4	 Choosing	a	Qualitative	Research	Methodology	
The alternative qualitative methods primarily explored were case studies, narrative approaches, 
ethnography, participatory action research, and grounded theory.  
I quickly discarded phenomenology, given that I did not have a particular “object” (van Maneen, 
1990 quoted by Creswell, 2013, p.58) of human experience – not all the participants had 
experienced in first person a governance scandal, at least at the beginning of the thesis, and just 
focusing on those who had gone through such an experience would represent a serious access 
problem. In addition, I was not particularly interested in “what” participants had experienced and 
“how” they had experienced scandals (Creswell, ibid.), an approach that would turn this research 
into a more philosophical or psychological study, but in the impact of a series of scandals on 
their actual governing practices, closer to what is required in the spirit of AL. 
Ethnography was the object of my first interest, given my focus on a particular group of people – 
primary actors in the governance arena. However, ethnography focus in cultural patterns 
(behaviour, language, and interactions among group members) appeared, again, as too passive for 
an AL investigation. And its main method of participant observation was definitively outside the 
scope of this study, given the elite group I had identified as the main informers of Chilean 
governance scandals. 
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I perceived that a narrative study would be more akin to desk research and would hardly fit AL, 
given that it would focus more on written texts, and on personal stories, both approaches being far 
from the practical purpose of this work. I also thought that, in case of being able to persuade 
participants to carry and share diaries, these narratives could be valuable components of this 
research. Unfortunately, I could not see any real possibility of making that happen, given the sort 
of participant and their relationship with me (now) as a researcher, as explained in a subsequent 
section.  
The case studies methodology was an idea retained for some time, as Yin (2011)’s approach 
offered the possibility to critically analyse scandals. I soon realised that it would not make sense 
as an AL project. It would only offer a retroactive and relatively passive perspective. 
The option of developing a purist Participant AR was promising and would naturally perfectly fit 
the DBA requirement, and I kept it open for a long time. However, realising the difficulties of 
arranging meetings and the long time spent chasing up participants - despite their demonstrated 
interest in having this series of conversations -, and maintaining an open dialogue, it was obvious 
that getting them together would not be viable given the time constraints of this investigation. 
Thus, the community sense associated to PAR would be lost and the process would probably be 
destined to fail from the beginning, contradicting my pragmatic approach. 
However, influenced by the AL purpose, I set up the research project as a series of interviews 
spread over a year, with the idea of establishing a relationship with each participant in the first two 
rounds, and, at the end of the second one, inviting the participants to share and reflect on their own 
governance challenges. In fact, with most of them I found salient issues that concerned them 
directly and deserved their attention. However, as I realised during the process, they would not be 
willing to share their insights around their own issues with the depth and richness required for a 
rigorous stand-alone Action Learning project. 
Therefore, and more or less naturally, I began to converge around the idea of enriching the 
qualitative data analysis with a Grounded Theory (GT) methodology. The main reasons that drove 
me into integrating AL and GT were three: 
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1. First, the professional orientation as a scholar-practitioner attempting to conceptualise the 
daunting complexity of reality in the form of a “theory”, that is, a comprehensible 
conceptualisation of an ongoing process (Creswell, 2013); 
2. Second, the emerging nature of such research, endeavouring to flowing from practice and 
interactions matching my background and skills as consultant, aiming to capture systematically 
“what is going on” in the field; and 3. Third, the promise of GT to allow me to develop a theory that works, fits and is relevant in 
practice (Glaser, 1978) was a call that I could not resist, given my professional ambition of 
making a contribution to the actors engaged in action.	
3.5	 Choosing	Grounded	Theory	
GT was born as a way of bringing closer theory and empirical research, while appreciating the 
important advances in methods for verifying theory, GT centred in enhancing the capabilities of 
researchers to generate or discover theory solidly grounded in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
Thus, GT is an “operationalizing methodology” (Glaser, 1978, p. 2) explaining how the researcher 
should go out into the field to gather the data, the way of identifying categories through 
comparative analysis and integrating them, producing memos, sampling and composing theory; a 
process of research and theory construction “guided and integrated by the emerging theory” (ibid., 
emphasis in the original).  
The purpose of GT is the “systematic generating of theory from data, that itself is systematically 
obtained from social research” (Glaser, 1978) useful to provide “relevant predictions, 
explanations, interpretations and applications” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 73).  
Theory should be understood as “an abstract analytical schema of a process” (Creswell, 2013 p. 
63). Therefore, the condition is finding participants who have experienced such process, while the 
theoretical development should facilitate an explanation of the process that is being lived through 
and provide a framework for feed-back and – taking an AL perspective - eventually feed-forward 
the endeavours of the participants in the process, as well as to contribute to an expanding scholarly 
knowledge-base around the substantive area-problem (Creswell, 2013 Glaser, 1978; Easterby-
Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008). 
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The Grounded Theory generated should be evaluated for its abstractness, i.e. for its analytic power 
and generalizability, and for its sensitiveness to practitioners, in terms of being close enough to 
their own practices to allow them to relate such theory to their own perceptions, experiences and 
involvements (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008). However, it should be clarified that the 
resulting theory would be a substantive theory – relevant for the specific field studied, instead of 
a formal one, which would require constant comparison with a broader sample of diverse fields. 
This thesis therefore aims to build a substantive theory, following the recommendations of Glaser 
(2007) that puts formal theory well beyond the possibilities of an inexperienced researcher doing 
doctoral work. 
For all the above reasons and its intrinsic characteristics, Grounded Theory appeared as a valid, 
attractive and complementary qualitative methodology for this research. 
3.6	 Compatibility	between	Grounded	Theory	&	Action	Learning	Research	
However, how to relate GT to AL/AR? Bob Dick, a leading scholar-practitioner, has written a 
series of articles about the links and synergies between GT and AR. He posits that both share 
important similarities and differences. Among the former, both develop theories grounded in 
practice; provide flexible approaches and require responsibility (Dick, 2007). The later include 
distinct and complementary capabilities: GT builds theory from evidence. AR uses comprehension 
to inform action. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of AL is that it is often unable or unclear on how 
to analyse data and how to build a theory (Dick, 2007).  In the case of combining both 
methodologies, Dick recommends using Glaser version of GT, given its more explicit emergence 
and supplementary flexibility. Dick goes even further along the line of integrating both theories 
by reporting that many doctoral candidates and authors include GT in AR research “to remedy the 
perceived shortcomings of action research” (p. 403). The former is supposed to add rigour, while 
the later would support action, and according to Dick, who cites many recent examples, the mix is 
more powerful and critique-proof. He also clarifies that the usual process is having AR as the 
foundational methodology and adding GT to strengthen rigour and make the research process more 
systematic. In other cases, AR and GT have been used in a sequential manner (Teram, Schachter, 
& Stalker, 2005). 
Walters (2014) synergizing GT principles and AR, proposes an innovative model of practitioner 
research developed from a case study based on the development of a UK high-school attempting 
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to implant a formative assessment system. Walters’ research adopts an AR methodology, in which 
he acts as both a participant and a researcher, using GT to enrich the AR model. He also reports 
that several researchers have been combining GT and AR adopting it as a methodological 
approach. These include Dick (2007) mentioned above, Simmons & Gregory (2003), Poonamallee 
(2009), and Butterfield (2009). Indeed, Simmons & Gregory (2003) have developed ‘grounded 
action’, in which GT provides the methodology to define a theory, while Grounded Action (GA) 
is the way to operationalize a transformative action. Poonamalle (2009) develops a GT analysis of 
sacred Hinduist texts integrated with a PAR on an Indian community. Butterfield (2009) uses a 
social constructivist approach integrating both GT and AR to stimulate the successful practice and 
enjoyment of reading at the school level. 
Therefore, given my need to pragmatically enrich AL/AR with GT methods, while not committing 
to their full packages, I found an emerging and promissory support in the literature. Thus, in this 
research I started with an AR broad purpose, developing a GT research to enrich the theory 
generation and including a subsequent AR loop as evaluation process of the GT developed. 
3.7	 Choosing	a	Grounded	Theory	School	
How to choose between the diverse GT schools? Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson (2009) dictum 
is that a researcher should not only be aware of the different varieties of GT, but also be prepared 
to justify a personal position vis-à-vis such alternatives, when presenting the research.  
The differences between the three GT versions all arise from the original departure from Glaser 
and Strauss, which might have been catalysed by the influence of the arrival of Corbin as a student 
and then collaborator of Strauss (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & Jackson, 2008). And although it has 
been attributed to ontological and epistemological distinctions (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe & 
Jackson, 2008) the supra-epistemological and ontological perspectives of Glaser, argued by his 
close collaborator - Holton (2007) - would indicate that the main differences are non-existent.   
Creswell (2013) attributes the breakup to differences in attributed meanings and techniques of GT. 
However, both schools of thought tend to follow a striking parallel in many aspects despite the 
diverse nomenclatures used, the conditional matrix or paradigm model of Corbin & Strauss (2008) 
can be perfectly accommodated as a particular case within the 17 sociological families proposed 
by Glaser (1978).  
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In addition, Charmaz (2006) has initiated a new constructivist school of GT, positioning her 
approach as a reaction to the ‘objectivist’ approaches of both Glaser and Strauss - marking another 
similarity between both schools of GT - (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008) and emphasizing more the 
voices of individuals than the methods (Creswell, 2013). However, Charmaz (2006) is less 
systematic about the process and has even challenged one of the essential elements of GT, the 
purpose of studying a basic social process or core variable (Creswell, 2013; Bryant & Charmaz, 
2007). Therefore, given my inexperience and the need to decode a method that seemed appropriate 
and attractive, but quite difficult to apprehend, I decided to look for a more structured and guided 
approach. So, I was left between the Corbin & Strauss and Glaserian schools. 
At this stage, I decided to look at doctoral theses related to corporate governance (CG) using GT, 
and found a series of GT dissertations about CG, and even more interesting for my own purposes, 
such studies were situated in emerging countries and recommended a GT approach to undertake 
these kinds of studies in non-developed country contexts (Boadu, 2013; Sorour, 2011; Ibrahim, 
2013). The entire collection of thesis found in this preliminary search used the Corbin & Strauss 
variety of GT. So, I decided first to study this version.  
However, the analysis of such works and attempting to apply the procedures established by Corbin 
& Strauss (2008) to my own data – already in process of accumulation through the initial round of 
interviews and being incipiently open coded (more about this process in Chapter 4 - Methodology 
& Conceptual Development) were both quite disappointing: I felt that using Corbin & Strauss 
(2008; 2010)’s was like ‘painting-by-numbers’, as it tended to pre-determinate categories and to 
producing tautological results, preventing the emergence of fresh insights – the attribute I valued 
most with the possibilities offered by GT. Later, I found out that these unsatisfactory results were 
parallel to the reservations of Bryant & Charmaz (2007), with the mechanical application of Corbin 
& Strauss’ axial coding and conditional matrix that tended to rely excessively on “preconceived 
prescriptions” (p. 9). And I would make my own Bryant & Charmaz (2007)’s motto that techniques 
“should earn their way into their respective methodological repertoires for their specific research 
problems” (ibid.). 
In consequence, I embarked to study Glaser’s ‘Classic Grounded Theory’ school through his books 
and attending a “Troubleshooting Seminar” run by Barney Glaser, with the collaboration of Judith 
Holton and Andrew Lowe in San Francisco in November 2015. The guidelines received, including 
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personal coaching and feedback from leading faculty members and participants, and the posterior 
study of Glaser books (1965, 1978; 1998, 1999, 2007) persuaded me that I had found the required 
level of flexibility and rigour. 
Hence, I proceeded with a ‘Classic’ Grounded Theory (CGT) turn in my thesis, while recognizing 
that given both the work developed up-to-that-date and the required AR/AL ethos of the thesis, I 
would not be able to commit to the full “package” of CGT, as done by many well-published 
researchers (including Charmaz, op. cit.). Therefore, I adjusted the subsequent procedures to fit, 
in the measure of the possible at this stage, the demanding tenets of GT, without compromising 
the AR spirit of the research.	  
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CHAPTER	4	-	METHODOLOGY	&	CONCEPTUAL	DEVELOPMENT		
This chapter closely follows Chapter 3 as I engage with the methodology selected previously to 
present the process of conceptual development undertaken to produce an emerging Grounded 
Theory, fully developed in Chapter 7. This chapter comprises three parts. The first part provides 
an overview of the Action Research process, including access, interactions with participants, the 
‘action turn’ and ex-post evaluation. The second part presents the Grounded Theory analysis: 
constant comparison and its outcome, the development of conceptual memos, the emergence of 
concepts, and the integration of concepts around a basic social process. In the third part of the 
chapter, I account for the conceptual development of an emerging theory, making explicit how it 
emerged and was developed. 
The research work started as a qualitative approach, with the attention placed on emerging 
elements from the field study, which would allow me to identify the specificities of the fieldwork 
interactions to choose a specific method. Thus, it can be said, the investigation was approached 
with an open spirit, attentive to emerging elements from the field study that would ultimately lead 
to the choice of a more specific method. Thus, volume, quality and data-type guided me to the 
chosen methodology. 
The research methodology also deepened my comprehension of the promises and limitations of 
alternative qualitative techniques permitting to gain an increasing appreciation of the alternative 
ways of approaching the phenomena emerging from the fieldwork. 
Therefore, the methodology evolved during the research process, selectively combining induction 
and deduction at different stages and becoming more focused, rigorous and deliberate, while 
retaining an inductive inclination. 
4.1	 Selective	Combination	of	GT	&	AR	Methods	
Figure	1 presents the sequence of activities developed; distinguishing the GT and AR aspects to 
convey a sense of how both methods interacted and informed the theory development process. The 
figure illustrates the temporal arrangement and the incessant influence of the ongoing institutional 
context during the research process.  
As the figure shows the process started with an initial sensitization stage reviewing broadly the 
main streams of literature (presented in   
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review)– an activity developed before integrating GT consistent with Lo 
(2016).  The production of reflective and conceptual memos accompanied the whole process. For 
the sake of simplicity, the horizontal links and recursive actions between the activities, are not 
shown. The figure reflects the temporal sequencing between all developments, driving to the 
emerging grounded theory.  
Figure	1	-	Grounded	Theory	&	Action	Research	Interactive	Process	
 
The landmarks of the process are illustrated in Figure	 1 that emphasizes the theoretical 
development, and its three key processes:  
1. The selection of a matching sociological family that allowed conceptualising the macro social 
processes, thus contributing to integrating conceptually the data and making sense of the main 
actions developed by the participants  
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2. The recognition of the sociological family chosen as properties of the basic social process 
identified as the core category and anchor of this research project; 
3. The formulation of the emerging substantive theory and its set of corresponding theoretical 
propositions. 
Following CGT, the research process does not include verification, given that the theory should 
be taken as a proposition to be evaluated by the communities of practitioners and scholars. CGT 
establishes that the evaluation of a grounded theory should be done in terms of four criteria: it fits, 
it works, it is relevant, and it is open to be modified according with the apparition of new data, 
including new literature, given that “all is data” (Glaser, 1978). In this thesis given the parallel GT 
and AR processes, the evaluation was organised to coincide with the last cycle of the AR 
procedure, evaluating the process and the learning. Next, I explain both research processes and 
their integration.   
4.2	 Action	Research	Process	
Coughlan & Coghlan (2008, p.247), propose an AR cycle that includes: (a) context and purpose, 
(b) diagnosing, (c) planning action, (d) taking action, (e) evaluating action and returning to (b), as 
a cyclical process in which a theory should emerge. 
a) Context: The Chilean setting and its evolution over time is introduced in Chapter 5. 
b) Purpose: The broad purpose of this research since the beginning of the investigation was to 
explore the trajectory of the development of the understanding and practices of corporate 
governance in Chile, to make sense of what is going on in boards of directors and to reflect 
critically about it. 
c) Planning Action: The question guiding the process was how to advance from freely expressed 
opinions about crises into valuable disclosure of inner governance realities, key concerns as 
directors, and relevant insights as active actors conforming boards. A questioning process 
guided by Action Learning/Action Research methodology was the approach to make 
participants reflect about their own realities, focus their attention on their own key challenges 
and commit with an actual purpose relevant to their own professional practices, and then 
attempt to make change happen, and overall to attempt to learn from the experience. That is 
why the original questions were posed under the spirit of AL’s “Qs” conceived as mobilisers 
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of reflection, action and learning (Pedler, 2011; Revans, 1981, 1983, 2011), and consequently 
they were deliberately broad and generic, and went around the generic question: “How do main 
actors in the corporate governance arena are addressing the corporate scandals in their 
professional practices?”. 
d) Taking Action: Corporate governance understanding and practices are volatile, intangible 
subjects, difficult to approach directly. Perceptions and social dynamics play an important role, 
but so do human attempts to save face and hide in front of adversity. In addition, the duty of 
confidentiality as well as internal solidarity might prevent full access to inside information of 
board realities for research purposes (Hill 2012; McNulty & Pettigrew 1999), making relevant 
data virtually inaccessible, with few notorious exceptions (for example, Pick, 2007; Leblanc 
and Gillies 2005). Consequently, the approach selected was to focus research interactions with 
informers around the subject of corporate governance scandals, an “out there” topic, currently 
hotly debated in the Chilean business community, thus spontaneously enticing people to 
provide opinions and express critical reflections, facilitating in this way the access to key 
informers, and avoiding intimidating and, conversely, trying initially to stimulate them to 
openly share their views. 
e) Evaluating Action: The “engaging” approach selected was to progressively attempt to turn 
informers into actual reflexive and action oriented participants by shifting their perspectives 
from “there and then” to “here and now”, that is, to drive and help them focus on their actual 
experiences and challenges governing in practice, in a context of rapid change and increased 
expectations about the roles and responsibilities of board members (Letza, Smallman, Sun & 
Kirkbride, 2011). This was done with the deliberate -although tactically hidden- purpose of 
transforming standard interviews into a virtual “learning set” (Pedler, 2011), in which 
participants would not only respond to unstructured and general answers from the researcher, 
but would have the chance to reflect, learn the ones from the others using the researcher as a 
communicating vessel and eventually commit internally to some sort of action, including the 
chance of influencing others in their own communities of practice around governing activities. 
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4.2.1	Selecting	Key	Participants	
A group of well-informed “insiders” aware of realities within major corporate boards was required 
to help developing an understanding of realities “behind closed doors” and to capture the nuances 
of changing behaviours. 
The selection process started identifying through the business press some of the main actors 
systematically active in the governance landscape, to then taking contact with them, asking for a 
meeting to introduce the research and attempt to enlist them as informers and finally, requesting 
them to suggest names of potential participants, or just noting their suggestions about other high-
profile actors that might have interesting experiences to share. Such snowfall sampling process 
(commonly used in family business research, see for instance Bjornberg and Nicholson, 2012) was 
“both deliberate and emergent” (Dacin et al., 2010, p.1399). It also considered the network effects 
associated to the elite context of participants.  
Taking into consideration the most repeated names and using the researcher’s insights and 
connections as consultant and academic, 16 persons were approached, I met 15 personally, 14 
accepted to participate, and 12 were finally selected according with their willingness to participate, 
commitment with the one-year process, and their uniqueness as kind of participant. The number 
made sense in terms of the requirements of time, and was the maximum I consider I could manage 
within the timeframe of the thesis. It also matched the relatively small number of participants in 
AR projects (and was also compatible with GT usual sample sizes). Below I share more details on 
the manner I approached them, how I secured access and why I think they were willing to 
cooperate, and the degree of credibility that could be attributed to their responses. 
According with the University of Liverpool’s Ethics Committee’s regulations, the identity of the 
selected participants is kept confidential and they were given code names. 
The participants collectively implied a sound theoretical sampling in terms of presenting a broad 
diversity of perspectives, experiences, background and ages. Thus they provide a fair and 
knowable representation of Chile’s governance “system”, given that the main actors were 
included: leading members of business groups, financial investors, foreign investors, government 
officers, board leaders of both state-owned and private enterprises, regulators, risk-rating agencies, 
pension funds, business associations, the social sector, politicians, the media and new 
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entrepreneurs, as well as independent board members and professionals working closely with 
boards and shareholders.  
At the same time, the participants are diverse in other aspects: in terms of their political orientation, 
professions, gender, origin, social outlook; namely, a foreigner, a woman, two left-wing 
politicians–businessmen, one right-wing professional, two former government senior officers, an 
entrepreneur, a social leader, two lawyers, a sociologist, three economists, two managers, two 
engineers, two financiers, two members of Chile’s leading business groups, three independent 
professionals, two linked to foreign investors, three leaders of business associations. The approach 
followed was in line with series of studies by Terry McNulty, Andrew Pettigrew and colleagues 
researching with qualitative techniques the realities of managerial elites and board members 
(McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas, 2013; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1996 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1996; McNulty et al., 2011; McNulty & Steward, 2015; Pick, 2007). 
The participants had another –potential- key role to play. As they are not just passive followers of 
governance norms, structures and practices, but leaders, movers and shakers in many aspects and 
multiple fields of activity, and consequently they could be expected –within certain structural 
limits- to eventually attempt to move the envelope of possibilities, practices and behaviours within 
their own worlds of practice. And thus, they could support the explicit aim of this investigation to 
move away from an externally focused, positivist study of an unchangeable reality, to allow an 
Action Research around a potentially live change process (Bradbury, 2015; Poonamallee, 2009; 
Simmons, 2006; Dick, 2007; Butterfield, 2009). 
4.2.2	Interviewing	Process	
An interview protocol had been developed, formed mainly by open questions (see Appendix 2 – 
Questions). The interview protocol was reviewed after the first three interviews, corrected and 
used for the remaining nine ones. In general questions took a chronological perspective, starting 
by reviewing the past scandals, checking the present perspective on good and bad governance and 
attempting to anticipate changes on governance, including board duties and responsibilities and 
tasks, regulation and social expectations. Questions centred on the major cases, their causes, 
impact and derived learning. 
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The 12 participants were interviewed in three rounds: the first one to examine past scandals and 
former governance practices changes they had personally experimented. The second, to discuss 
future scenarios and to identify an area in which the participant would like to see some change 
happen. The subjects tackled varied from changes in board practices, board design, board 
orientation, to somehow broader attempts of creating a culture of risk management, facilitating 
mutual understanding between diverse public stakeholders, among others.  
Prior to the third round, the participants were given a set of questions both as a reminder of the 
commitment and an observation tool to help focus their attention on the governing processes they 
were going through. These centred on the question: “what’s going on in your board”. 
The third interview was originally oriented to collect experiences, learning, processes and as well 
as successes and failures whilst attempting to make change happen to overcome their own 
governance challenges. 
As explained above and presented in Figure	1, the interviewing process included the following 
steps: 
a) Preliminary Contact - Negotiating access: The participants were contacted by email followed 
by a phone call request to meet me. I had short introductory meetings with each participant in 
their offices, averaging approximately 30 minutes where I told them about the study. I also 
informed them of the conditions of confidentiality established by the Ethics Committee and 
they signed an agreement. The agreement also indicated that they were to hold three subsequent 
meetings in a period of about one year. At the outset, the requests coming from a moderately 
well-known professor from a recognized school probably helped secure the initial access, as 
well as providing the required level of confidence for them to agree to a series of conversations. 
They were all aware that our conversations would be recorded, and that the information 
managed privately and securely. That said, they did not seem overly concerned about 
confidentiality – I attribute this to their intuitive trust in Anglo-Saxon confidentiality standards; 
to their familiarity in talking to the press and to academics; and, most importantly, to their 
concern to share upsetting events, on equal terms. 
b) First Round - Establishing rapport: The first round of meetings allowed me to generate an 
initial level of interpersonal trust. No one ever mentioned the issue of confidentiality, but two 
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of them asked me to turn off my recorder; once in the first round, when they shared private 
conversations with third parties or matters with legal implications. At this stage, I began to 
discern that they really wanted to speak their minds about such candent issues and in a safe 
environment. Some participants also openly stated that they expected/hoped to influence others 
through this study. Most of them appeared to relaxed and happy in talking to an interested 
listener. The subjects covered in these interviews were mainly focussed on discussing the main 
governance scandals, their impacts and the learning they left behind. Table 1 presents the dates 
and duration of the first round of meetings. 
Table	1	-	First	Round	-	Interview	Statistics	
 
c) Second Round - Taking stock of governing issues: This round of interviews had two distinct 
parts. The first related to the foreseeable (likely) evolution of the corporate governance system 
and their position vis-à-vis such possibility. The second part built upon the level of 
interpersonal trust created with the researcher and was focussed on questioning the interviewee 
about his/her own governance issues and the way she was dealing or attempting to deal with 
such challenges. Two of them could not identify, or (more likely) were unwilling to share any 
personal CG challenges (REF and BPO). After this round of interviews this researcher felt 
elated about the chance of having these primary actors in governance report on their 
endeavours. However, as the days passed by, I realised that it was probably an unfounded 
illusion and that the likelihood of receiving direct, clear and complete reports would be 
minimal - as turned out to be the case. 
 
 
 
	 Code-Name	 Date	 Duration	
BUI	 18	November	2014	 01:11:18	
LAW	 18	November	2014	 00:53:01	
ENT	 21	November	2014	 01:08:05	
FIN	 03	December	2014	 01:24:03	
PHI	 04	December	2014	 00:48:02	
MAN	 22	December	2014	 00:38:	54	
GUI	 22	December	2014	 00:46:23	
SOP	 07	January	2015	 00:46:19	
REG	 12	January	2015	 01:26:00	
BPO	 14	January	2015	 01:06:18	
REF	 27	January	2015	 00:37:	27	
PEN	 14	April	2015	 00:33:58	
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Table	2	-	Second	Round	-	Interview	Statistics	
 
d) Third Round - Evaluating and feedback & feed-forward exercises: The third round allowed me 
to confirm that – as expected - the participants had not really taken to heart the idea of acting 
on their challenges.  They didn’t have the time, or simply were unwilling to share the steps 
they had taken, beyond their more generic expressions of interest. There were, however, three 
exceptions (PHI, PEN and ENT), all of whom were going through major change processes or 
crises and were more than willing to discuss their reactions, fears and/or the opportunities they 
saw for change. Beyond looking to check up on progress on participants’ challenges, this round 
was designed to present a preliminary outline of the emerging theory, based on the 6Cs – see 
Figure 3.  It was an opportunity to both provide feedback to the participants and receive their 
comments. Reponses and reactions are presented in Chapter 7 - Emerging Theory & 
Discussion. 
In general, all participants stated their appreciation of the conversations as a reflection on the 
opportunities and expressed their agreement with the emerging conceptualization. One in 
particular (SOP) expressed his expectation that this work might help push the business 
community towards self-reflection and ‘creative introspection’. 
Table	3	-	Third	Round	-	Interview	Statistics	
 
Code-Name	 Date	 Duration	
BUI	 09	April	2015	 00:59:02	
LAW	 09	April	2015	 01:10:10	
ENT	 17	April	2015	 00:51:02	
FIN	 09	April	2015	 00:36:22	
PHI	 22	October	2015	 01:29:50	
MAN	 25	June	2015	 00:38:53	
GUI	 07	July	2015	 00:55:37	
SOP	 24	April	2015	 00:45:02	
REG	 06	April	2015	 01:27:00	
BPO	 14	May	2015	 01:03:04	
REF	 08	April	2015	 01:18:	01	
PEN	 14	April	2015	 00:34:26		
Code-Name	 Date	 Duration	
BUI	 15	December	2015	 00:49:55	
LAW	 03	December	2015	 00:39:06	
ENT	 14	January	2015	 00:49:16	
FIN	 13	January	2016	 01:08:30	
PHI	 04	May	2016	 00:48:02	
MAN	 13	May	2015	 00:36:	42	
GUI	 05	April	2016	 00:49:09	
SOP	 29	March	2016	 00:51:20	
REG	 21	May	2016	 00:34:30	
BPO	 02	December	2015	 01:12:02	
REF	 14	December	2015	 00:37:	27	
PEN	 06	May	2016	 01:00:01		
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4.3	 Reconciling	Action	Research	with	Grounded	Theory	Methods		
4.3.1	A	Preliminary	or	a	Posteriori	Literature	Review?	
As explained above, my research process had started with a brief review of the history scandals in 
Chile and the extant literature with a view to preparing my research proposal, designing the 
research strategy, and deciding best on the sorts of relevant questions that should be posed to the 
participants, including potential relevant action to be taken by the participants. I followed Lo 
(2016), whose writing within the classic GT paradigm, differentiated three stages regarding the 
literature: An initial, preliminary sensitizing process, vis-à-vis the literature, taking an open 
perspective to the data. Second, a continual stage of literature revision, which aimed at saturating 
the theoretical categories; this time taking a more focused approach to develop an integrative 
analytical strategy. And, finally, an overlapping and more reflective and abstract recursive stage, 
with an aim to contextualize my research, synthesizing the literature identified in the earlier stages 
with the triangulated empirical data, the emerging theory and the extant literature.  
In general, I used the tenets of GT in the handling the literature, as suggested by Lo (2016) and 
Walsh (2014), so combining literature and empirical data. 
Figure 2 - Combining Literature and Empirical Data 
 
Data	slice	1	
(Qualita.ve	
data)	
Data	slice	2	
(Literature	
review)	
Theory	
(proposi.ons)	
	
Adapted	from	Walsh	(2014,	p.54)	
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4.3.2	Interviews	or	Conversations?	
As explained above, the first two rounds comprised general interviews, featuring open questions, 
as suggested by AR. However, the broad outlook of such interactions soon turned into broader 
conversations, featuring the free flow of speech by the participants - all of whom are senior, 
experienced professionals – very used and willing to speak their minds.  These open conversations 
were most likely helped by the personal philosophy of this researcher and training as consultant, 
where clients are encouraged to voice their thoughts, expectations and feelings in a highly 
emotional and charged context. 
4.3.3	Proper-lining	or	Basic-lining?	
I reviewed the interviews once more, carefully looking for distinctions across the thoughts, feelings 
and actions expressed by each participant. I also made a point of using the last (3rd stage) interview 
to probe deeper with each participant to check the consistency of their expressed views – to avoid 
receiving a “proper-line” instead of their “basic-line” (Glaser, 2015) of opinion. I then cross-
checked (without giving an information away about other participants) the behaviours, as seen by 
other players involved in the ‘small corporate world’ of Chilean corporate governance (Kogut, 
2012). I also reviewed press cuttings and public speeches in which they figured (SOP, PHI, BPO 
and LAW). 
4.3.4	Research	Question	or	Problem?	
Although GT does not officially use research questions, it incorporates many implicit questions or 
aspects to observe, such as: “what is going on?” “What is the participant’s main concern?” “What 
are participants doing to solve their issues? What process is used to deal with the problems? 
Therefore, in this way I was able to adapt my questions and make them compatible with both GT 
and AR. My original research questions then evolved into the following ones: 
• What is going on in the corporate governance arena? 
• What are the main actors in the governance arena doing about CG? and 
• What new can be learned about CG? 
I think that such questions represented not only a compromise solution between both 
methodological streams, but was also faithful to their respective spirits, while also being consistent 
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with the pragmatic approach I adopted as a guide for my interactions with the participants during 
the three stages of fieldwork and throughout my research. 
4.4	 Qualitative	Data	Analysis	
4.4.1	Qualitative	Data	Analysis	Process.	
Transcripts of the conversations with the participants were produced, read (and listened to), several 
times. The process of reading/listening allowed me to take detailed, hand-written notes and draft 
informal memos to myself to assist in identifying and exploring ideas about coding categories and 
the relationships between the salient concepts. 
Moreover, I developed a manual open coding process after the first few interviews to check 
transcriptions in detail - line-by-line - initially by hand and identify potentially relevant concepts. 
After developing several categories, where relevant, the data from subsequent interviews was then 
compiled and assigned to these categories. Contrasts between interviews were soon established 
and, therefore, some new categories were created, others were then combined, and some were – 
after a while - dismissed. As the data began accumulating, I began codifying using NVivo software.  
With this, there followed an on-going process of computer-aided revision of the classification of 
all data into the established categories. This was done to facilitate the creation of cases from each 
of the three interview stages. 
This initial process wavered between pure inductive extraction of categories and the more 
deductive search of subjects. However, the proliferation of data made it extremely difficult to re-
integrate broken (incomplete) pieces of information. As a result, there were around 100 
categories (see in Appendix 3). However, unfortunately, not much sense could be gleaned from 
such large variety without an organizing framework. 
The second process of the data analysis occurred, when I began comparing my data with that of 
the 26 sociological families proposed by Glaser (1978; 1998), to make sense of the information 
collected. Finally, the sociological family of 6Cs was used, given I saw a clear fit as a way to 
organise the information (see Figure 3). 
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Figure	3	-	Sociological	Family	
 
I then started analysing the 6Cs to check for a fit and, after some trials (see Appendix 4 - Attempts 
to Fit the 6Cs Sociological Family), and the production of a series of reflective memos (See 
Appendix 5 - Sample Conceptual Memos) I observed that I could at last make sense of what was 
going on by capturing most of the variation in the data and, at the same time, integrating the long 
list of categories created in the previous stage of the research project, and so get to organise them 
into Higher Level Themes (Dacin et al., 2010).  After that, Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, 
Table 9 and Table 10, presented in Chapter 5 were developed. As will be seen, the concepts in 
these tables were derived from an analysis of the categories, properties and indicators and then 
related to illustrative data. 
Next, the literature was used to enriching the categories to what Dacin et al. (2010) call Aggregate 
Theoretical Dimensions, that is Grounded Abstracts concepts assisted by contributions from the 
literature (see Chapter 6 - Theoretical Sampling). This allowed me to theoretically saturate the 
themes and extend the potential applicability of these dimensions to a wider range of situations. 
The combination of illustrative data, minutes and memos, specified the substance under the 
categories, which became the properties of the emerging basic social process, and its sub-
processes. Thus, the outcome was the emergence of a “developmental” theory, reflecting a social 
change process (Glaser & Strauss, 2009 pp: 109-113). 
Glaser´s	(1978,	p.74)	6	Cs	Family	
CONTEXT	
CONDITION	
CAUSES	 CONSEQUENCES	
COVARIANCE	
CONTINGENCY	
A	
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The analysis of the key sub-processes led to the conceptual “explanation of how processes actually 
process problems” (Glaser, 1978) of this research. 
4.4.2	The	‘Grounded	Action’	Turn.	
The actions being developed by the participants – analysed beyond their own statements - were 
identified by analysing, conceptualising and typifying patterns of behaviour. The next step was to 
share the general conceptualisation to which I had arrived with participants and get their direct 
feedback. This allowed me to enrich, challenge and refine each concept. Finally, three postures 
were consolidated in terms of their concepts, categories, and properties, as well as being illustrated 
with representative data. Thus, I developed a conceptualisation of the ongoing action and the 
participants themselves were included in an evaluation loop completed as the final AR/AL cycle. 
4.5	 The	Emergence	of	a	Substantive	Grounded	Theory		In	 this	 section	 I	 introduce	 the	 development	 of	Minding	 the	 Corporate	 Governing	 Gap,	 its	emergence	and	its	development.	The	research	project	had	three	clear	landmarks.	
1. The	first	one	was	the	election	of	a	sociological	family	to	model	the	data.	And,	as	presented	in	Chapter	5	this	helped	me	identify	the	6Cs	involved	in	the	social	process:	the	Context,	
Causes,	Condition,	Covariance,	Contingencies	 and	Consequences.	This	 conceptual	 clarity	facilitated	the	process	of	organizing	and	integrating	the	data,	as	broken	down	into	the	open	coding	process.	This	made	the	whole	processes	of	densifying	and	saturating	these	6	 concepts	 that	 much	 easier,	 in	 terms	 of	 identifying	 and	 completing	 indicators,	properties,	dimensions,	and	categories.	2. The	 second	 was	 provided	 by	 the	 literature	 revision	 that,	 as	 Langley	 (1999)	 poses,	contributed	to	enrich	the	theoretical	aggregates	of	the	concepts	identified	previously.	It	also	 served	 to	 subsequently	 place	 the	 emerging	 theory	 among	 extant	 literature	 (see	
Chapter	6	-	Theoretical	Sampling).	3. The	 third	 was	 the	 identification	 of	 the	 basic	 social	 process:	 Minding	 the	 Corporate	
Governing	Gap,	as	it	brought	out	the	dynamic	perspective	of	the	interplay	between	the	
institutional	context,	the	concern	of	main	actors	involved	in	governance,	and	the	role	of	
institutional	entrepreneurs,	flagging	up	how	participants	process	the	problems	faced.	
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From	these	3	sub-processes,	and	underlying	 institutional	 logics	were	 identified	reflecting	different	stages	of	development	(Chapter	7	-	Emerging	Theory	&	Discussion).		
4.6	 Evaluation	Phase	The	 resulting	 theory	 was	 shared	 and	 presented	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 audiences	 to	 which	 the	researched	has	privileged	access	-	friendly	board	members,	members	of	the	Chilean	business	elite,	foreign	directors	and	senior	executives	–	with	a	view	to	gaining	their	qualified	feedback.		This	was	used	in	the	evaluation	phase.	Table	4	illustrates	some	of	the	feedback	received.	
Table	4	-	Feedback	from	Board	Members	
 
	
Codename	
	
	
COMMENTS	
	
QUESTIONS/EXPECTATIONS/	
SUGGESTIONS	
BER		 “it	looks	very	good	to	me,	sophisticated,	and	at	the	same	time,	clear.	Quite	spectacular	to	say	the	truth….		I	like	the	clarity	and	consistency	with	which	the	reader	can	contrast	it	with	his	own	observations”	
“…perhaps	as	an	open	question	or	critique.	Like	most	new	models	and	concepts,	it	ends	with	a	X	state	,	as	if	it	was	the	end	of	the	history.	We	know	it	is	not	like	that,	so	what	will	come	next?	[my	own]	candidates:	ecology,	crisis	of	democracy,	demographic	[changes],	evolution…”	
ROL	 “I	see	what	you	describe	in	your	model	as	a	complex	evolutionary	system,	…	as	mechanical,	biological	or	social	forces	that	once	they	reach	certain	threshold	they	carry	you	with	them	and	they	tend	to	precipitate	another	following	stage…like	what	you	can	see	in	the	evolution	of	plants,	animals	or	men…”	
“Analysing	this	I	conclude	that	we	were	wrong	entering	into	that	environmental	business,	as	we	did	not	expect	the	level	of	social	and	political	turmoil	we	experienced.	If	we	had	known	this	we	would	have	stayed	out	of	this	business”	
FIF	 “each	stage	adds	complexity,	and	make	this	an	ever	expanding	and	increasingly	complex	system…”	 “What	is	the	connection	with	what	is	going	on	abroad?…we	are	not	alone…what	are	doing	the	Scandinavians,	Canadians	….?”	
GEK	 “….it	is	as	we	were	speaking	of	the	lack	or	loss	of	certainty	instead	of	uncertainty”	 ---	
DIE	 “I	see	that	we	are	going	through	cycles	with	time	windows	each	time	more	shorter”		 “…	some	actors	capitalise	a	short	span	of	popularity	to	benefit	from	their	power	over	masses,	so	perhaps	popularity	is	a	variable	in	your	model	for	those	institutional	entrepreneurs	you	are	studying…anyway	what	they	all	are	searching	at	the	end	are	economic	rents…so	even	if	it	is	a	social	world,	still	you	need	to	have	a	3%	of	your	budget	to	pay	fees	to	different	leaders	of	social	movements	to	have	some	level	of	peace”		
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Although informal, the spontaneous feedback received is indicative of the actors during action the 
theory has some degree of workability, fits their experience and is still open to be changed in case 
of obtaining additional or improved information, as required in Grounded Theory. This point is 
further analysed in Chapter 8 - Conclusions.	
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CHAPTER	5	-	DATA	ANALYSIS		
This chapter summarizes the conceptualization of data and the emergence of a practical theory 
grounded in that data. This elaboration was conceptualised progressively, beginning with the 
inductive open coding, followed by theoretical coding, deductive theoretical and selective 
sampling, complemented with literature revision, and the production of 97 memos – see Appendix 
5 - Sample Conceptual Memos.  In the process, several conceptual families (Glaser, 1978) were 
applied to evaluate their best fit with the data, finally selecting one, and using it to make further 
sense of the data. The next – and most challenging - step involved identifying the implicit central 
basic social process. Once found, this core variable allowed me to conceptualise its associated 
basic social sub-processes.  
This theory-building process follows Glaser & Strauss (1967), namely in identifying an 
area/problem, accessing participants involved in the area, engaging in open conversations with 
these participants, all with the aim of finding out just “what is going on”, in terms of what are their 
concerns are and how they are seeking to resolve the problem.  
The open coding process was carried out using the questions suggested by Charmaz (2006, p. 53): 
• What process is at issue here? How can I define it? 
• How does this process develop? 
• How do the participants act while involved in this process? 
• What do the participants profess to think and feel while involved in this process? 
• What might his/her observed behaviour indicate? 
• When, why and how does the process change? 
• What are the consequences of the process?” 
As with Charmaz (2006)’ experience in her study, developing a series of interviews of the same 
participants, the repeated contact with participants allowed me to observe how their expressed 
emotions, actions and interactions evolved over time. This allowed me to draw comparisons 
between similar and dissimilar incidents and so identify patterns and conceptualise significant 
processes (Charmaz, 2006).  
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In summary, the process helped me identify a basic social process (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006), 
defined by Glaser as “the process processing the problem”.  This is what the participants in my 
research experienced. 
5.1	 A	Sociological	Family	to	Make	Sense	of	the	Data.	
The first round of open coding encompassed the results from 24 interviews and produced literally 
hundreds of different concepts that were more descriptive than conceptual.  Thus, they were very 
difficult to organise in a coherent manner. So, taking a lead directly from Glaser (2015) I used the 
6Cs Family as a framework to make sense of the open categories.  
At the same time, I heeded the warning provided by Professor Andy Lowe (2015) “Grounded 
Theory is not suited to deal with other people’s abstract concerns, but to study their problems 
directly” and informed the conceptualisation process. Figure 4 summarizes my application of the 
6Cs Family. 
Figure	4	-	6Cs	Sociological	Family	Application	
 
The main purpose of this family of codes is to reunite disintegrated data during the open coding 
process, while tying open coding categories together and so obtaining more accurate, 
comprehensive and systemic explanations about phenomena under study (Strauss and Corbin, 
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1998). As Strauss & Corbin (1990) have warned, Open and Theoretical Coding (axial) occurs 
sequentially and simultaneously, while a recursive process is developed. 
5.1.1	Context:	Market	Institutional	Logic.		
Strauss & Corbin (1998, p. 101) define context as the particular set of structural, social and 
economic circumstances that happen in a specific time and place within which the occurrences or 
problems to which individuals respond through actions are generated and so might help understand 
them. Thus, I needed to ask from the data what are the set of structural settings within which the 
corporate governance scandals occurred? 
To make sense of the context I complement the interviews with an analysis of the historical 
socioeconomic setting established in Chile during a period of forty-three years (1973-2016), 
presented in Appendix 6 - Chilean Context, which I conceptualise in Chapter 6 with extant 
literature. I use this historical background as complementary data.  
Table 5 presents representative data from interviews illustrating the previous analysis, its 
properties and the main associated categories. 
Table 5 - Evolving Institutional Logics 
CONCEPT CATEGORIES PROPERTIES ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Multiple 
Institutional 
Logics 
Chicago/Friedman 
economic logic as 
a central axis of 
Chilean 
institutional 
framework. 
Political/state 
logic co-existing. 
Emerging Social 
logic. 
Chicago logic as a dominant 
ideology. Chicago profiles in 
management and 
governance. Chicago 
economists transformed in 
dominant actors. 
Discredit of Chicago 
influence. 
Changes in logics. 
A political/state logic is 
present 
A humanistic, social logic is 
arising. 	
“…the firm did not adapt to the change in the country, got dizzy 
with its success. Why change if it’s successful? ... This change made 
obsolete one way of being in business. Firms are still very 
influenced by … the Chicago ideology. That logic vindicated them 
and made them feel enthusiastic. The free-market orientation of the 
[democratic governments] was a pleasant surprise... The 
justification of the profit maximization was that it improved society. 
With collusions, the Polar [fraud] and others [problems] the 
justification of business fell apart. The amoral logic. I never had a 
course in ethics in Catholic University. Ethics is a personal problem 
…the way of being a businessman has changed in Chile. We cannot 
continue with the logics of 20-or-more years [ago]…” (BPO-1) 
“… I pay my taxes and I offer employment … [while] I pay my 
suppliers after 90 days rather than 30 days. This is the negation of 
the capacity of providing value to the people, it is not enough … this 
[Milton] Friedman model did great harm to us” (GUI-1)  
“… I care about the relationship with the local community, where 
we are going to put a plant. Are we OK with unions? There are 
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boards that focus on the financial aspects, this is the skill of 
managers; … in Chile managers are very Chicago. We have to 
encourage them to be more humanist… managers who do not read 
newspapers, books, who do not look at the world, who are gauche 
with authorities…” [LAW-2]  
“…the board is too homogeneous. Everyone is a Chicago [alum]…” 
[PHI-3] 
“… the Chicago of yesterday are still today’s incumbents. They 
have forgotten everything.” [ENT-1] 
“…clearly the Chilean model is one of the most [liberal], radical in 
the world. The essence of the current government and its followers 
is to dogmatically dismantle every single trace of the structure 
created by the Chicago Boys…” [PEN-1] 
“…There is an [over] simplification of the thinking of Milton 
Friedman in this… Chicago thinking, which were relatively trivial 
by being instrumental in the privatizations, … because … our 
entrepreneurial development is very associated with the State” 
[SOP-1] 
 
Therefore, the predominant institutional logic defining the context that remained unchallenged for 
forty years can be associated to economic logic – finding inspiration in Milton Friedman and the 
Chicago free-market model implemented in Chile and maintained relatively inalterable throughout 
most of the period. 
Summarizing the conceptualization, it can be argued that the social facts that were transformed 
into institutions were an authoritarian government accompanied of a liberal economic system. 
Thus, individuals were conditioned to act not so much as citizens but more like economic actors. 
This encouraged their individual actions to focus on profit and self-maximization, reinforcing the 
institutional logic and making economic individualism and personal satisfying a core basic social 
processes of the period, consequently generating a mechanistic and very prosperous system that 
fed/promoted the notion of materialistic reality. 
Different international studies such as that of United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 
2015) observe that despite the unbalanced weight of the dominant logic and its widely recognized 
economic success (Krugman, 2014), towards the end of the period this achievement appears 
increasingly confronted by an emerging institutional logic of individual autonomy and rebellion 
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against factual powers. This is anchored in a widespread social empowerment (MIT professor Ben 
Ross Schneider interviewed by Guzmán, 2016). As an outcome of this contest of logics in the 
Chilean press, different surveys (Bicentenario Survey, 2015) and social networks regularly show 
strong criticism of the dominant groups, including the government and the political parties, and 
the result was a generalized loss of trust by the public-at-large in most private and public 
organizations (Encuesta Nacional Bicentenario UC - Adimark, 2015; UNDP, 2015).   
The data provide support to a maximizing logic as predominant in the period, such national macro 
logic has been maintained during 40 years despite major societal and economic changes. However, 
almost all participants in this research commented spontaneously the increasingly adversarial 
atmosphere towards the institutional logic gaining momentum during the last part of the period 
under study. So, to understand more in depth these tensions, in the next section I discuss the 
behaviours of the dominant groups during the period that represent the conditional aspect of the 
6Cs Family – see Figure 3. 
5.1.2	Condition:	Uncertainty-Reducing	Practices	&	Impression	Management	
Having analysed the context, and noticing the predominant economic logic flows, the next 
question: what conditions mitigated or accelerated the institutional context’s influence driving 
towards corporate governance scandals? 
In a nutshell, participants tend to share the attribution of scandals to old structures (FIN-1), 
interests (FIN-1), mindsets (MAN-1), habits (REF-1), protocols (REG-1), actors (PHI-1), 
dynasties (ENT-1), norms of behaviour (LAW-1) prevailing and preventing boards from taking a 
more self-critical (PHI-1), creative (SOP-2), or taking an introspective perspective (SOP-2).   
The conditions can be briefly described as a relatively small business class formed by powerful 
incumbents controlling most large business in highly concentrated industries; barriers of entry into 
banking services, instituted by conservative laws; a broker-controlled stock market, an 
authoritarian cultural heritage of the 17-year-long authoritarian regime still fresh in the memory 
of businesspeople, due to its economic success; and unbalanced educational advantages of mid-
high social classes in a setting of still deep economic inequalities (MAN-1; REG-1; ENT-1). 
A fortuitous encounter with a well-known industrialist in August 2014 produced the in vivo quote: 
“Chile is not a country, it is a country club” referred as how a senior member of the Obama 
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Administration perceived and characterised the Chilean context. Later, the press quoted the 
industrialist and the concept (Guendelman, 2015).  
Such contextual situation was quickly visualised in the interviews as participants refer 
systematically to groups of individuals having a sense of entitlement (ENT-1), feeling special 
(PEN-1), being self-referent for generations (REF-2), seeing themselves as more virtuous than the 
average due to their religious practices (SOP-2), most of them belonging to the same social group 
(BIP-1), acting as social tokens of virtue and distinction (PHI-1), while having crossed economic 
interests (FIN-1). These actors correspond to what one participant calls the “industrialist tribe” 
(LAW-1). This excludes new entrepreneurs, who are seen as young and powerless underdogs, and 
are identified as a different crowd by part of the population (GUI-1). In addition, several of the 
participants identified themselves as part of the traditional Country Club (MAN-1; GUI-1; PHI-1; 
ENT-1).  Almost all other participants were identified as forming part of the elite, by the rest of 
the group (of participants). 
After testing it with several participants I decided to keep the Country Club in vivo code to 
conceptualise the institutional condition, given that, according with some participants, it can 
encompass slightly diverse categories, mentioned at different stages of interviews by the 
participants, such as:  
• Business (including traditional Business or Industrial Associations, Banking System, Capital 
Market, the Santiago Stock Exchange, Family Business Groups, etc.); 
• Politics (the Political System, the so called “Red Set” formed by high-profile socialist leaders, 
technocrats or high-level professionals involved in the government, who have developed close 
links with the business class); 
• The “Economic Right” or traditional capitalists, formed by the landowning traditional 
aristocracy and modern industrialists; 
• The Army or the armed forces, etc.; 
• High-profile social networks (Socio-Economic Elites, a person’s informal networks, groups of 
upper-class, close friends, etc.); 
• Communications people (Media Owners, key TV figures, etc.); 
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• Religious groups (Catholic Church, Opus Dei, Legionnaires of Christ, etc.); 
These categories helped identify the properties associated with each category (such as power, 
resources, information, etc.) and the corresponding indicators (members, arenas, stakeholders, 
public profile, etc.). 
The Country Club concept cannot be conceptualised as unique or concentric, as it clearly has 
different intersections among these categories (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). These include; 
structural holes remarked by one of the participants [FIN-1] between people participating in the 
same industry, due to different intellectual or social backgrounds, who might not know each other 
– or just slightly so - despite the assumption, in such a sense, by the rest of the people (FIN-3). 
Thus, the Club could be considered more as a network, given minimal degrees of separation among 
the actors. However, it succeeds in conveying the meaning given by participants to a group of 
dominant players, active in an particular area, who tend to be seen as loosely structured, while 
conforming to relatively closed group (being the degree of closeness and formality empirical 
properties depending on each particular club segment analysed). Participants readily perceive the 
Country Club as traditional and conservative. It is called elite by some participants (SOP-1-2; FIN-
3), and seen as sharing socio-economic similarities, acting in its own benefit as an incumbent 
group, and often acting against newcomers, in terms of preventing their entrance into the Club or, 
more precisely, to specific industries (ENT-1-2-3). They are perceived as clearly distinct from the 
public at large. Despite this picture of a relatively conservative group, traditionally associated with 
right-wing actors, the concept includes certain variation in terms of its members political 
affiliation. It comprises members of the left-wing, who are have become leading politicians in 
since the return to democracy in 1990, and who are currently perceived as part of the modern 
national elite. 
One participant vividly describes the Country Club impact when sharing his frustration as a new 
entrepreneur attempting to compete against incumbents “who are not indexed to outcomes, people 
who think they deserve what they have, given who they are” (ENT-1). 
Another participant describes the traditional Santiago Stock Exchange as “old structures, 
interlocking interests” (FIN-1), exhibiting flagrant conflicts of interest. 
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The Country Club context can be understood as generic; thus, it can be affirmed that the Country 
Club conceptualisation allows capturing an impersonal, timeless, setting-neutral context, as 
suggested by Glaser (1978). Therefore, it might be suggested that the Country Club could be 
conceptualised as the dominant players or incumbents in an institutional setting. 
Such rules, according to some participants, would imply certain expected social behaviours. For 
instance, a participant mentioned as requisites: an orderly, or at least discrete, personal life (LAW-
1); attending specific churches or educating children in particular high-schools (SOP-1), as well 
as corporate governance etiquette associated with respecting minority shareholders, dealing 
properly with managers, respecting governance structures (LAW-1), offering family owners 
appropriate advice (PHI-1), and keeping in mind corporate social responsibilities, (LAW-1), in 
addition to respecting ecological concerns (MAN-1), and acting with transparency (LAW-1). 
However, these rules might not be fully respected by some members of the Club, due to a lack of 
self-critical reflexivity, a sense of superiority or by a sensation of untouchability (GUI-1; SOP-2; 
ENT-1; PEN-1). 
Therefore, a gap between espoused practices and practices-in-use is manifest and produces 
anecdotal evidence of some degree of impression management. 
The following Table 6 provides illustrative data, analyses the main properties and suggests the 
underlying primary categories associated to the Country Club conceptualisation. 
Table 6 - Country Club Condition 
CONCEPT CATEGORIES PROPERTIES ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Country 
Club 
network  
Traditional, 
social and 
economic elites.  
Technocrats. 
Politicians. 
Media icons. 
Top 
professionals, 
such as 
financiers, 
lawyers and 
managers. 
Feeling part of a social 
network, enjoying 
privileged conditions.  
Social advantages inherited 
and naturalised.  
A self-referent group. 
“[they] feel that anything is possible. License to gain… feeling self-
important, untouchable… A lack of restraint that goes beyond 
money…” (LAW-1) 
“we, industrialists… have many tools to weaken, nullify competition”. 
(BUI-1) 
“…in the DNA for many generations… they do not take the new laws 
seriously … boards are circles among very few people.” (REF-3) 
“They give themselves many awards… people believe that their 
viewpoint has a halo, that they are better than others…”[SOP-1] 
“… this would require industrialists to be much harsher, punishing 
those that have gone astray and so demonstrate that they are the bad 
apple,… they don’t suffer derision easily…” [SOP-1/2]  
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“Laws are frames that can be bent … a sense of entitlement… 
overvaluation of personal added value” (FIN-1) 
Managing 
Impression  
Social norms. 
Reputation 
issues. 
Tacit expectations of 
appropriate practices of 
those belonging/ entering 
the Country Club. 
Preserving the group’s 
reputation. 
Maintaining pretence of 
good behaviour. 
“…this is a legalist country, but an astute one, …there is a relativity in 
business… dodge legal aspects, not directly violating the law, make it 
appear ethically correct, but basically incorrect.” (REF-3) 
“You didn’t ask for permission to become rich; have gone from being 
an employee to being rich without realising that some norms need to be 
respected as part of the tribe of industrialists… acting correctly… even 
in your personal life…” (LAW-1) 
“[incumbents] believe their own publicity” [ENT-1] 
Resisting 
change 
Delayed 
insights. 
Blocking 
changes. 
Delayed comprehension: 
• Excessively	long	tenures	
• Lack	of	self-criticism	
• Lack	of	reflection	
• Sense	of	self	importance		
Taking power for granted 
No incentive to change  
Sense of entitlement 
Overestimating personal 
contribution 
Loss of reality check. 
“The Stock Exchange was stuck. Permanent re-election.” (LAW-1) 
“Everything seems normal... a spiral you cannot quit. The firm is 
missing reflection, reality check., not reading what is happening in the 
world.” (PHI-1) 
“… business take for granted its importance and expect the president to 
visit them and to explain her policies.” (PHI-1) 
“We have a dominant position… auto-complacency is easy, thinking 
that we have power per se, that we are not going to lose it. … 4 groups 
dominate 98% of retail… easy to lose humility.” (PHI-1) 
“…Feeling untouchable. The silence of the business class. Secret 
negotiations. Bad faith.” (LAW-1) 
“No trust. Perfect argument to maintain status quo.” (ENT-1) 
Summarising the Country Club concept captures an esprit de corps including ethos, interests and 
norms expected-to-be-respected by insiders to protect the reputation of the Club. Likewise, 
common interests of Country Club members reflect the objectives of maintaining control, making 
selective use of laws and using self-governance and wit to bend ethics, while maintaining the 
concern of preserving an untarnished reputation, at least superficially.  
Whilst the structural economic context is characterised by few players, with certain business 
groups controlling concentrated industries in a small country with unequal distribution of wealth 
and - existing but challenging - progress opportunities for upstarts. The Country Club is typified 
as exhibiting delayed insights, resisting change and attempting to put obstacles in front of emerging 
social and economic forces.  
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In an opportunistic exchange of opinions with an acquaintance with a long career as CFO of 
leading business groups, when hearing about my research, he spontaneously confided: “I have 
witnessed grotesque conflicts of interests of controlling groups against the bests interests of the 
company they serve as directors, … stone-faced, without modesty, not ashamed of themselves on 
the least, and in front of all the board, watching without saying anything!!! And I say it in plural, 
many cases” (DOG, 2016, personal communication) and when I asked him why he thought that 
could happen, he answered: “because they are who they are: the rationale is how influent they are, 
the money they have got, the small group of referents with whom they have dinner, …the son 
married with …, being relative of… etc.” (ibid.).  
5.1.3	Causes:	Institutional	Entrepreneurship.		
Strauss & Corbin (1990) define causes as occurrences, instances or goings-on that lead to the 
occurrence of a phenomenon or influence it. Thus, my question to the data is what happenings are 
tensioning the context in the arena of corporate governance? 
I would summarise that according with the interviewees a set of long-time established pre-
conditions, derived of the historical context, appear to be clashing against recent social and 
economic developments generating a highly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous scenario. 
Participants tend to agree that the traditional context analysed above is currently being tensioned 
by a set of increasingly empowered stakeholders. Some of them mention that the entrance of 
pension funds opened the doors for the participation of a wide variety of minority investors in the 
Chilean capital market. Adding that those new actors are not easily silenced, that they actively 
fight for their rights and are increasingly able to successfully challenge majority shareholders, 
often with the support of diverse parties such as specialised lawyers and some increasing level of 
protection provided by regulations and authorities (REF-1; FIN-1).  
One participant (FIN) described a situation in which he and his fellow minority investors had hard 
time attempting to challenge a transaction of a major corporation with one of its related business 
units independently listed in the stock exchange that affected negatively minority shareholders. At 
the starting point of the conflict he was informed by the company officers in friendly albeit 
patronizing terms: “don’t bother us, don’t lose your time, FIN, we never lose this kind of legal 
trials” [FIN-1] After two presentations dismissed by regulators, FIN and his co-investors kept 
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insisting for years to be heard, to be finally compensated by the corporation with the consequence 
that a top manager of the controlling corporation was removed from his job as result of the affaire. 
The recent trends causing turbulence include the sustained expansion in the number of newcomers 
into the investment community -including small investors and activist investors-, the continued 
professionalization of -closely monitored- pension funds investing activities (REF-1). REF (1) 
refers to the rebellion of minority shareholders demanding more complete information, enjoying 
many rights and denouncing incidents ending as governance scandals.  
These stakeholders can also comprehend communities. For example, the local rebellions against 
large corporations contaminating natural areas, in special the case of dying swans in southern Chile 
due to contamination of a river by a plywood plant and the equally polemic case of a bad-smelling 
plant processing pigs that was successfully battled by the community and that was subsequently 
closed down by decision of its controlling-owner. Both cases are frequently cited by participants, 
stressing the outcome of both plants paralysed with the consequent loss of hundreds of million 
dollars in investments and related jobs [BUI-1; MAN-1; BPO-1].  
ENT (1) describes his own entrepreneurial serial disruption of mature industries as a professional 
vocation to attempt democratizing sectors, business and social activities. 
Besides the obvious possibilities offered by new technologies for social networking, interactive 
communications and fast diffusion processes, these have had the effect of favouring social 
peership, a major effect in the context of a traditional highly hierarchical society (Guzmán, 2016). 
Thus, the public opinion has been increasingly able to provide feedback to big business, thus 
reinforcing the power of these new tools and the attractiveness of using (and abusing) them. Thus, 
a participant (ENT-3) mentioned the case of the polemic chairman of a football club, who entered 
incognito into the chamber of a referee at a stadium in the mid time of a football match, denying 
the fact afterwards, without realising his public exposition in an event in which every spectator is 
potentially a cameraman. Another participant (BPO-1) cited the book by Foreign Affairs editor, 
Moises Naim, The End of Power (2014), to illustrate the loss of power of different entities, 
including the Catholic Church, corporations and government, among others in front of the public-
at-large. 
The Institutional Construction of Corporate Governance in Chile – G. Jiménez-Seminario 	
	 61	
Other factors are thousands of new entrepreneurs (ENT-1), more robust regulatory agencies (REG-
1-2), assertive fiscals investigating economic offenses eager of ventilating through the press their 
findings and self-promote their moves (BUI-1), and the recent strict ruling of justice against two 
well-known businessmen that ended in jail – harsh punishments not seen in Chile in more than 
twenty years.  
In addition, an empowered society fuelled by independent new media, and a young and vibrant 
democracy, as well as by 30 years of economic progress and social development (REG-1). Society 
has grown intolerant of discriminations, rejecting the sense of entitlement of some of the new 
players –alien to the widely perceived traditional austerity of leading family businesses (LAW-1). 
The scenario is compounded by the aggressive actions of a left-wing government, with low level 
of public support, carrying a series of polemic re-foundational reforms, with uncertain effects, in 
the middle of an economic crisis (PHI-1).  
Rules broken include collusions, frauds, systematic exploitation of minority shareholders, 
environmental crises, corruption, insider dealing, public officers in the private roll of business 
groups, illegal political financing by business, tax evasion and managerial abuses, among others. 
Some add to the offenses the non-transparent privatization process by the Pinochet Regime in the 
80s that ended with some formerly state-owned companies in hands of those in charge of 
privatizing them –many of these subsequently involved in scandals (SOP-1; BUI-1; GUI-1; BOP-
1). 
Therefore, according with participants a change process is under way, although it’s ending point 
is unknown, and the situation is seen by some observers as ‘liquid’, unstable, volatile (SOP-2). 
Some change has already happened (BUI-1; GUI-1; LAW-1), but certain members of elites are 
still resisting it, and might continue doing so (SOP-1). According with participants more social 
control, and increased expectations of transparency and accountability are being put in place 
(REG-1). So resisting parties continue falling down and experiencing a negative social reaction –
often verbal offenses in the streets and public sanctions are perceived as stronger punishment than 
the lagged reaction of courts of justice- and according with some, some seem unable to realise 
what is going on around them [SOP-1].  
Therefore, some call for a creative introspection to find a way ahead (SOP-2). This seems to put a 
special pressure on boards as the main governance bodies [PHI-1]. And therefore, adopting new 
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professional practices appear as a necessary change for many interviewees (GUI-1; LAW-1; 
MAN-1-2) and according to some participants (MAN-1; BUI-1, LAW-1) -although not all of them 
(SOP-1, for instance disagrees)- a change process might be (slowly) going on. 
Table 7 shows illustrative data, its main properties and proposes the underlying main categories 
associated to Institutional Entrepreneurship as a causal condition. 
Table	7	-	Institutional	Entrepreneurship	
CONCEPT CATEGORIES PROPERTIES ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Institutional 
entrepreneurs 
Challenging the 
Status Quo. 
Empowerment of 
emergent 
stakeholders  
New stakeholders 
accessing more 
information and 
supported by laws and 
other actors acting 
with more autonomy. 
Empowering. 
Requesting 
accountability. 
“there is a spread extension of socio-economic groups investing … 
minority shareholders have invested in many companies, they are 
protected by new legal regulations … these laws require companies to 
provide complete information and reinforce the rights of minority 
shareholders, who attend the AGM … rebel and denounce [abuses], 
driving the situation to end as new corporate scandals” (REF-2) 
“…there is an immense socio-cultural transformation… in which people 
are better informed and have more antennae … and an economy that is 
changing fast and these things are not adjusted for, so we are living a 
moment of readjustment … that is why the logic of yearning after the 
past time, when things worked differently is not at all useful.” [SOP-2] 
	 Stakeholder 
distrust. 
Asymmetric 
interrelations no longer 
tolerated. 
“the country has difficulty in achieving basic interpersonal trust… there 
is a resentment of minority shareholders, consumers, users, and workers 
against the complicity of public and private sectors. All the weak ones 
who are many in the country feel that they are in relationships of perfect 
asymmetry…they always screw you … people are full of expectations to 
alleviate their situations” (SOP-1)  
“… a UN study concluded that the greatest problem of Chile, …, which 
prevents full development is the low level of interpersonal trust … your 
word does not mean anything without legal records …. Everything works 
over complex levels of regulation, while capitalisms are much more 
dynamic than that…” (SOP-1) 
“… there is some polarisation vis à vis business, …instead of being a 
natural part of the economic design, that creates progress, it is an object 
of suspicion, hence the need to be treated like toddlers, lads who are 
always putting themselves and others in danger” (SOP-1) 
“…citizens are not prepared to accept (mock-ups), it is not enough to 
respect the law, ethics need to be considered” (REF-3) 
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	 Strengthening 
social control 	
Expectations of 
transparent and 
consistent actions  
Ethical demands v. 
market abuses 
“The values of society have changed as part of the social networks and 
the public discussion of laws. The media reflects these discussions in 
parliament, and opinions appear, and there are change in values going on. 
And this affects institutional investors, especially those that have relevant 
social functions, such as pension funds. Things that happened in the past 
are socially questioned today: so, what did you do to stop this? … and 
did you prosecute those executives or not? And if you did not sue them, 
why didn’t you do so it if they acted illegally and you lost money? and 
the money that you are managing belongs to the Chilean workers? So, 
you must make best efforts to avoid been assessed as negligent and you 
must go to the very end with it. So, there is a great social demand on 
investors, especially pension fund and insurance companies and who 
have a responsibility for the workings of the country’s social security 
system. So, they are obliged, they do not have option, they need to act, 
and that is what they have been doing in the few last years. If the past a 
would-be private conversation with an executive, today needs to be 
public. Actions are becoming visible to society. People like to know that 
they are complying with their duties”. (REG-1) 
“the important thing is that the public humour vis-a-vis free enterprise, 
market, and capitalism has changed …the Polar [scandal] case happened 
in a very complicated moment because at that time the Piñera (centre-
right wing) government was facing the students movement, that had 
ethical arguments with a symbolic-cultural content about public 
education, not a wish list, just when the market economy produced a case 
of abuses against the poorest people who shopped in these retail stores” 
[SOP-2] 
The causes driving the (current) process can be related to the empowering of stakeholders 
combined with their lack of trust in institutions, and the widespread distrust of traditional elites. 
At the same time, the empowerment of people has facilitated the emergence of expectations of 
new institutional logics, related to higher standards of transparency, and more consistent 
behaviours, all under a more stringent social control generating a more effective public 
accountability. In terms of governance this brings an increased attentiveness to corporate practices 
by extremely alert and demanding stakeholders. 
However, the observation of the categories of current institutional entrepreneurs, namely students, 
public prosecutors, regulators, pension funds, normal citizens, among others, implies recognizing 
the roles of previous institutional entrepreneurs, such as the Chicago Boys who built the main 
modern economic institutions, and the centre-left politicians and technocrats who led the 
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democratic transition, rebuilding the representative institutions of the country after the 
dictatorship. 
For instance, the young Minister of Work serving in 1980, who observes the heavy deficit carried 
by the state to pay the retirement of workers and contrasts the collectivist ideology of such old 
system with the individualist logic dominating the country those years.  His subsequently design 
of a new-to-the-world private pension fund fuelled by individual pension savings was one of the 
most relevant institutional developments of the period –few years later widely imitated around the 
globe.  
5.1.4	Covariance:	Regulatory	Upgrading	&	Enforcement		
Glaser (1978, p.74) introduces the idea of covariance in his coding families as connected variables 
developing in parallel, co-evolving, thus having some relationship, but although not having direct 
causality, yet still able to exercise certain influence, to explain a phenomenon. 
In this section the question is what circumstances coevolved with the causal conditions around the 
corporate scandals? The changes in regulation are systematically seen as both causes and 
consequences of scandals. The former is seen as manifestation of voids of the regulatory system 
permitting sustained abuses and generating public outcry. The scandals are catalysers of new 
mechanisms, such as self-denunciation by members of cartels and enlarged powers of investigation 
of regulatory agencies and public prosecutors.  
The participants have a wide range of views about the status and evolution of regulation. For some 
they are still underdeveloped [ENT-1]; for others they have been steadily progressing as part of 
the incorporation of Chile to OECD countries [REG-2], although they still have a way to go; and 
for some there is already a high standard that the business community is not enough aware of 
[REF-1]. However, in general regulatory bodies are perceived as a force to be increasingly 
reckoned with.  
As part of such evolution some participants stress the historically high fines and harsh penal 
measures involved in the last sanctions to those involved in governance scandals compared with 
milder traditional punishments [FIN-1; 2]. Although other participants are puzzled by parallel, not 
well coordinated, and even contradictory [BUI-2] initiatives of public prosecution, tax and 
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regulatory agencies. Some observers see such discrepancies as demonstration of independence, 
autonomy and part of the inner strength of institutions in Chile [REF-2]. 
Table 8 shows illustrative data, analyses its main properties and proposes the underlying main 
categories associated to the updating of regulation. 
Table	8	-	Updating	&	Enforcing	Regulation	
CONCEPTS CATEGORIES PROPERTIES ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Regulatory 
Activism 
Updating & 
Enforcing  
Consistent 
upgrading of the 
regulatory 
system. 
Global regulatory 
convergence. 
Inconsistent 
enforcement 
among different 
agencies. 
Regulation 
becoming a force 
to be reckoned 
with. 
The process of updating 
the regulation has some 
features: 
• It	is	externally	demanded	due	to	the	inclusion	of	Chile	in	the	OECD	
• It	lags	behind	the	speed	of	the	market	evolution,		
• It	requires	permanent	update	
Crises propel a drive 
towards upgrading 
processes. 
Upgrading is part of the 
process associated to 
economic development. 
There is still a 
precarious civil servant 
system in place, which 
affects efficiency of 
regulatory institutions 
(watchdogs). 
Regulation is still not 
proactive. 
Tougher sanctions are 
producing an impact 
and a change in 
behaviours. 
“…authority is slower vis-a-vis the velocity of the market... Authority 
sends minutes and letters....” (FIN-1) 
“[it is required] to permanently up-date norms, because new forms of 
breaking them keep appearing …” (PHI-1) 
“crises become challenges for companies to improve… from crisis to crisis 
the country progresses, takes advantage of them and solves them… crises 
mark Chile, which is still adolescent in its development… reactions to 
scandals drive an evolutionary process…”. (REG-2) 
“Chile has travelling on a good path. That is why there is a scandal when 
these things happen… many things that were usually done will be 
forbidden. It is the only way for Chile to become a developed country. 
Good institutions create GDP”. (REG-2)  
“…autonomous institutions are needed, with teeth, few rules, but with 
absolute clarity about their objectives, to comply and to demonstrate that 
they are doing what they were created for. This requires appropriate 
leaders… institutions are conceptually well organised, but badly led …”. 
(PEN-2) 
“Regulatory supervision does not function well enough; known cases were 
discovered by whistle-blowers, not by the proactive actions of 
authorities…  until Mr Délano and Mr Lavín were put in jail, no one 
thought this could occur”. (SOP-2) 
“Boards are paying more attention to the new Law about money 
laundering and drug trafficking. Firms might even be wound up. Sanctions 
are worse when boards do not take corrective actions. For instance, 
collusion or illegal financing of politicians. Major change in company 
governance. This thing changed! There are things that cannot be done 
anymore. There is preoccupation for compliance, turnarounds...” [REF-2] 
“… I am surprised how many different visions of the State have been 
arising among state agencies, just like that, sectorial and group-
based…including political perspectives. They are taking very influent 
decisions, …, the Prosecutor suddenly said: this is like that, and began 
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Boards are beginning to 
take stock of this update 
in laws and regulations. 
There is a simultaneous 
stirring process of 
different justice and 
regulatory agencies, 
producing perplexity, 
confusion and 
misalignments 
The changes are seen to 
be positive and required 
to reinforce the 
institutional strength of 
the country;	
shooting and spreading a problem difficult to stop now, courts, IRS, 
everyone has its own agenda…” (BUI-2) 
“… institutions are working well, and I expect they will continue doing so, 
that there will not be underground deals to hide [affaires], or to go for a 
clean new start, … people are not unable to accept that, today”. (BUI-2) 
“I believe that Chile has had a positive evolution in the few last years, 
standards have been improving, and demands too … and the facts that 
have driven to crises…have led to legal reforms, with major impact in the 
culture of companies, and in boards and in their corporate governance”. 
(REG-2) 
“In Chile in the last 20 years there has been significant institutional 
change, in the securities market, insurance and in all financial markets, 
also in preserving competition… and protecting markets. With a growing, 
ever more complex economy, now there is antitrust, electrical regulation, 
sanitary regulation that have been renovated or developed in the last years. 
So new institutions have been renewed, for instance to protect consumers, 
because there have also been abused…” (REG-1) 
“…the laws have changed, the company law has changed, the norms and 
minutes of the Chilean SEC have also changed. And the demands for 
information and responsibilities at board-level are much larger than they 
used to be.” (BOP-1) 
“…putting people in jail modifies behaviours” [FIN-2] 
Consequently, participants observe that traditional arrangements are being increasingly challenged 
and that boards (and companies) are subject to conflicting calls, resulting in an increased level of 
uncertainty and volatility when compared with the old certainties. This brings a loss of 
predictability. Therefore, a fuzzy logic seems to be the order-of-the-day, in which tolerance, 
deviation and discipline go together and are overriding the old certainties of previous governance 
logics. 
5.1.5	Contingencies:	Scandals	Making	Transparent	Governance	Deviance		
Merriam-Webster online Dictionary defines “contingency” as a “juncture whose outcome will 
make a decisive difference”, which is a critical connection or intervening factor that produces a 
significant effect (normally negative). In this research, the main contingencies identified by the 
participants are the corporate governance scandals. So, the question is what produced them? 
The following Table 9 shows illustrative data, analysing the main properties of corporate 
governance scandals and proposing the underlying categories associated with the process of 
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making the incidence of previously hidden events more transparent to the general public and 
leading producing public turmoil. 
Table	9	-	Scandals	Making	Transparent	Corporate	Deviance	
CONCEPT CATEGORIES PROPERTIES ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Making 
Transparent 
Corporate 
Deviance. 
Making 
transparent 
incidents as a 
catalyst for 
scandals.	
Extended access to information has 
been exposing irregular procedures, 
conducts and mismanagement of 
conflicts of interests, collusion and 
frauds affecting public-at-large.  
An increased level of transparency is 
increasingly available and expected. 
Expectations of consistent behaviour 
and information on what leaders are up 
to. 
Considering actions of leaders as 
public facts, so subject to open 
scrutiny. 
Transparency occupies a central 
position. 
Most incidents (scandals) have come 
into the public domain because of 
internal whistle-blowers, ratting, 
international and leaks. 
Transparency as a catalyser of 
scandals. 
Transparency as specific expectation of 
society. 
Aggressive leaking of information by 
authorities. 
Corporate deviance becoming 
transparent. 
“… due to increased transparency, we have had a cascade 
of cases that have exposed the ugly aspects, because they 
are all deceptions of public faith, taking advantage of 
private information, violating legal obligations, tax 
evasion, so an ethical discussion arises, …. I cannot say 
that it is worse than in the past, but the cases are better 
known than before, there is more transparency in society to 
learn about it” (BOP-1) 
“… we now live in a much more transparent world, today 
you cannot hide things, because there is a high capacity of 
accessing loose information… having secrets is much more 
limited …” (BOP-1) 
“… information leak by [whistle-blower] Hugo Bravo who 
sang as a canary and told it all in the Penta scandal 
episode…” (REF-1) 
“…as soon as State agencies discover dirty facts they 
ventilate them publicly…” (BUI-2) 
“… press has played a great role in publishing this or that 
sanction. The sanction for many is in the press, not in the 
prosecutor... of late, the press and media in general have 
acted well. Denouncing everything, sometimes 
exaggerating, they have been unfair, but mostly in right 
measure. They may exaggerate, offend people more than 
what they deserve, but they are never too lost”. (LAW-1) 
“…today, what is saving Chile … is transparency. Today 
we are transparent. We have learnt the hard way. We have 
learnt to see our friends fall”. (LAW-1) 
Making transparent (or putting information on private events into the public domain) is the key 
basic social process that has been going on, whether through leaked information, self-accusations, 
and investigations by regulatory agencies and prosecutors. The media plays an important role in 
disseminating these events. The return of democracy has given the press greater degrees of 
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freedom. The appearance of electronic media and social networks has only served to amplify the 
process [BUI-2]. 
Corporate deviance is what becomes transparent in such processes. Behaviours in direct conflict 
with a company’s corporate image, official declarations and public, as well as private, 
expectations. This gave rise to the series of corporate scandals; reinforcing the fall of public trust 
in elites, including key political and business bodies and players. 
Hence, the impact of deviance is not limited to culpable actors. Thus, there is a phenomenon of 
categorization that drives to spread the loss of legitimacy as a reaction to individual cases of 
organizational deviance.  
Therefore, corporate scandals lay bare layers of objectivity by putting into question the 
predominant institutional corporate governance logic and setting in motion the gears facilitating 
the emergence of competing logics. 
5.1.6	Consequences:	Social	Accountability	of	Elites	
Consequences can be defined à la Strauss & Corbin (1998) as outcomes or interactions or failures 
of persons or groups to respond to the situation created by their dealings. Consequences are the 
last of the six properties of the basic social process responding the question: “what is going on?” 
around corporate governance scandals. And as such it is directly and indirectly influenced by the 
five previous “Cs”: context is present as the predominant institutional logic; condition reflects the 
surface corporate governance compliance derived from delayed understanding of the ongoing 
social processes; causes are generated by newly empowered actors problematizing the status quo 
and pressuring the institutional arrangements out of its traditional stability by questioning 
governance practices; covariance is the increasingly updated and enforced regulation giving 
leverage to those challenging the established governance practices; and contingencies act as 
catalysers of change by revealing the gaps (deviances) of governance practices in use.  
Therefore, the consequences are an outcome of former interactions, and represent what is at stake 
in the current predicament and potentially a drive towards new institutional arrangements. The 
following statements from participants help to visualise stakes and ongoing –and future- 
consequences (see Table 10). 
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Table	10	-	Corporate	Governance	Challenges	
CONCEPT CATEGORIES PROPERTIES & 
INDICATORS 
ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Making 
Elites 
Accountable 
	
Corporate stigma.  
Corporate social 
accountability. 
Social demands to 
business. 
Disconnection of 
business and 
society. 
Forcing a search 
for new 
governance 
answers. 
Governance scandals have 
tarnished the reputation of big 
business. 
Immorality is perceived as a 
common property among 
business. 
The high concentration of 
markets exacerbates the impact 
of scandals; and its consequent 
effect on public opinion. 
A prevailing sense of impunity 
and lack of justice. 
The social impact includes the 
stigma of the business class. 
Industrialists are seen as alien 
tycoons and not a normal part 
of society. 
An increasing conviction that 
conduct of companies should 
be responsible on their own, 
beyond the will of their owners 
and, thus, be more accountable 
to society. 
Some degree of social 
decomposition. 
Social demand for corporate 
social accountability. 
“That means that there is an sickness installed at the top of 
companies that is terribly strong … those industrialists who own 
the companies who do not react in front of this [case] … the whole 
system enters into a spiral, fed by one and other and other and 
other case, … the legitimacy of the private enterprise is at stake in 
the country … and big businesses are more relevant in Chile, 
where there is a very high level of market concentration … so a 
trait of immorality in the construction of these companies, given 
their monopolistic power, has an effect of moral decomposition on 
the whole system ” (BPO-1) 
“The case of Bilbao and Hurtado [insider trading scandal] is about 
using privileged information [obtained] as part of the board of the 
company … they have just given USD92 million as guarantee to 
the SEC, so it is a case of immorality in the leadership of a 
company, [which is] easier to get away with here than in the US, 
… so there is a feeling of impunity around this, which speaks of a 
very damaged corporate culture”. (BPO-1) 
“…the persons involved [in several scandals] have very relevant 
positions in the Chilean business world and were very prestigious, 
so the way they managed themselves has surprised many people, 
and several among them have ended very damaged. That is why 
these cases have had such a great impact” (MAN-1) 
“…the current trajectory is that business is becoming more social 
both internally and externally…so everything becomes part of the 
responsibility of the firm, … more subject to social scrutiny than 
ever before …” (BPO-1) 
“…classical industrialists got lost when they locked themselves up 
on a crystal tower and the Chileans stopped seeing them as 
common people … walking the streets” (PHI-2) 
The consequences can be broadly conceptualised as a social demand for accountability from 
corporate elites in terms of their governing practices. That is, stakeholders’ expectations are 
presenting challenges and social demands to governing elites, which according with participants 
to date have not been up to these requests. Consequently, there is a loss of public trust and a heavy 
loss of legitimacy of political and business elites, as well as some level of social decomposition in 
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the forces governing the country. This situation is making corporate elites accountable and thus 
threatening with tarnishing their identities (Glaser, 2015, personal communication). 
This situation is consistent with the reality of Chile being a small country, with a mid-level of 
economic development, a still unequal distribution of income with a limited number of wealthy 
families controlling most large companies in highly concentrated industries.  
The previous analysis conceptualises the main concern at the corporate governance level faced by 
participants. Thus, we need to identify how they are processing the problems they are facing in 
their professional governing practices. That is, to conceptualise their responses and reactions amid 
action. I come back to this point in Chapter 6, in which I develop the theoretical sampling of actors’ 
actions in response to the above-mentioned challenges. 
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CHAPTER	6	-	THEORETICAL	SAMPLING	
In this chapter I engage in Theoretical Sampling to deliberately seek happenings, incidents and 
movements to elucidate action on the ground. Thus, on the one hand, I direct the data search and 
analysis to develop an emerging theory (Stern, 2007). And on the other hand, this process 
corresponds to the action loop of the AR process. 
Hence, I explore the actions being developed by actors in their endeavours to resolve their main 
concern, based on the inputs of the participants and the data collected, and I propose a model of 
action to understand these ongoing actions.  
Morse argues that theories emerging from research might not fit perfectly with the specific 
experience of a particular participant (1998 cited by Dick, 2007), while according with Bradbury 
(2015) AR is based on experienced, fractional, emergent, and perceptual. That means that learning 
often comes from making the invisible, latent patterns visible. Therefore, capturing the maximum 
variation is key (Dick, 2007; Creswell, 2013). If the variety of participants is limited for practical 
reasons, such as accessibility, time or the nature of incidents investigated, diversity might be 
obtained by focusing in divergent postures towards the same phenomenon (corporate governance 
challenges derived from scandals in this research).  
In this research participants exhibit a myriad of different attitudes, feelings and actions. So 
considering that GT “…is not findings, not accurate facts and not description … [but] 
conceptualisation integrated into theory …” the actions developed by actors in the governance 
arena can be conceptualised by asking: “what are people doing? And why are they doing it?” 
(Glaser, 1978, p.94). I next revise such set of actions. 
6.1	Ongoing	Actions		
The Chilean governance arena is populated by a group of actors who have been operating for 
almost three decades under a set of emergent manifestation of shared beliefs, non-written norms 
of behaviour, conventions, codes of conduct and implicit mutual expectations.  The testimonies of 
participants show that many of these tacit agreements have been badly shaken; and some have 
even broken down by a series of corporate scandals and social challenges. These events have left 
actors wondering how to avoid been involved in such occurrences, both personally and at the 
organization level. Thus, while participants perceive clearly that traditional governance practices 
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are under hard questioning, they also suspect that their own practices might fall under public 
scrutiny, given the expectations of social accountability surrounding business and the increased 
transparency of events in front of the public eye.  
Given the loss of a framework of reference to guide conducts, previously associated with the 
previous institutional logic, and the challenges experimented by the Country Club, actors are being 
obliged to revise their conducts. Thus, they are re-negotiating expectations, and engaging in 
actions –and/or public demonstrations- consistent with new norms. By the same token, such micro-
behaviours might be reinforcing an eventual institutional change.  
We can conceptualise three of such patterns of actions following a triple pronged development, 
including some crossings and tensions between them. 
The three concepts derived from the grounded data are ideal-type actions of taking distance from, 
deal-making with or directly defying the Country Club practices. This configuration tell us the 
strategies been applied by participants in the governance arena to manage the problem of governing 
under increased uncertainty. Naturally, this represents a challenging situation for those actors 
given the lack of a previous background to guide their actions in the middle of changing 
circumstances.  
Thus, strategies of the main actors in the governance arena could be conceptualised around two 
main poles, collaborative or competitive according with their focus on co-evolving or confronting 
the Country Club, respectively. These could be action-based or attitude-based. However, some 
attitudes cannot be readily allocated to co-evolving or confronting signs as they appear to cover a 
range of somehow nuanced perspectives on a continuum ranging from collaborative to competitive 
postures, as shown in the following Figure 5.  That is why I highlight three main ideal strategic 
options, namely distancing, deal-making; and defying. 
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Figure	5	-	Patterns	of	Action	
 
Next, I analyse each one of these three patterns of action. 
6.1.1	Distancing:	Institutional	Re-Alignment	Pattern	
In unstable conditions, sensible actions are not easily devised, the predominant emotions of shock 
[PHI-1], affliction [REF-2], sense of shared responsibility [MAN-1], might blunder the way ahead. 
Therefore, most of the primary reactions are consistent with distancing from common Country 
Club practices. For instance, taking more seriously board work [LAW-1], revising old attitudes 
[LAW-1], questioning traditional styles [MAN-2; GUI-1], and even refreshing implicit group 
values [REG-1/2], preaching for more ethical behaviours [GUI-1] or for harsher punishments 
[REF-2] or just waiting and seeing what happens [PHI-1]. But reactions can also take more 
concrete and decisive aspects, such as propelling internal moves attempting to replace old leaders 
too committed with traditional styles of governing, with new generations [MAN-1/2]. This implies 
selecting and retaining new kinds of leaders aligned around the current institutional logic [REG-
1/2]. It might also imply sanctioning verbal or institutionally offenders [BUI-1; GUI-1; [SOP-1]. 
Conversely, others may present a variation in these kinds of behaviours and attempt to get the 
suspicious ones, e.g., businessmen and politicians, together with the idea of fostering mutual 
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understanding and thus attempting to construct common solutions to deal with their commonly 
tarnished identities [BOP-1/2; Glaser, 2015].  
Structurally, most of these insights, alerts and preoccupations might imply a stronger role taken by 
reputation management policies and/or departments within large companies [REG-2] or direct 
preoccupation for such issues at the board. Thus, firms typically begin analysing their inner 
identities, values, and culture within their long-term value creation intent. This kind of process is 
usually continued by a process of self-questioning about the gaps found in practice between actual 
and expected relationships with workers, community, environment, the state and its different 
agencies, as well as the political world [REG-2; MAN-1]. These efforts combined should be 
expected to tend to make companies more robust and increase their social capital in the long term 
(Bourdieu, 2005). 
Overall, these behaviours point toward a hypothetical process of raising standards and setting new 
and higher level of expectations that might on time propel in motion a realignment with the new 
institutionalisation logic. This kind of initiatives could centre on a new equilibrium of more 
professional, accountable and responsible dynamics.  
Table	11	-	Action	Patterns	of	Distance-Takers	
CONCEPT MAIN 
CATEGORIES 
PROPERTIES & 
INDICATORS 
ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Distancing 
from the 
Country Club 
practices 	
Responsibility of 
leaders 
Sense of higher 
purpose 
Unifying role of values 
Adapting/updating 
internal governance 
Learning in process 
Changing time-old 
habits 
Differentiating 
between traditional 
actors and upstarts 
Actors taking distance from 
wrongdoers, replacing, 
criticizing, suspending and 
denouncing them 
Actors preaching good 
practices reinforcing bylaws. 
Transparency, open 
communication are preached 
Some see the offenders 
mainly in traditional groups, 
whilst others see them in 
more recent dealmakers. 
Increasing ethical 
sanctioning 	
“this is not delegable and must come from the chairman, but the 
problem is that most of them are from the old school, so a 
generational change is required, and we need to change the 
image [of business]” [MAN-1] 
“I would like to write what’s the kind of firm we expect for the 
XXI century, what are the good practices, which is the mission 
of enterprise in society, which are the values to be held within 
the company…it is an issue of values.” [GUI-1] 
“The main thing I would correct, is that we have to continue 
preaching and keep preaching about the social responsibility of 
companies’ values and the ethics of business of generating value 
for all" [GUI-1] 
“We changed our bylaws to suspend wrongdoers” [GUI-1] 
“…when you lose trust in the regulator, ultimately your try to 
evade it as much as possible. Or you create a bureaucracy, like 
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	 the one that I am arming with lawyers. Never before have I had 
a full-time lawyer, now I have two, but I also have external 
consultants, then I’m "spending" grants in [learning to] moving 
in this new scenario. It’s a trial period for both sides...” [PHI-
1] 
“It was necessary to correct habits, many. For example, in the 
stock market everything cannot be regulated. Today we care for 
customs, we care for the due care, we care that an order be given 
through an email that a counter-order is given through another... 
treating people with respect, avoid overpowering an underdog, 
to respect him. If a shareholder who has got just one share goes 
to an AGM, respect him to be duly heard.” [LAW-1] 
“it is OK to regulate some things, but we need to be able to trust 
people’s criteria otherwise we will be chasing them permanently, 
and we will have trouble functioning in such environment” 
[MAN-2] 
"I will be politically incorrect, there is a tough cultural problem, 
… because there are many new players. Chile was a small 
market and suddenly it grew exponentially, and newcomers who 
don’t have such culture appeared… traditional families have a 
culture of how to behave in business…. There is a large group of 
newcomers, who emerged in the last two decades, privatisations 
during the Military Regime. You see that there are them who are 
producing the problems, Ponce is the prototype of these deals, 
Enersis and Chispas cases were great deals, too. All those are 
new-borns. So, I think we have a major cultural issue of 
emergent players that are not up to the standard, … others have 
a Bible that no one can skip. So, newcomers will need to learn in 
the hard way, this is the problem, it is them who are producing 
all the problems…because in this country many new business 
and investment opportunities aroused that attracted those 
players which have made money …and then began living luxury 
lives, expensive houses and cars" [REF-2] 
Therefore, a process of slow, including somehow contradictory moves, but still persistent long-
term change could be getting in place, putting “still adolescent” countries like Chile [REG-2] in 
the path of a painful evolutionary development through budding new governance habits. Naturally, 
these new practices would need to be identified, adopted and developed by most leading actors.  
Although not all actors might be willing to act with the same purpose, the same conviction, nor 
the same interests, as we see in the next section. This type of actions would be backing up the 
affirmation [REG-2] that some –but not necessarily all- emerging markets learn from their crises, 
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take advantage of them and make progress from the point of view of the development of their 
institutions.  
6.1.2	Deal-Making:	Institution-Maintenance	Pattern	
Participants point to human agency avid of making short-run gains by profiting from turmoil. 
Indeed, crises might look like business opportunities for well-situated actors, and may appear as 
particularly attractive ones given the weakening of the dominant establishment, making it more 
important to have good friends, discrete helpers and well-connected bridges and networkers [ENT-
3; REF-3; BUI-3]. This dynamic gives origin to a myriad of deal-making actions, lobbying, 
manoeuvring [BUI-3], silencing, cajoling and others, often presented under an apparent new and 
higher standard of conduct consistent with new and higher level of expectations mentioned above 
[LAW-1]. But this new correctness might be only superficial, while still continuing to ‘banding’ 
[REF-3], that is, making tricks look reasonable, honourable and even charitable, often hiding 
individual monetary and/or power interests below a mantle of technicalities, legalism and scientific 
outlook [REG-3]. According with some participants, these kinds of actors are solving the 
institutional challenges à la il gatopardo (de Lampedusa, 2014), in which the motto “everything 
needs to change to make things continue being the same”.  These actions are all oriented to 
maintaining the old equilibrium and the power conceptualised in this research around the Country 
Club concept. 
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Table	12	-	Action	Patterns	of	Deal	Makers	
CONCEPT CATEGORIES PROPERTIES & 
INDICATORS 
ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Deal making 
around the 
disempowerment 
of the Country 
Club 	
Dealing       with 
the disempower-
ment of the 
Country Club / 
Incumbents. 
Avoiding tarnished 
identities. 
Lobbying activities, 
consulting 
engagements and both 
public and private 
persuasion campaigns 
to help dominant 
incumbents get away 
with their plans and 
actions in a context of 
increasing corporate 
questioning. 
“LAW came to persuade me to help him make the board of YY change 
its mind vis-à-vis the ZZ acquisition” [BUI-3] 
“Journalist [alluding to public minutes of a board meeting]: Why 
didn’t you give your opinion against or your criticism regarding that 
[excluding a publicly listed subsidiary from participating in 
renewable energy businesses]?  
[LAW]: Perhaps I kept silent tacitly supporting [a dissident 
director]. But I always wanted a good agreement between A and B. 
Of course, I am interested, but perhaps I was silent because someone 
else had already said it…” [La Tercera 29-11-15] 
“---The majority shareholder has the right to want its norms of 
management to be applied. A controlling party, without abusing 
minority, can always impose its vision on the business” [La Tercera 
29-11-15] 
“I was an expert witness to demonstrate that the Superintendent 
acted wrongly in the XYZ case” [REG-3] 
“…XX is an old kind of director, chosen by the block-holder… 
thereby is in an implicit contract. He is very conscious that he will 
be treated by regulation as responsible in front of all shareholders. 
He knows his duty is to all shareholders… but, there is a risk-return 
calculation, probably it is a very rational decision… I will have these 
benefits, I will strengthen my relation and perhaps be part of the 
international expansion of the [block-holding] group.” [REG-3] 
“These cases will continue occurring. We are in a difficult period 
and the executives are not prepared” [REG-3] 
“…do not discount the role of deal-makers, such as LAW and others. 
They are friendly, loyal, they do not criticize others, they reduce 
transaction costs… look at the case of XX, who did not make deals, 
raising costs to infinity…” [REG-3] 
From the point of view of the social capital at stake during crises, the natural consequence is that 
in a tarnished identities context, corporate reputation might become an actively traded commodity, 
leveraged by an individual agent’s own identity and networks. This is likely to be even more 
dramatically stressed given short-term pressures to conform to a higher standard; while in the 
background the ‘establishment’ (Jones, 2014) might be struggling to maintain its privileged 
position, perquisites and associated power. 
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These behaviours then would be on the one hand directly associated to the weakening of the 
Country Club under the contingent shocks generated by the scandals. They can on the other hand, 
contribute to its maintenance and sustainability. Thus, this could give rise to a process of 
reinforcement of a culture of double-discourse. In this case, it could widen the gap between public 
expression and practice, reinforcing the slump of corporate reputations, and the overall loss of 
social capital. 
6.1.3	Defying:	An	Institution-Renovating	Pattern	
An enterprising reflex should be anticipated from businesspersons - people of means, action and a 
practical, resourceful orientation [Memo 43]. Scandals reflect market imperfections, frictions - 
sometimes even sustained fictions - and lack of appropriate solutions to people’s problems, so they 
should naturally offer chances of creating or discovering opportunities; the fuel of an enterprise. 
Such enterprising could have a social content, initial motivation and/or final purpose – alongside 
the profit motive that sparked the development of the original eventual market/service opportunity. 
In this research the loss of power of the Country Club due to social empowerment, delayed insights, 
making transparent incidents, and updating regulations, according with some participants [ENT; 
FIN] provide diverse opportunities, associated with closing gaps between new expectations and 
old practices. For instance, providing alternatives furthering customer/user choice, while 
capitalizing empowerment, transparency and in-sighting by means of new products, services, 
platforms, technologies, etc., and further promoting these same attributes to increase the 
differentiation between standards of incumbents and insurgent actors.  
Therefore, defying the establishment could not only be weakening it, but also profiting directly or 
indirectly from Country Club’s loss of power, while aiming to create economic and/or social value.  
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Table	13	-	Action	Patterns	of	Challengers	
CONCEPT CATEGORIES ANALYSIS OF 
PROPERTIES & 
INDICATORS 
ILLUSTRATIVE DATA 
Defying the 
Country Club 
through 
democratizing 
opportunities 	
Playing a 
competitive 
game. 
Rewriting the 
rules of the 
game. 
Challenging the 
establishment.  
Competing 
against the 
incumbents. 
Entrepreneurial 
action to compete 
and disempower 
the Country 
Club. 		
Entrepreneurship to overcome 
corporate deviations. 
Frustration and disappointment 
with status quo. 
Hot, sentimental feelings. 
Calm, cold, rational bets driven 
by the thrill of playing David 
against Goliath –incumbents. 
Rewriting the rules of the 
competitive game through 
enterprising. At the micro 
(industry), meso (associations) 
and macro levels (political 
platform). 
A proposal for a new pro-
competitive paradigm is arising. 
Entrepreneurs attempting to get 
their views included in public 
policies to avoid incumbents 
capturing authorities as solo 
interfaces. 	
“… [feelings of] disappointment, anger. Overall anger... Lots of 
disappointment, power to do both evil and good. Triggered [my 
own] option of enterprising. Desire of contributing and grateful 
for the opportunities my family has had in Chile. I want to 
reinforce the system of liberties. To democratise.” (ENT-1) 
“… personally, I have had a deep and genuine process away 
from ideology. I have returned to a stronger conviction in free 
markets and freedom. But I have had to understand how the 
system works, you see the connections: ministers of economy and 
finance sitting on the boards of two main banks. At the 
beginning, I took it very personally, as a betrayal... [This] is not 
the consequence of capitalism, but of a captured market…” 
(ENT-1) 
“My attempts entrepreneurship have been to try to democratise 
education, entrepreneurship, financial services, politics 
…”[ENT-1] 
“… [The Santiago stock market] has old structures, cross- 
interests … so we invested our own money and created an 
electronic stock market from the scratch with different 
governance system, compensation plans, transaction fees … and 
we did it for peanuts, just for fun.” [FIN-1] 
“We proposed to the minister: ‘There are entrepreneurs’... So, 
we are speaking to ministers to include in each Public-Private 
Table of Discussion the perspective of new entrepreneurs… we 
are asking authorities to act as promoters of competition, 
guaranteeing fair play, changing the paradigm of regulators. 
Taking up the mission of opening industries up to new entrants, 
to recognize them, assign them value, and to commit with them.” 
(ENT-3) 
“… [We are] taking advantage of technology to assemble 
citizens, increase participation, and using an e-platform to get 
[citizens] represented; to provide more information to citizens… 
to connect business, non-profit and associations…” (ENT-2) 
However, the response of incumbents to such moves still need to be fully understood. Indeed, the 
deal-making actions analysed above are only one kind of likely responses. Probably giving up in 
peripheral or marginal aspects should be one of the main tactics used while preserving the core 
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dominion. In the meantime, the Country Club should be expected to attempt to retain its power, 
keep protecting its interests and continue to impose its particular interpretation of reality; its central 
purpose (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012), while taking care not to compromise its stronghold. To 
what extend there is an actual re-design (an eventual fourth D, D4) from the core of the Country 
Club rests to be seen and researched, but it cannot be discarded - at least at a tactical level. 
The testimonials of some participants provide a basis to hypothesize that such a defying process 
might not go smoothly or without a struggle and may even give free rein to direct counter or 
guerrilla warfare attacks from incumbents [ENT-1], given the de facto mechanisms in place 
protecting the Country Club, including captured regulators [ENT-1], crony politicians [BUI-1], 
powerful business groups controlling mass media [REG-2], and strong public relations levers. 
Thus, the impact on social capital and reputation can be conjectured to be – at least initially - 
minor, slow to happen with an uncertain outcome, given the unequal resources of the players in 
conflict. Thus, alternative options might take time to materialize and even be subject to suspicion, 
given the generalised distrust affecting the country. 
The enterprising behaviours reinforce the raising of standards, and the updating of institutions, but 
their impact might be slow, minor, and the renovation effort can also be swamped by effects of 
more powerful forces. Indeed, these defying patterns, combined with both the distancing pattern 
and - up to some point - even the tactical compliance associated to the deal-making patterns, might 
provide some momentum for change, but naturally, the consolidation of such superior standards 
should not be taken for granted. 
Concluding, the action of defying capture, most of the variation going on in the institutional 
context: the increasingly empowered causal forces, the conditional resistance of the Country Club 
and the deal-making activities by its allies and go hand-in-hand with the co-variant updates in 
regulation, and the contingencies derived from processes becoming transparent. It also explains 
and catalyses the consequent demands of accountability placed on the business elite, called here 
the Country Club. It is also consistent with the distancing among those close to the Country Club, 
including even some members. This means disapproving tactics and actions – perhaps fearing the 
eventual tarnishing of their own identities -, thus pushing them to set new rules, criticise offending 
behaviours and attempt to stick with traditional values. It also encourages a call for a generational 
renewal of leadership, and, overall, an attempt to reconcile privileged social positions, sense of 
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belonging and conscience, with a compatible meaning system, without resigning to their 
(legitimate) economic interests. However, defying goes beyond all these reactions and attempts to 
represent the process of struggle of those enterprises looking to challenge the Country Club, as 
well as the institutional setting. In fact, these insurgents are working hard to change the status quo, 
but do not have any guarantee of success, given the powerful established forces they are going up 
against. 
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CHAPTER	7	-	EMERGING	THEORY	&	DISCUSSION		
This chapter continues the conceptualisation process and presents and discusses an emerging 
theory. As explained in previous chapters this elaboration was conceptualised progressively 
starting with inductive open coding, and following with theoretical coding of the 6Cs sociological 
family (Chapter 5), complemented with literature revision, deductive theoretical sampling 
(Chapter 6), and the production of around 97 memos (see Appendix 5 - Sample Conceptual 
Memos). 
7.1	 Basic	Social	Process	Conceptualisation		
The basic social process proposed to conceptualise how participants are ‘processing out’ the 
problem of governing under uncertainty can be abstracted as Minding the Corporate Governing 
Gap. 
Minding the Corporate Governing Gap is seen from the point of view of actors in the governance 
arena, and it means reviewing, selecting, developing, practising, correcting and feed forwarding –
often in the midst of action- their governance options. This is a response to namely: the new 
transparency of actions, the empowering of challengers, the updating and enforcement of 
regulations, the resistance of Country Club members, the social demands for social accountability, 
and overall, the need of adapting to a new institutional logic. This last aspect implies an exercise 
of interpretation and learning in action given that the new logic has not been crystallised yet around 
a new paradigm; although it appears as divergent from the previously dominant institutional logic.    
This appears as a basic social process, given that there are at least two stages: ex-ante and ex-post 
actions. Indeed, it implies observing, reflecting, acting, reviewing, evaluating, adjusting, and 
learning during the process. In addition, the actions identified ‘process out’ the need for continuous 
actions required by governing activities. 
As Figure 6 shows there are systemic mutual influences among various elements. The main links 
explained in Chapter 5 are presented as solid lines. However, the theoretical sampling (Chapter 6) 
suggests the feedback influences presented as white lines. Thus, the collection of micro governance 
strategies might reinforce the institutional logic (context) or help it to mutate. The consequences, 
might also fuel new contingencies (scandals) and stimulate further waves of institutional 
entrepreneurship. And these might contribute to the further evolution of institutional logics. 
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Figure 6 - Basic Social Process: Minding the Corporate Governing Gap 
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creation of an industry of private pension funds administrators (AFPs, in Spanish) by the Minister 
of Work in 1980. As explained in section 5.1.2 Condition: Uncertainty-Reducing Practices & 
Impression Management, his action was coherent with the dominant economic logic of that 
period of time and reinforced this institutional logic. At the same time this innovation introduced 
the challenge of governing the investments of those new actors acting on behalf of Chilean 
workers. Thus, this slowly introduced a systematic improvement in corporate governance of the 
companies receiving their funds, including the need of introducing independent directors in their 
boards. Hence, a governing gap appeared that had to be closed by increasing professionalization 
in diverse areas of the system. The regulation of AFPs and listed companies also had to be 
upgraded to contemplate these new players. At the return of democracy politically linked actors 
where included in the boards of AFPs to cope with the exposure of these organizations to state 
power, responding to the new political institutional logic. This generated a series of deals, all 
legitimate although many indefensible, which sowed tensions that remained latent. In recent years, 
a social institutional logic characterises the current context at the country level. Therefore, some 
scandals related to abusive severance packages by politically-connected operators in a scenario of 
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low average pensions and a large number of people excluded from the system, have originated a 
“NO+AFP” social movement that is threatening the very existence of the system. This occurs 
despite record financial performance and recognition by their international peers. And the situation 
has been magnified by publicity about the bonuses of managers and impressive profits of the 
private fund management companies. Currently, many are pushing for radical reform.  Therefore, 
leading AFPs have been implementing new governance strategies to attempt to align the industry 
to the new institutional logic. In addition, new entrepreneurs are attempting to create new 
organisations: low cost AFPs, not-for-profit AFPs, and a State-owned AFP, generating still minor, 
but increasing noise in the system, and challenging regulation and governance practices. At the 
moment of writing this research, the process is far from concluded: the government is pushing for 
new legal reforms to reinforce solidarity, modify AFP governance and increase the level of 
pensions. In the meantime, the industry is alert and in a defensive posture, reminding their great 
efforts educating adherents. The new chairman of the Association of AFPs has publicly recognised 
lags and misses in their communication and governing strategies. And some have realised lately 
that the self-employed – who are not obliged to contribute - were perhaps a key piece of the system, 
which got forgotten in the process. 
7.2	 Main	Concern	of	Participants.	
From the analysis presented in Chapter 6, we can grasp the main concern of participants: 
managing themselves in front of institutional complexity. This represents a challenging context, 
which has been triggered by the occurrence of a series of corporate governance scandals reflecting 
the diverse and counterpoised institutional logics. That is why their challenge is how to govern 
organizations in the context of institutional complexity. 
7.2.1	Engaging	with	Complexity.	
Each successive change in institutional settings experienced by Chile in its historical evolution has 
increased the level of disconcert of leading actors in front of the accompanying complexity, which 
has compelled some to question their ways, practices and even their values [PHI-1; ENT-1; BUI-
1; GUI-1; BPO-1; REF-2; REG-2; PEN-1; MAN-1; LAW-1]. For instance, there is a telling 
anecdote occurred in early 70s reflecting the perplexity experimented by the main producers of 
sausages in the country, who did not know how to deal with a free pricing system at the moment 
of the sharp economic liberalization process after years of price fixing schemes.  Fontaine (1988) 
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recounts their visit to the adviser of minister of finance to ask for their new list of fixed prices 
while presenting their own suggested prices. When told that they were free to set their own prices, 
after saying their goodbyes they came back, twice in the next 24 hours, each time with lower 
suggested prices! 
Bucheli & Salvaj (2014) convey a similar feeling of complexity combined with incredulity and a 
sense of outrage, which affected the Chilean corporate world in 1991 with the appointment of 
Oscar Guillermo Garretón to the board of the Chilean Telecom. Garretón, previously one of the 
two “most wanted criminals” by the Pinochet Regime was accused of attempting to provoke the 
mutiny of Navy sailors. Garretón was elected with the votes of the Spanish state-owned enterprise 
(SOE) Telefónica and ended taking over as chairman and leading in 1993 a series of critical 
negotiations with regulatory agencies.     
The current scenario is not less complex for players like the pension funds industry as explained 
above or the main fishing corporations. The second ones, are currently under threat of a harsher 
fishing law after public discovery and legal investigation that a member of parliament, who led the 
law-making process, was in the payroll of the main fisheries.  In both cases the regulators, the 
legislators and the government officers are sharing the discredit of the corporate actors. 
Therefore, the common thread among these cases are how to deal with the increasing complexity 
affecting both formal and informal rules, public expectations, and an array of stakeholders with 
conflicting interests –who distrust corporate actors-, as well as the lack of solid, credible, trustable 
state referents to rapport with [SOP-2]. 
7.2.2	Governing	under	Complexity.	
The second aspect of the main concern is the challenging problem of governing in such complex 
circumstances.  I herein explain the choice of the word governing rather than governance, in 
referring to an action verb, a process, that in words of Letza, Smallman, Sun & Kirkbride (2011, 
pp.: 171-172) represents: 
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These ideas about governing are complemented by Fiss (2007), who writes about corporate 
governance and institutions articulating various ideas that go hand in hand with the notions of 
power, complexity, and institutional activism presented above. He suggests using the Institutional 
Theory lenses to move away from usual ideas of “complementarity and consistency” (p.401) 
around a unique institutional logic and hence to consider practices rich in “conflict and 
inconsistency” (ibid.); facets well represented in this research. Fiss (2007) also suggests exploring 
power relations implicit in governance models that are too often naturalised.  
The ongoing basic social process used by participants to process the problem of institutional 
complexity can be called minding the corporate governing gap. And this process implies 
systematic, recursive and ongoing reflecting, questioning, acting, experiencing, perceiving, 
discoursing, organising, negotiating, interacting, settling and challenging while governing.  It also 
involves dominant players, challengers, regulators, state agents, institutional entrepreneurs, 
pension funds, activist investors, communities, and stakeholders, among other actors. The issues 
include simultaneously achieving economic viability as business captains, social legitimacy as 
social leaders, corporate accountability, environmental sustainability, and professional 
responsibility as board members, and personal ethics as businesspersons.  
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Naturally, it should be clear that governing goes well beyond tactic corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) practices that are far from the governing level, and more often consigned under marketing 
or corporate communication areas (Ariztía & Melero, 2013). It also transcends the strategic 
management of stakeholders as proposed by Freeman (Freeman, 2010), which neglects the 
political and social impact of macro-social actors [REF-1] –who are critically relevant in the 
context of emerging countries. Such changes in socio-cultural logics derived from institutional 
change associated to turbulent emerging markets in instable socio-economic-political transitions 
are the main sources of complexity in Chile and are not seen as technical delegable themes by 
participants in this research, but as core governing concerns. 
7.2.3	Incorporating	Insights	from	Institutional	Entrepreneurs.	
The two associated aspects around the main concern, namely complexity and governing, are 
closely connected with the role played by institutional entrepreneurs (Hardy & Maguire, 2008), a 
concept explored in theoretical sampling (Chapter 6), which is driven by the action of multiple 
actors and/or processes challenging the established institutional arrangements; and a status quo 
regularly acting on behalf of dominant incumbents (Bourdieu, 2014). Thus, the issue of power and 
its exercise in practice is central to institutional entrepreneurship (Fligstein, 2001).  
Hardy & Maguire (2008) refer institutional entrepreneurship to Lukes (1974)’s three dimensions 
of power: leveraging material resources; managing meaning; and manipulating “decision agendas, 
arenas, and participants to bring about change” (p.210). In the Chilean case we see the 
entrepreneurial movement acting as institutional entrepreneurs both challenging and collaborating 
with the establishment (to contest political reforms by President Bachelet government), using 
Lukes (1974)’s three kinds of power:  
• Leveraging the material power of their major collectiveness [ENT-1; ENT-3];  
• Reframing the meaning of who are the entrepreneurs, what they stand for (ENT-3), and what 
they do for themselves and for others; and 
• Attempting to intervene in public policies. 
This research therefore finds on the one hand, many incumbents still operating in a world 
apparently simple, due to their small number, homogeneity, highly concentrated industries, control 
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of the political forces through economic support of their campaigns, as part of the Chilean “elite 
pact” described by Mayol (2016).  
In the other hand, the emerging institutional entrepreneurial movement is a reaction to the failures 
of both market and state derived from the institutional complexity. And, as predicted by Gustave 
Le Bon in his classic The Crowd (1895; 2008) social movements might also add to chaos.  
Indeed, the action of challengers, a crowdfunding initiative for instance, augments the 
empowerment of social stakeholders thus sending back waves of uncertainty to incumbents, 
bankers in this case, threatening with disrupting the status quo. So, a non-linear and mutually 
recursive interrelation might relate complexity and institutional entrepreneurship.  
Having clarified the main concerns and their link to institutional entrepreneurship; I turn now to 
the emerging theory. 
7.3	 Emerging	Theory:	Minding	the	Governing	Gap		
Governing has become an exercise of minding the corporate governing gap maintained for 
decades.  This has been propelling main actors to act through distancing, deal-making, and defying. 
Governing can thus be associated to the attempts of participants of answering the following 
questions in their professional practices: 
1. What governing means in practice?   
2. What is to be expected from the governing function? 
3. What do institutions, the field and the environment expect of organizations? 
4. What are the governance practices available? How to access these practices? 
5. Who should be involved in governing? 
6. What is desirable, acceptable and/or feasible? 
7. How can an organization add or protect value in the new institutional framework? 
The following Figure 7 integrates the theory, the critical moments and the conceptual governing 
processes processing the problems faced by main actors active in the governance arena during a 
period of more than 40 years (For a detailed explanation of how codes converged into the ideas 
presented in Figure 7, see APPENDIX 7).  
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Figure 7 - Integrative Map 
 
Stage 1: Economic Dominant Institutional Logic 
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polarization of the Cold War period. Chile was deeply divided during the three years of socialist-
communist government of President Salvador Allende, who counted with the explicit backup of 
the URSS and Cuba and was strongly opposed by the economic right wing supported by the CIA 
and the US administration (Opotow, 2015). The result of this was a military coup d’état. Thus, an 
economically liberal model as far as possible from central planning was not an unlikely outcome. 
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However, such development would not have been possible without the inspiration and education 
provided by the Chicago University to a group of Chilean economists, and the support and 
inspiration they found around the figure of Milton Friedman. Friedman’s high profile visits to 
Chile, the widespread diffusion of his ideas through diverse channels, including letters to Augusto 
Pinochet, his columns published in the New York Times referred to Chile, the “Free to Choose” 
TV series broadcasted in the national channel, public speeches in a number of universities and 
publications in national academic journals, have been well established by several authors as well 
as by a number of participants in this research (GUI-1; SOP-2) as important support to the 
economic reforms imposed by the “Chicago Boys” helping them to prevail over overly critical 
insiders coming from the traditional right wing and the military world (Cárcamo-Huechante, 2007; 
Ossandón & Tironi, 2013; Fontaine, 1988. For a contrarian view see Caldwell & Montes, 2015. 
A rational economic system (Scott, 1987) was established during the Pinochet Regime as a by-
the-book free market model, which brought a new institutional paradigm, which I characterize as 
the Economic Institutional Logic, symbolised in figure 8.1 as an arrow falling from abroad given 
the external (Chicago) influences in its origins.  The liberalization and marketization processes 
were experimented as a shock treatment by the weak Chilean economy (Fontaine, 1988) given the 
sharp reduction in tariffs from exorbitant levels to minimal ones almost overnight, the devaluation 
of the currency (Fontaine, 1988), and the brisk end of subsidies and the elimination of 
protectionism.  
Therefore, the first governing challenge experienced by the main actors in charge of companies, 
that is, in the governance arena, was to attempt to overcome the difficulties presented by the 
economic situation and the need to survive in a brand new institutional logic, they did not 
understand well. First, actors needed to understand what was going on. Thus, soon main actors in 
governing functions realized they faced a competitive and managerial gap, given that their firms 
were not prepared to compete, due to their traditional reliance in the state, as well as the poor 
condition of Chilean firms after almost three years of economic chaos. Second, they needed role 
models from whom to learn. In that context, the Chicago boys and their followers acted as 
institutional entrepreneurs, first as state reformers, regulators and next as company leaders, as they 
were seen as professionals prepared to manage in a more modern, open and liberalised market. 
Third, governing meant leading companies to overcome their historical lack of competitiveness, 
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as well as the volatility of the economy, to be able to maximise profits, minimise costs, compete 
both internally and externally (BPO-2; SOP-2).  
After a brisk economic shake out, both the corporate sector, and the country as a whole, began to 
learn the new ways, and slowly began to grow and prosper as seen through the rising living 
standards of the Chilean people. Overall, the common “currency” of this first period could be said 
to be economic value creation in a country traditionally starved of resources (Fontaine, 2016). 
Chile on the one hand could be seen in this first period as a New Institutional Economics (North, 
1990; Robinson & Acemoglu, 2012) textbook example of a virtuous cycle, deriving from sound 
institutional rules: neoclassic economic principles, encouraging incentives, clear property-rights, 
optimizing the economic model and assuring market efficiency (PHI-1; FIN-2), all inclusive 
measures contrary to extractive policies (Robinson & Acemoglu 2012). 
On the other hand, the corporate downsides of this bonanza were frequent abuses of weak 
suppliers, sub-contracting and exploitation of SMEs by large corporations (Echeverría, 2013), 
similar to the situations reported in Japan by Ibata-Arens & Obayashi (2006). At the consumer 
level, the lack of regulation led to consumer abuses and frauds. And, at the competitive level, some 
actors set up long-lasting agreements to collude, profiting from the weak competition regulations, 
or some weakness in the ability (or unwillingness?) to enforce of these agencies (REG-2). Hence, 
some important institutional “extractiveness” left-overs were still present in mid of the “Chilean 
Miracle”. 
Stage 2: Political Dominant Institutional Logic 
In 1989 the Pinochet Regime lost a key election and it gave way to a renewed democratic period, 
starting in March 1990.  This stage was characterised by an increase in institutional complexity, 
given the lack of understanding of democratic parameters by main actors in governance, after 17 
years of an authoritarian, pro-market logic (BPO-2).  This was especially stressed in regulated 
sectors – in particular, utilities - dependent on government agencies. Hence these areas were 
naturally the first ones to react. 
The actors, who should be characterised as institutional entrepreneurs showing the way in this new 
environment characterised by political uncertainty, were mainly Spanish SOEs, such as Telefonica 
and Endesa, followed by other corporations, which began, acquiring majority stockholdings in 
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Chilean companies linked to infrastructure, pension funds, banking, utilities. These Spanish 
companies had a long history incorporating political actors in their boards and were the first to 
include centre-left-wing professionals and politicians among their local board members (Bucheli 
& Salvaj, 2014; BPO-1; ENT-1).  
This incipient trend became an established way of dealing with the state, regulators and other 
factual powers-that-be [BPO-2]. Naturally, this drove to some degree of politicization of 
companies, a process which would later turn into illegal financing of political elections and direct 
support to sympathetic and later even of opposing candidates; the highest profile one by the former 
son-in-law of Pinochet controlling a privatized mining corporation. Therefore, Chile a country 
well-known by its low levels of corruption ranked at the same level of the US (Schwindt-Bayer & 
Tavits, 2016), began losing its traditional good practices and importing and developing its own 
brand of corporate governance deviance (PEN-2). Again, this global influence is represented in 
the figure as an arrow falling from the upside. 
This complex institutional setting had a strong influence propelling some interesting responses 
from the Country Club. In fact, as explained earlier during the Pinochet Regime the traditional 
business class had made room to some of the previous institutional entrepreneurs (namely, the 
Chicago Boys), who had been turning into incumbents [ENT-1] through leading the privatisation 
process. [REG-2].  During this stage a new generation of centre-left-wing politicians [BPO-2] 
joined the Club. 
This situation configured a natural system (Scott, 1987) of alignments. A consequence of which 
was the blurring of lines between right and left-wing actors, as they all had become at this stage 
part of the Chilean elite [REG-3]. 
The situation parallels closely the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer, 2003; Davis & Cobb, 
2010) and consistently the institutional “currency” of the period could be said to be power (or 
influence), and its acquisition and maintenance a main concern of actors. 
Stage 3: Social Dominant Institutional Logic 
The year of 2011 brought back the ethical protests of Chilean university students, and Camila 
Vallejos, their young Chilean leader was selected as Time “Person of the Year”, (Padgett, 2011). 
A massive movement against a gigantic hydroelectric dam in Patagonia also attracted a transversal 
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adhesion of Chileans (Scherman, Arriagada & Valenzuela, 2015). Since then, there has been an 
unceasing fall in the levels of public trust, fuelled by the corporate scandals [SOP-1, PEN-1]. And 
massive citizen protests have become the norm.  
Thus, the institutional context has added a new source of complexity, by incorporating a social (or 
stakeholder) logic. Such evolution is neither innocent nor neutral, as it has been occurring amid a 
society increasingly empowered, deeply distrusting, widely interconnected and having the means 
to demand and attempt to realize their demands for transparency from elites. This has been 
occurring in all fields, whatever the attempts of hiding and justifying their moves by the new or 
old members of the governing elite (ENT-1;2;3; SOP-2; REF-2). 
The problem of governing has then become the challenge of orchestrating equitable interrelations 
and transactions between corporate actors and stakeholders, in such a manner that actors need to 
demonstrate that they are invested in society’s wellbeing and prosperity (SOP-2).  
The institutional “currencies” of the period could be said to be trust and legitimacy. 
This stage, just as the two previous ones, is not free of threats of corporate deviance. In this case 
the dangers are what could be called abusive stakeholding, in which organizational survival or 
prosperity might be put at risk by making environmental and social satisfaction goals the top 
priorities. An opportunistic sampling of an encounter with a colleague produced a vivid description 
of his frustration by the way his company had changed after an environmental scandal. He 
described how the new management adopted a systematic yielding attitude towards any demand 
from stakeholders to avoid potential problem –even unreasonable exigencies from local powers-
that-be (CHA, 2016). This scenario corresponds to the conceptual case of communities killing 
organizations proposed by O’Mahony & Lakhani (2011), which could happen if the former is able 
to systematically siphon out resources from the latter without restraints.  
However, these three stages should not be taken as independent, autonomous or self-contained, as 
they do not represent definitive end conditions, but they are progressive, interconnected and up to 
some point recursive. That is why they are not represented in figure 7.2 as closed circles, but as 
encompassing parabolic, open, forms. This is because these institutional logics are not alternative, 
a tacit argument in much of the literature (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Thornton, Ocasio, 1999 
Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). In this research these logics may be conceptualised as 
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representing different layers, which tend to superimpose ones on top of others. Thus, the 
underlying capes should not be interpreted as fully covered, overwhelmed, and subsumed by the 
following ones. This means that for instance, the patriarchal instincts prevailing previous early 70s 
are still present, latent and ready to pull invisible strings in critical moments (PEN-1), just as the 
Friedman-like rational mindset did not disappear with the natural alignment logic of corporate 
and political elites of the 90s and the first decade of the XXI century.   
The previous reasoning brings home the macro basic social process going on during the period 
under study in the governance arena, as well as the process used by main actors to process the 
problem of governing. Main actors have been systematically minding the corporate governing gap 
across institutional logics. This has implied –and is implying- three key processes: getting aware, 
accessing and activating distinctive governing strategies (Aguilera et al., 2018) –ad hoc to 
prevailing institutional logics. This is the way boards are attempting to deal with the increasing 
complexity. Correspondingly, the role of governing has become more challenging, demanding, 
multidimensional, subject to stringent accountability and transparency requisites.  
How do those main actors manage this challenge? The analysis of the core process, minding the 
corporate governing gap across institutional logics, permits conceptualising its three main sub-
processes, namely: 
1. Interpreting	the	new	dominant	institutional	logic	
A new institutional logic rarely is publicly announced and officially launched. On the contrary, it 
normally evolves gradually, before getting fully installed onto a society. Thus, interpreting a 
particular logic as an institutionally dominant one implies an insightful awareness of the ascent of 
such new institutional logic and a continuing comprehension of its underlying governing 
requirements. It also requires accessing appropriate solutions among the existing repertoire of 
corporate (and professional) tools, skills and/or routines available both within and outside the 
organization.   Interestingly, as explained above, to remain effective the organization should 
achieve this without fully forgetting, relegating or displacing the previous institutional logic’s 
demands, given that their imperatives might still be not only relevant in the short run, but remain 
crucial to succeed in the long run. This implies that the efficiency imperative from the first stage, 
and interrelations with powers-that-be from second stage cannot be fully removed from the 
corporate governance capabilities but should both leave space for trust-building governing 
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practices. The latter might include some contradictory elements vis-à-vis the pure paradigm of 
previous stages. Hence, a major dose of pragmatism and broader scope of the governing function 
is expected to become part of the awareness process. 
Thus, interpreting the new dominant institutional logic has required the governance function in the 
three stages studied: awareness about the requirement of acquiring a profit maximising shared 
mindset and imposing related skills on the organization to be able to survive and prosper in front 
of open, free and highly contestable markets since early seventies. In the 90s, governing actors had 
to become aware of the needs of building bridges with the new political powers in an era of 
increasing –and updating- regulation, political interventions and importing global norms by 
successive governments.  Since the beginning of the second decade of the century, awareness has 
been developing –although not at all fully developed at the time of this research. There still is an 
open gap in terms of the current requirement of hearing, dialoguing and incipiently learning from 
society (ENT-2; SOP-3).  
Consequently, this sub-process can be considered as having potential fit, relevance and 
contributing to practice, but being still incomplete, without considering role models showing the 
way ahead. Hence, this takes us naturally to consider the second and complementary sub-process. 
2. Learning	from	Institutional	Entrepreneurs	
The learning sub-process both follows and fuels the previous process of interpreting the 
institutional logic. It implies a process of methodical and/or casual observation and access to the 
actions taken by leading actors in the governance arena –a process facilitated by a relatively small 
and cohesive elite group (Robinson, 2015).  This accessibility (Aguilera et al., 2018) permits 
learning from trials, successes and failures of first movers in the governance arena.  
However, this process tends to be slow and conflictive as it might imply some (partial) degree of 
corporate forgetting and excruciating de-learning of skills acquired in previous stages or even 
painful abandonment of governing practices associated to past paradigms, which might not be 
longer favourable (REF-2; PEN-2). For instance, agreeing on production quotas with friendly 
competitors as did the cartel of chicken meat; discovered by Fiscalía Nacional Económica (anti-
trust agency) (www.fne.gob.cl); which recommended and obtained from the court the dissolution 
of the industry association orchestrating the collusion.  
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Who those institutional entrepreneurs are and how are they spotted, are then relevant conceptual 
questions. As flows from previous analysis, the institutional entrepreneurs should be those actors, 
on the one hand, having had access to divergent institutional logics.  And on the second hand, 
having the drive, resources and opportunities to take part on the attempt of implementing actions 
derived from the new institutional logic, whatever successful or not (Battilana et al., 2009).  
How do they get such institutional access? This research in the situated context of an emerging 
market points towards educational activities in first world organizations, such as the ones the 
Chilean economists had in Chicago University or as modern Chilean entrepreneurs are having in 
Silicon Valley around Stanford University. But, it may also be originated through direct corporate 
experience, as the Spanish SOEs had during the democratic transition in Spain, which occurred 
fifteen years in advance of the Chilean one. Or it might arise from people’s own entrepreneurial 
experiences, as happened to new entrepreneurs. 
How transparent are their governing actions to the rest of the actors in the governance arena? This 
research shows that in the case of state-empowered actors, such as the Chicago Boys during the 
Pinochet Regime, it was not automatic or easy. However, definitively feasible using the power of 
public policies, authoritarian rule, repression, and fluid access to all sort of public levers, such as 
the public apparatus and state broadcasting means. However, the relevant aspect that made possible 
this institutional change was the systematic incorporation into private and public organizations of 
new actors educated within the new logic in the main universities. Thus, learning required 
incorporating the new mindset as well as bringing technical and social skills required to deal with 
the new institutional logic (Fligstein, 2001) –a process that began happening and became publicly 
noticeable in Chile (Fontaine, 1988).  
In the case of the Spanish SOEs given that it was a structural change in the political mix of boards 
members it was visible, and noticeable for acute observers, although it could have been initially 
misinterpreted, or resisted for ideological reasons –as happened with the case of Garretón (Bucheli 
& Salvaj, 2014). This implies that it might have taken some time for actors to see through the 
phenomenon, but that eventually it tended to happen, propelling a drive to imitate it in similar 
settings. In the current third stage, perhaps given its newness or its more intangible characteristics 
-anchored around values, styles and purposes instead of public policies or structural changes-, and 
the leadership by a younger generation farther from the traditional Country Club, it might be less 
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visible and thus it could take more time to make impact (Mustakis, 2016). At the corporate level 
it might also be confused with tactic-level CSR, which might well blur the signals and create 
difficulties for other actors to actually read the new clues to learn how to govern themselves within 
the new institutional logic.  
Therefore, institutional entrepreneurs provide accessibility (Aguilera et al., 2018) to innovative 
corporate governance practices fitting the new dominant institutional logic. However, being able 
to interpret, that is obtaining some awareness, and having accessibility are two necessary but not 
sufficient sub-processes of minding the corporate governing gap.  The previous could well remain 
passive reflectivity, but not conductive to action, thus we need to add a third one.  
3. Activating	Institutional	Complexity-Reducing	Strategies	
This sub-process, contributes the action-oriented aspect of minding the governing gap. Given that 
as explained above the introduction of a new institutional logic is usually not evident, and takes 
some time to become dominant, hence coexisting with previous dominant logics. Thus, there is an 
increase in complexity (GUI-2), therefore managing institutional complexity becomes one of the 
chief governing challenges (SOP-3).  
This activation process is compounded and informed by recurrent awareness and accessibility 
processes analysed above.  
The institutional complexity during the different stages has different sources. First, it arises from 
the liberalization of the economy and the elimination of most sources of protectionism and the 
promotion of free competition. The advent of democracy is the next major source of institutional 
complexity for organizations used to operate in an apparently politically neutral environment. The 
third cause of complexity is the awakening of a distrusting, empowered civil society unprepared 
to accept traditional corporate governance practices, and enraged by systematic abuses, frauds, and 
collusions, as well as upset by the discovery of a parallel world of political cronyism and business-
politicians’ corrupt interactions (BPO-2; SOP-3). 
Each one of these stages had an accompanying gap to close. The first stage had an efficiency gap 
that required both focusing and activating the governing function on maximizing profits, 
developing competitive skills to survive and grow, although occasionally it derived into market 
abuses, exploitation of SMEs, and illegal collusions. The second stage presented the challenge of 
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maintaining prosperity in a politically exposed context. Consequently, it brought a mutual 
adjustment between business and political actors oriented to co-exist, align and, in the background, 
controlling external powers-that-be, through donations, contributions, gifts and shadow salaries 
for related state agents, deriving in corruption and cronyism. The third stage is derived from the 
downside of the two previous stages. Thus, the gap organizations need to close implies attempting 
to recover their legitimacy in front of an open, transparent, distrusting and interconnected society 
(BUI-1;2; GUI-2). Governing would mean in this context, social bonding and becoming socially 
invested in a fairer society, being accountable and dealing successfully with challenging 
stakeholders. 
Empirically, the strategies used by actors to handle institutional complexity in each period are 
diverse and multifaceted (see Theoretical Sampling in Chapter 6 for current activating strategies). 
The market institutional logic was discernible by the incorporation of new talent at both the board 
and organizational levels [MAN-1;2; REG-2]. The power institutional logic drove into an 
influence-building process through the inclusion of politicians at board level. And the institutional 
logic centred around (dis) trust is challenging organizations to attempt to collaborate with society 
at large; a process which, according with participants are making boards question their interactions 
with their stakeholders (GUI-2; MAN-1,2; SOP-2]. Therefore, some call for an “creative 
introspection” [SOP-2] at the governing level to try to find new answers to current challenges.  
7.4	 Credibility	&	Evaluation	of	the	Theory	
Despite not committing to the whole set of GT and AR, these research methodologies provide 
some tenets to help evaluating the emerging theory. 
7.4.1	Evaluation	from	the	GT	Perspective	
Glaser (1978) proposes that the criteria for evaluating how credible a grounded theory is “fit… 
work … relevance … [and] modifiability” (pp. 4-5).  
1. The conceptual categories of the emerging theory should fit the data: the categories theorized 
need to match the behaviours conceptualized (Loy, 2010).  
2. A theory should work by being able to explicate what has happened, predict what is going to 
happen, and decode what is happening in the area researched.  
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3. The theory should have relevance to the ongoing action of the area “because it allows core 
problems and [basic social] processes to emerge” (p.5). 
4. The theory is alive in the sense that it can be easily modifiable in case further ideas may appear 
out of new data Holton (2007). 
In my case I started with an AR approach and I borrowed parts of the GT “package” to enrich it 
and extract an emerging theory. This is however, what most researchers do (Ellwood, 2017, 
personal communication), arguably due to the demanding tenets of Classic GT. However, I have 
made all the possible to stay close to the data and open to emerging concepts, and I have applied 
the constant comparison, memos, and theoretical sampling procedures. Consequently, the 
emergent theory should be evaluated in terms of its relevance to main actors in the governance 
arena. 
7.4.2	Evaluation	from	the	Perspective	of	Participants	
In this research the purpose was “developing with the contributions of the participants a “theory 
of practice” that might be useful to understand what is going on in the field, be relevant for their 
practical endeavours, fit their lived realities and work as source of reflection and inspiration for 
action to inform, actualise and contribute to the eventual remodelling of their actions in practice, 
if appropriate”. It was built upon participation. It aimed overall at contributing practical 
knowledge. The research methods were as transparent as possible, given the nature of the research 
and the ethical requests of the University of Liverpool, and it attempted to preserve the voices of 
the participants. The underlying goal was to act as a sounding board to real actors and change 
agents, that is, influential actors in the governance arena, informed by the outcome of this research. 
I tackle in a later section the requested self-critique as researcher. And I analyse next the sense-
making results from the viewpoint of participants to evaluate the impact beyond the situated 
context, 
Next, I report the interactions developed with the group of 12 participants in the last round of 
interviews. 
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Table	14	-	Evaluating	Fit,	Work	&	Relevance	
	 AWARENESS STRATEGIES: 
• Questioning	
• Interpreting	the	dominant	
institutional	logic		
• Recognizing	past	pitfalls	
ACCESSIBILITY STRATEGIES: 
• Searching	role	models		
• Learning	from	Institutional	
Entrepreneurs		
• Processing	experiences	
ACTIVATING STRATEGIES: 
• Institutional	complexity-
reducing	strategies		
• Reflexion-in-action	
• Purposeful	movements	
PHI-3 “Now we need to observe critically: 
Managers from your same school, you feel 
that if he studied in your same university, 
that you already know him, you assume he 
has the same values, you drop your guard, 
but it is not true…” 
 “… [there is a group of] very hard-
working, studious young people, who 
are very critical, no one comes from 
Tabancura [an elite school] …. [there 
are] various social movements, study 
groups and young opinion leaders [to 
whom we should be listening].” 
“We should not look like we are 
accumulating economic, moral and 
political power.” 
“[after a scandal] now we are taking 
very good decisions and we have 
renewed the full team. 
“To open major instances of reflection 
and forming new board members… a 
new [family] member entered into the 
board...”  
“We should not abandon the public 
debate … maintain the interest for public 
policies… 
SOP-3 “Politics stopped being territorial and 
about social classes, and has become [a 
matter of] networks, interests, … the 
diversification of a very heterogeneous 
society in terms of interests… and politics is 
always the articulation of interests … and to 
be able to group them through networks, is 
something that is much more difficult …” 
	
“…don’t be blinded by a hyper-
ideological vision of the current 
situation… In other situations, while 
the big industrialists had the same 
[negative] discourse, other 
entrepreneurs were buying 
companies, because they understood 
that other options were open, and that 
different escapes might exist … or 
perhaps they had better information” 
““You need to introduce risks and 
uncertainty, degrees of variance over the 
domain of the future, … To invest in 
Brazil: you listed risks, costs and 
synergies…and perhaps socio-economic 
risks … [but] you did not know how to 
put the thermometer… Brazil is a hell of 
a country: its trajectory is unpredictable. 
This questions McKinsey models, they 
were not able to foresee this dimension. 
REG-3 “There have been cultural changes in the 
business community, this is part of the 
evolution of the model, there is a 
convergence of patterns … Formerly white-
collar crimes did not look so bad”  
	
	
 “Chile is a small elephant, so it 
cannot go far from the herd … the 
international organizations, …so 
Chile dictates laws, and international 
guidelines are being implemented 
[following] OECD, Basel rules for 
banks, insurance, etc.”	
“Boards have changed in the last few 
years, a strong change has been required 
to protect the firm, and its values, its 
identity, to have long term viability, to 
avoid a decline in its social value” 
“There are changes in practices, there 
are punishments, and values are being 
inculcated…” 
“…a collective monitoring is permitted”	
FIN-3 “Competition has a power, the power of 
disempowering, to take away the 
“… you need good people, all the 
time. For instance, Felipe Irarrazaval 
in FNE [Anti-Trust Agency], he was 
chosen by [right-wing President] 
“in boards you must be more careful 
with executives, to be two or three 
degrees more cautious” 
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[excessive] power that goes beyond your 
capabilities” 
“Institutional frameworks have infinite 
value… good rules … Chile made very good 
ones. …[but] they have to be reviewed all 
the time…” 
Piñera despite his [left-wing] political 
ideas, … [select leaders] on merit … 
we need good leaders” 
“corporate governance needs to be 
cared for and this is required to work 
well. But to work properly, it needs to 
be done well; persons do the change. 
A group of good guys is capable of 
changing people” 
“those who have the capacity of 
creating, they push, they can smell 
each other, they form teams, they 
introduce tremendous changes” 
“you have to take more care, be diligent 
with [your] prestige and name, in front 
of situations that might not appear 
elegant…to be more attentive in facing 
conflicts and exposure, … and 
conversations with competitors … in 
cocktails I have felt stupid, ...you cannot 
be in a picture, …. You must be careful 
with this intangible value. Today’s 
general standard demands very strict 
behaviour patterns in all these matters, 
anything which smacks of collusion, 
bribery and corruption …you have to be 
and to look. Be careful.”	
LAW-
3 
“[the] board does not manage the company. 
We are fed by external and internal 
[actors], …some doubts are not solved, you 
may not have the time to find out, or get it 
late. Do I need to know or not? You cannot 
bear the doubt. When the river sounds 
something is going on” 
“is the firm updated or left behind [in] 
political, social or technological changes 
…” 
“[ask] am I right? Permanently give your 
opinion, look around. … the world is not 
black and white, … there are many greys. 
How to have the time? Explain me why you 
think…listen and take the time to hear. 
There is no reflection in boards, you [just] 
believe one or the other…” 
“pension funds need to open up to 
[new] diverse directors…historians, 
academics, it is a more complex 
world.  Pension funds just involve 
financial guys. [that is] a poor 
perspective…” 
 “they [foreign multinational officers) 
need to understand how is Chile, the 
transcendence of boards, … they need 
to learn the concept of peership…. 
You need to feel that you are a peer, 
… not commanded, but [act as] a 
counsellor” 
	
	
“boards need to change their rhythm, 
listen to directors, respect, satisfy their 
doubts. They may change their 
perspectives.” 
“you need to find a form of exempting 
your responsibility… to make clear to the 
public opinion that you were informed, 
that you believed, that you were wrong, 
delimit carefully, be discreet… take 
risks... but with care …” 
“I am willing to cooperate, to be 
transparent, saying things the day 
before, pre-board meeting, check if 
postures are very different. Am I wrong? 
Possibility of mutual convincing. Don’t 
hit the ball in the board, no disloyalty in 
the board, … ask…perhaps you have 
received erroneous information…” 
GUI-3 “there is a group of people who 
understands, who tries to collaborate to fix 
all the mistakes we have made” 
“it is not stigmatizing, we all did it, but this 
changed. There is an introspection” 
“fair price and profit are matters that have 
a frame of reference, over the limit [they] 
are unbounded greed“  
“There is a very interesting 
movement. It is not taking distance, 
but the other way around, it is being 
more collaborative, to work for a 
change … without rupture … 
counsellors who are around 50 year’ 
old, who sit on the board of many 
companies, who are well disposed to 
change towards a culture of respect 
… to relate to the people … we are 
“we are working with a group of 
corporate governance, … we want to 
hold workshops, to preach, to create 
consciousness … none of us dares to 
throw the first stone, we all did the same 
stupid things… we are working …to 
share good practices, to change what 
needs to be changed … there is a good 
movement of people ….the ethics 
committee is great, we are trying to copy 
the good things … we want to bring an 
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making alliances with NGOs and 
others …” 
[international] guru… there is a good 
ambience” 
MAN-
3 
 “… many sectors need to be heard, they 
were not taken into consideration … 
stakeholders who are the raison d’être of 
business were lost from view” 
“Social legitimacy is lost in any scandal… 
immediately [seen as] guilty…laws are not 
enough …social capital is easily lost” 
“We need to regulate ourselves otherwise 
regulation will affect the business 
environment…and might inhibit 
entrepreneurship” 
“If people don’t feel that you are betting on 
society they ask you to settle your bill” 
“A few members of the new 
generation of industrialists are 
making the change, but it is slow and 
will take time and will also have 
consequences for Chile.” 
“New [upstart] entrepreneurs are 
very valuable, they are thinking out-
of-the-box, and they have no problem 
[to speak freely] because they are 
their own bosses… they have social 
capital… people identify with them” 
“These changes are common in the 
world and are exacerbated by social 
networks”	
“You need to create social capital, 
…measure that people is happy… to 
create welfare…efficient forms of 
combining capital and human 
resources” 
“We want to build a different way to 
relate to our stakeholders” … be 
proactive, to anticipate …” 
“All society [needs] to be included: the 
Church, the Army, everyone… in 
dialogue. Start with our own people, 
show interest, solve their problems, be in 
the ground … get involved and [try] to 
understand the social role of business”  
BPO-3 “…with collusion, frauds and others, … the 
justification of being an industrialist 
collapsed. It is now obsolete. Maximizing 
today has got different requirements. Before 
these things went unnoticed, but not 
anymore. It was an amoral logic… We must 
see how to change it; the way of being an 
entrepreneur in Chile has changed. We 
cannot continue with the logic of 20-or-
more years ago…” 
“…the change in paradigm, and in the 
cultural logic made sense…not only to do 
things well, but different in firms of today. 
“...it is evident that [old] articles of faith 
are not so today: ‘All that is free market is 
good and anti-market is bad’. The trend to 
collusion and cartels of the Chilean 
economy is a f*** one for a market 
economy. [Being a small country] we 
require more regulation than the US” 
 “I am an enthusiast of ASECH, … 
they have a challenging reaction in 
before the state”  
“…critical vision of business of today, 
ASECH is going out of the firm into 
the street. What they do not do for 
business no one else will do it” 
“Ethics is part of being an industrialist 
today. And the politics of being an 
entrepreneur [implies] a commitment to 
the environment, workers, suppliers and 
clients. There are politics [not only] 
products and services” 
“strategies to protect reputation… 
culture, communicating with the 
people… be very present as board 
leader, hands on. Not to play the role of 
controller but be close to the people. 
That the people who works with you feel 
that they cannot propose weird things, 
because they will upset you… There is a 
very special role for directors: to unify 
and make people feel enthusiasm with a 
common goal…”  
	
ENT “… we are in an age of networked 
intelligence, of openness, transparency, 
sharing and empowerment”  
“…the regulator does not give room 
to new entrants, what a hassle to deal 
with that! But if I make the regulator 
see the implications for his own job. If 
everyone was connected, the banking 
regulator would know in one second 
“…. we orchestrate parameters, there is 
so much value available after so much 
time intermediated.” 
“We are permitting self-governance. 
What is the minimal level of intervention 
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[what is going on], if creditors, money 
operators, etc. were connected… [it 
could say] please tell me….” 
“we want to have entrepreneurs in 
every public-private forum of analysis 
and discussion … to have the 
entrepreneurial perspective present” 
“we are asking the authority to 
become a promoter of competition, a 
guarantee of fair play, change the 
paradigm of regulator: mission of 
opening up industries to new entrants, 
to attribute value to them and commit 
with them” 
“Total transparency, this is our 
advantage, to involve everyone, and 
each one selects the information they 
want to use” 
to make the system work? We regulate 
the field, not the moves, [it is] a 
collaborative approach” 
“network without a unique centre, with 
more energy… we manage the network: 
maximum amount of information, utility, 
and trustable, a trust that feedbacks 
itself. I depurate the information and I 
give it back to you … and I inform those 
who comply” 
BUI-3 “Country Club has been getting diluted and 
losing collaboration and mutual 
commitment, by itself, there are new 
entrepreneurs, there are many NN [new 
people, not known] investing…” 
“[so-called] ‘natural’ relations between 
business and politics cannot continue going 
unnoticed. There is suspicion of hidden 
things” 
 “we industrialists, we were tremendously 
homogeneous in our basic ideas, in our 
free-market vision and nobody else 
represented these ideas. As political parties 
were not channels of expression [during the 
Pinochet Regime] … we played the role of 
Country Club, but with social mobility” 
““loss of power and prestige of the Country 
Club as social unified actor. Today, we can 
just aspire to have a legitimate voice “ 
	
	
“Regulation has been learning from 
new phenomena…noticing aspects, 
which were not seen earlier. There 
are new regulators, new industries…” 
“[actors] with vision are exercising 
leadership in a more personal way… 
there has been a generational change 
that has brought a new breed of 
entrepreneurs, who are each one 
working on their own” 
 “… [new start-ups] have been 
challenging the financial 
establishment, with technology, new 
products, new marketing, that obliges 
the incumbents to change … in our 
industry we are being obliged to be 
current, and that is a positive 
phenomenon for the country, the 
society” 
“the entrepreneurs are indignados but 
who did not stop to criticize but rather 
they are rolling up their sleeves 
without guarantee of success”  
 “industrialists [say] to the government: 
do whatever you like, but you will still 
need us” 
“some have dropped their heads: I better 
live off my rents, and so do not invest” 
“it’s going to be difficult for firms to live 
in a stable environment. Before I adapted 
to a new framework, but today, a stable 
frame doesn’t exist, but it is changing 
constantly. That is why managers need to 
learn to live with these innovations that 
affect your activity, new competitors, 
new start-ups, instability. You affront 
people that you don’t know. As a member 
of the Country Club, I knew 90% of the 
members, now it’s [just] 5%…” 
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“I see that [entrepreneurs] getting 
organized, creating an organization, a 
form of doing things, … they are 
achieving things” 
PEN-3 “Perception of attempts by the government 
to exacerbate a crisis and weaken and 
destroy the private pension funds system … 
due that [new] authorities are highly 
marked by ideology”  
“the regulator [innovated] asking us 
[a privately held financial service] to 
apply good practices of public 
companies in the board, adding two 
independent directors and a 
committee of external directors... “	
“we are questioning the [regulatory] 
methodologies applied in Chile” 
“we are asking the regulator to clarify 
its position … [ask the regulator] why 
are there press leaks? What is their 
idea? What are they trying to do…?”  
These testimonies provide a clear perspective on the insight process, the change agents acting as 
institutional entrepreneurs, and the consistent actions that are being adopted by main actors in the 
Chilean governance arena. And therefore, it flows how the paradigm is been slowly updated. 
7.4.3	Evaluation	from	the	Perspective	of	AL	Research	
I argue here that this research was under the Action Learning Research tenets (Rigg & Coglan 
(2016) by using Revans´s Alpha, Beta and Gamma Systems as summarised by Rigg (2014; 2015)   
• Alpha System: what is the actual reality of my current situation?  
The first round of interviews (see Appendix 2 for the three rounds) had as central topic taking 
stock of the historic corporate scandals from the point of view of the participants through 
questions oriented to remind them of the antecedents deriving into their current situation. Thus, 
the questions invited to reflect critically and understand their situation in a social, economic 
and political context. Examples of reflections are the following statements of LAW: 
o “…feelings of rage, disappointment of some friends, deception, frustration of a system, 
uneasiness because many people might think that I am part of the same group…hard 
feelings about individuals, which I thought were right persons … today we are 
transparent…. we have learnt on the hard way, seeing our friends falling down.  I believe 
that in matter of governance an era died. A phase in which there was much abuse and easy 
money, things that cannot be done again. We are nowadays in a new page. Thanks to God.” 
[LAW-1]. 
Thus, the questioning implied a contemplation process for the participants consistent with 
critical practice by conveying a reflecting process, that is “thinking about” their own situation 
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and problematizing the usual professional practices of their milieu as problems with real and 
significant consequence for their peers and themselves. 
• Beta System: what should I learn more about? What should I consider and examine more? 
What should be my approach to analyse the situation?  
The second round of interviews was designed based on the experience, analysis and reflection 
about the first round of interviews. The questions were consistent with the purpose of helping 
participants to reflect deeper, to imagining new options and new ways of learning and acting. 
Examples of this are the following statements by [-2]:  
o “We have a major communication deficit in my company. We are wondering how to 
communicate better. How to get closer to the people? Young folks are willing to get closer 
to the people. We need to dare to ask questions between different generations… we have 
played with our prestige as group in the past…. As if we have earned and owned our 
prestige…we have fallen behind… our new leaders need to be younger, brave and 
daring…. Do not lose the bond with people. Avoid disqualifying people who think 
differently. To reach out for them…we need to be much more involved. If we are the largest 
company investing in the area, how cannot we do it along with the community? How not 
to think everything from the first day? How to impact positively the community?” [PHI-2] 
In this second round we see the participants voicing, that is “talking about” (Rigg, 2014; 2015) 
evaluating the potential introduction of alternative leaders, overall in an exploring mode of 
different conducts, approximations and approaches, as well as suggesting trials, experiments, 
and reviewing new possibilities. Again, this takes a critical stance towards past behaviours and 
previous front-runners. 
• Gamma System: what am I discovering about how to act in the current situation? How finding 
out more about the situation might alter the way I act and how I learn?  
The third round was again feed-forwarded by the second round and it took a more dynamic 
perspective by reviewing current strategies, outcomes and potential risks and ongoing actions. 
Example of such are the following statements: 
o “We are experimenting social complexity. So, we are now talking with our clients to 
explain them that they need to train their people, set new values, a new culture, new 
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contracts, empower compliance officers, establish new policies, and engage a new kind of 
executives. This is key to do international business nowadays… These conversations with 
you have helped me to formalise what is in my mind… to raise new concerns, doubts…for 
instance, I have been trying to create a new think tank, a centre to strengthen public social 
debate…” [REG-3] 
This final round finds the participants “enacting”, that is putting into practice, both for them 
and for others, sharing with them their new insights and learning.  This reflection in action 
takes again a critical perspective (Callahan, Rigg & Sambrook, 2015).  
Therefore, the three rounds imply the incorporation of new meaning and attaching to it a critical 
outlook, becoming on time a critical action. As proposed by Rigg and Trehan (2004) and Pedler 
(2005), the process seems to have helped the participants to see in context the dominant social 
situation in order to appreciate how it could be altered and transformed to improve it. Thus, we 
can esteem that it has not only been an exercise of Action Learning Research, but Critical 
Action Learning Research. 
Concluding our analysis if we evaluate the AL in terms of Pedler, Burgoyne & Brook (2005)´s 
distinctions we can argue that it has been an exercise of Critical Auto-Action Learning holding the 
12 participants responsible for understanding their own interpersonal and institutional practices, 
creating and evaluating options and exploring eventual changes (Pedler et al., 2005). This implied 
reviewing their own past, present and future actions as a repeated exercise, problematizing their 
behaviours and those of their peers, helping them recognise the importance of the problem, for 
them, their organizations, and society-at-large,  facilitating them to recognizing progress, 
identifying comrades-in-adversity aiming at seeing progress on the problem, and foreseeing 
difficulties and opposition, and overall helping them -often just by being present, attentive and 
close-  to maintaining in view the benefit (as well as the risks) of (not) reducing or (not) solving 
the problem of governing according with the institutional logics coming from age. Thus, the 
recognition of power relations and structures associated to critical theories has been present in the 
exercise. Besides the interactions made them review and explore the demands of “responsible 
citizenship and personally and socially rewarding lives and careers” (ibid, p.59). In this context, 
this researcher played permanently the role of facilitator, and in three of the cases as mentor or 
coach of the participants in front of their challenges [PEN; PHI; FIN]. 
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7.5	 Discussion	
7.5.1	Governing	&	Institutional	Logics	
As explained above the three sub-processes associated to minding the corporate governing gap are 
transversal to the three stages, and bring diverse definitions of what is governing, what is its 
purpose and scope of action, questions intimately linked to institutional logics. 
According with Westphal & Zajac (2013) Institutional Theory permits broadening the perspective 
of an emerging Behavioural Theory of Corporate Governance by taking a macro viewpoint, which 
allows viewing theories of corporate governance, such as agency or stakeholder theories as 
“institutional logics” (Friedland & Alford, 1991) containing culturally consistent “social 
prescriptions” (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, p. 28) and “organizing principles that furnish 
guidelines to actors as to how to behave” (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003, p. 797). This is very 
useful in conceptualising the three stages analysed above, especially in terms of studying the 
evolution of the institutional logics of governance as a societal-level transformation, including 
consequent re-organizations aligned with such logic –an attempt rarely accomplished in empirical 
research according with several relevant investigators (Westphal & Zajac, 2013; Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Scott & Davis, 2007).  
Minding the corporate governing gap as a basic social process allows conceptualising the 
determinants of top-down institutional change. These important sources of institutional evolution 
have been rarely researched and normally left to speculation in literature. It also permits 
considering bottom-up receptivity of certain organizations to new logics of governance: an 
important aspect, given its relevance as possible precursors of institutional change at the level of 
society-at-large (Westphal & Zajac, 2013).  
The economic institutional logic implies conceptualising governing as directing an organization to 
maximize its value for its shareholders. This in the context of a very simplified and quite stylized 
rational system (Scott & Davis, 2007), following the Friedman principles and echoing on the one 
hand, a fiduciary definition (Chait, Ryan & Taylor, 2005) associated to assuring capital providers 
the protection of their investments. Thus, the primary focus of the board around the goal of 
generating an appropriate return on the funds invested (Aguilera et al., 2018 Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). The logic also implies a strategic perspective in terms of governing as planning, monitoring 
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and achieving corporate goals (Chait, Ryan & Taylor, 2005). Naturally, during most of the period 
in which this market logic ruled an external perspective of corporate governance -beyond tactical 
relationships with clients, suppliers and shareholders- was not an issue, partially explained by 
social forces contained by an authoritarian regime and a controlled press. So, governing would 
tend to be systematically confused with managing. 
The political institutional logic implies conceptualising governing as a natural system (Scott & 
Davis, 2007) in line with the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer, 2003). That is governing an 
organization to ensure its survival and autonomy, under the motto: “power trumps profits” (Davis 
& Cobb, 2010), where power, not just the previous logics of rationality and efficiency goal is key 
in understanding organizational behaviours. This matches the idea of governing relations with 
extra-organizational exchange partners so as to reduce uncertainty and external dependence (Davis 
& Cobb, 2010). The Resource Dependence Theory goes as far as proposing that “… an 
organization can manage uncertainty by inviting a representative of the source of constraint onto 
its governing board, thus trading sovereignty for support … [thus] ...corporations reliant on 
government contracts might invite former senators and cabinet members to join the board to gain 
contacts and signal legitimacy. The expectation is that having a representative serving on the board 
provides the source of constraint with a vested interest in the dependent organization’s survival” 
(Davis & Cobb, 2010 pp. 7-8). This is consistent with Hillman (2005)’s finding that highly 
regulated corporations have more ex-politicians as board members than companies in less-
regulated sectors.  
Given the dearth of investigations, the empirical evidence in Chile is small but significant (Bucheli 
& Salvaj, 2014), and coincides with the observations of participants in this research, and the simple 
observation of the composition of boards of utility companies, transportation, banking, pension 
funds and telecoms corporations, among others. The interlocking directors and elite studies in 
Spain by Baena (2002) and Rubio & Garrúes (2015), among others, affirm the hypothesised 
awareness and accessibility of Spanish SOEs to corporate governance practices involving 
politicians, for most of the XX Century.  In general, the rationale is that former politicians work 
as mediums of valuable information and provide access to critical political resources, which are 
beneficial to companies operating in regulated, politicised and government-dependent 
environments. 
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Thus, governing could be understood in this stage as co-existing, aligning and attempting to control 
the powers-that-be, by co-opting them as members of the elite Country Club. 
The social institutional logic implies a notion of governing within an open system (Scott & Davis, 
2007), closer to the more recent works of Foucault (2000, 2011; Ramos, 2013; Dean, 2010), who 
questions the continued association of governance with the state. Foucault précises that the role of 
regulating conducts, which used to be performed by the state was further developed when they 
were transferred to private enterprises, educational, health and religious organizations. Thus, 
drawing from Foucault (2000) I relate governing to the set of procedures, forms of analysis, 
calculations, dispositive, and social-scientific knowledge and related technologies, which 
legitimise from a distance the conduct of individuals congregated in human groups, with the 
purpose of regulating increasingly complex organizational, socio-economic and environmental 
processes. 
In the case of Chile, governing organizations in a context of deep distrust implies; establishing 
social bonds; becoming invested in society welfare; being socially accountable; and maintaining 
fair dealings with challenging stakeholders, all while targeting both economic and social-value 
creation. 
Comparing the emerging theory with Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury (2012) is of interest in so far 
as they distinguish between transformational and developmental change in institutional logics. 
They offer a taxonomy of forms of change and their definitions, within these two categories. In 
this research we observe elements of both kind of processes.  On the one hand, it forms part of a 
transformational change, in the sense that a traditional logic is being partially replaced by a new 
one.  However, rather than full replacement, it is more a blending of two or more previous logics 
with a new one. On the other hand, it is also a developmental change, as there are elements of 
assimilation, taken as the incorporation of external (global influence) dimensions.  Perhaps this is 
due to the relatively small size of Chile’s economy when combined with its notable openness to 
the outside world. However, there is also an elaboration reinforcing the process, and an expansion 
in the scope of the new logic. Therefore, as the figure shows, it is an add-on, layering process, in 
which a traditional logic is enriched, complemented and “completed” by the new logics. Naturally, 
the outcome is a major increase in the complexity associated with governing. Indeed, the governing 
process implies a continual minding of the institutional gaps, that recur in the historical and 
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contextual process.  A process mostly propelled by the comprehension and assimilation of the 
challenges associated with the new institutional logic, as well as by the example and influence of 
institutional entrepreneurs, in addition to the concrete actions attempting to reduce the uncertainty 
in front of the institutional evolution and its progressive complexity.  
7.5.2	Governing	in	Practice	
Therefore, I argue that governing in any contemporary organization extends to considering, 
evaluating, and taking a position vis-à-vis the diverse institutional logics available at a global, 
national, field, community, professional and organizational level, in terms of their implied 
governance practices. 
As seen from the participants’ experience, an awareness of corporate governance is assumed 
explicitly and implicitly to derive automatically from taking a position in a board.  However, of 
late it has tended to be more of a conscious and ongoing action, given the increasing condition of 
open systems surrounding an organization and the introduction of factors of heightened 
complexity. 
1. Governing in practice increasingly implies contemplating the interactions between established 
incumbents, challenging newcomers and associated stakeholders as social exchanges. This 
gives rise to alternative corporate governance practices. The rationale is that an increase in the 
level of interactions between diverse factions - especially those including institutional 
entrepreneurs - acts as a source of information and diffusion about a variety of corporate 
governance practices, allowing organizations to access such diversity directly and so 
expanding installed governing capabilities [SOP-2]. 
2. Governing in practice increasingly implies activating corporate policies and practices aligned 
with regulation, given stricter enforcement of (newly) established rules. In the Chilean case, it 
means leaving behind past expectations of exceptionality [PEN-1]. Transition from a natural 
system into an open system implies foreclosing on calculated alignments between public and 
private parties, which hitherto had allowed special treatment / consideration by state agencies 
given the opaqueness (lack of transparency) [ENT-2]. Therefore, “improving” corporate 
governance practices are expected to reduce their corporate deviance and increase effective 
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compliance while, predictably, many actors may try to maintain their strategic decoupling 
(Oliver, 1991).  
3. Governing in practice implies attention to the increased degree of transparency of corporate 
governance practices. This implies more consideration of what should be done, in terms of 
feasibility, acceptability and desirability from an organizational point-of-view (Alasuutari & 
Qadir, 2014). Therefore, organizations should tend to revise the visibility of their corporate 
governance practices and – over time - move away from their historical zone of conformity 
(Aguilera et al., 2018 GUI-1; 3, LAW-1).  
4. Governing in practice implies responding to the demands for social accountability. That means 
becoming increasingly aware of expectations, criticisms, and unsatisfied requests from the 
governing institutions, the field, and organizational surroundings. Naturally, that implies 
rational analysis by the board and senior management, but increasingly, such evaluation will 
tend to include a sense of corporate duty, and a revision of their alignment with the corporate 
values, and the implications derived from the predominant institutional logics [REG-2; MAN-
2; GUI-1]. 
5. Governing in practice brings both the challenge and the opportunity of developing an exercise 
of reflection [SOP-2] to incorporate both extended social and private value, all of which will 
tend to increase its fitness with society. This added value is intimately related to the dominant 
institutional logics and the capacity of introspection, and effectively echoing the results 
throughout the organization. 
6. Governing in practice implies transcending; challenging and at some point - possibly - 
abandoning the organizational alignment with the dominant institutional logic [GUI-2]. The fit 
with the institutional logic is likely to be both a source of value creation and organizational 
obsolescence at some point in time. Therefore, organizations will need to review their 
alignment if they are going to survive and prosper. Thus, alternative emergent institutional 
logics should work as permanent sources of corporate governance renewal. 
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CHAPTER	8	-	CONCLUSIONS		
In this research I have investigated how the logic of institutional governance has evolved in Chile 
during a period of 44 years using mixed methods derived partially from Grounded Theory and 
Action Research methodologies.  
A basic social process of minding the corporate governing gap across institutional paradigms has 
emerged. Three sub-processes compound this core variable: Interpreting the dominant 
institutional logic; Learning from Institutional Entrepreneurs; and Activating Institutional 
uncertainty-reducing strategies. The first one corresponds to a process of awareness of alternative 
institutional logic and its derived corporate governance practices. The second is a process of 
accessibility to specific corporate governance practices through observation, imitation and/or 
learning from institutional entrepreneurs. The last one relates to the process of putting in practice, 
that is activating the new corporate governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2018).  
The three sequential institutional logics identified can each be related to extant literature.  First, a 
predominant economics logic that matches New Institutional Economics theories (North, 1990) 
and Scott (1987)’s rational system, that can be related to governing as economizing à la Friedman. 
Second, a dominant political logic, matching Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003) and Scott (1987)’s natural system. And then there’s a social one, like Institutional Theory 
(DiMaggio, 1998) and Scott (1987)’s open system. Interestingly, these logics can be directly 
related to influential international events: 
1. The Cold War and the radical postures of such a political divide, arguably fostering the early 
adoption of the free-enterprise models endorsed by the University of Chicago. 
2. The democratization process, implying a convergent process between the business elites and 
the socialist authorities, further facilitated by the incorporation of politicians on to the boards, 
which was rapidly adopted in Chile following the examples of Spanish SOEs. 
3. The emergence of global social movements against established powers, that also hit Chile in 
2011, commencing an era of deep questioning of elites and their corporate governance 
practices, which remain to this day. 
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8.1	 Contributions	to	Research		
Lorsch (2012, p.134) has asked: who should act as convener of new governance practices, listing 
among possible candidates: stock exchanges, lawyers, business leaders, academics and authorities. 
He insists, however, on the convenience of providing a forum in which governance issues can be 
explored and agreements be made. Naturally, this thesis stops short of the actions required to 
explicitly providing for such a forum. However, the possibility of engaging managerial elites, with 
pivotal influence, through interlocking boards might be part of a larger change-process; and could 
be part of a series of initiatives contributing to set the wheels in motion to up-date Chilean 
governance practices – although such a long-term initiative goes well beyond the scope and time-
frame of this research. 
This research is distinctive in the following aspects, namely by: 
• Involving part of the main actors, ‘managerial elites’ in Pettigrew’s terms (1995), it attempts 
to capture a major angle of the Chilean “corporate governance system” in its completeness by 
including the principal kind of actors present in the system provides a holistic perspective, 
scarce in research and of high practical value in practice;  
• Using an approach derived from Action Research ethos, it offered a new application of mixed 
methods, in which the Action Learning method was used as a learning process enriching both 
the participants and permitting to extract conclusions and lessons for professional practice;  
• Propelling a drive towards eventually produce a small contribution to promote change in the 
Chilean governance system, by reinforcing reflection, observation and mobilizing leading 
actors into action; who at their turn might act as conveners of a new and improved governance 
paradigm might also produce a major impact in practice. 
This research is an attempt at systemizing the evolution of corporate governance in the context of 
an emerging market - an under-researched topic and, in the process; it makes the following 
scholarly contributions: 
1. Linking different institutional governance logics to diverse (current) theories, which are used 
implicitly or explicitly by the primary actors in processing their governing problems –thus 
contributing to a small - but growing - stream of scholarly research interested in how theories 
model and impact reality (Westphal & Zajac, 2013). 
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2. Postulating the terms “governing” as an interpretive task of primary actors of institutional 
logics, mainly aimed to manage themselves amid institutional complexity.   
3. Illustrating empirically a process view of corporate governance, including the stages of 
awareness, accessibility and activation (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012; Aguilera et al., 
2018). 
4. Incorporating the role of institutional entrepreneurs as interpreters, learners, promoters and 
diffusors of new governance practices. 
5. Defining and explaining the macro and micro links between institutions, logics, organizations 
and actors. 
6. Exploring the non-linear interconnections between global events and local occurrences 
affecting a small country - acting usually as net taker of world trends, and how, because of 
some of these same events, the country has a chance to take a lead in new global developments. 
7. Empirically illustrate how diverse institutional logics interact, supersede and increase the level 
of complexity of the governing function. 
8.2	 Limitations		
The acknowledgement of limitations should start by reminding ourselves that the aim of an 
emerging theory is not a detailed report of data, but a cohesive set of interrelated concepts, 
revealing the main concern of participants and the underlying pattern of actions used recurrently 
to resolve their prime concern. Besides, the theory is restricted to one emergent basic social 
process. It does seek to explain everything about Chilean corporate governance endeavours, and 
it is not a definitive viewpoint - a the theory should be readily modifiable where new data comes 
to light, so enriching and illuminating other aspects or even contradicting the prevailing theory.  
Therefore, minding the corporate governing gap is an emerging basic social process – others may 
well exist – that appears or prevails in time. An emerging characteristic of the theory uncovers the 
primary challenge of the time and may stay relevant while the theory is able to stay close-to-the-
ground and relevant to the participants’ concerns of (Glaser & Holton, 2005a; 2005b; Loy, 2010). 
The main limitations of this study are: 
The Institutional Construction of Corporate Governance in Chile – G. Jiménez-Seminario 	
	 115	
1. This has been a process of learning-by-doing. The author has borrowed parts of the 
methodology from Grounded Theory, to enrich an AR inspired project. As such, quite possibly 
some contradictions may not have been resolved. However, as an attenuate, any drift should 
be considered minor and the natural result of a pragmatically-guided outcome – consistent with 
my own epistemological and ontological basis. 
2. The full compatibility of the Action Research and parts of Grounded Theory methods may be 
questioned. However, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, there is evidence in the 
research community of this kind of combination. In general, the reasons behind this type of 
combination is to grant the researcher the ability to propose a substantive theory, whilst 
profiting from the richer and deeper interactions on the ground, enhanced by AR’s more 
participative and open approach. 
3. The data sampled in this research was only drawn from 12 actors. It goes without saying that 
this is a small number and the outcome might be very particular and specific to these particular 
actors and so not representative of the general concerns and the on-going basic social 
processes. However, both AR and GT methods are designed to work with relatively reduced 
samples. And, given the exploratory and in-depth approaches associated to such methods, 
small numbers of informants/participants are generally considered appropriate in qualitative 
research methodologies. 
4. The data originates from a specific period and for a specific country.  Therefore, the questions, 
answers and reflections the participants might be biased by recent events and might lack 
temporal representativeness. However, as explained above, the “live laboratory” producing 
data is permanently in movement and might experience changes and evolve over time. Thus, 
the only way of producing an active theory is to stay close to lived realities. In addition, this 
research has proposed a substantive theory aiming at transcending units, people and time, given 
that minding the corporate governing gap implies an ongoing reflection, learning and 
consistent actions, which imply the adaptation to evolving realities. Finally, any study of 
different periods of time or different theoretical sampling choices, might permit discovering 
other basic social processes, which might, in turn, explain the participants’ more generic and 
latent concerns while offering possibilities of continuing to refine the theory. Nevertheless, 
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given the richness of the data, there is a possibility that minding the corporate governing gap 
is relevant among other potential alternatives remains tall. 
5. The research has covered the Chilean reality and cannot be extrapolated to other national 
realities. However, cross-border theoretically sampling of realities might produce more generic 
and rich propositions and a more solid or, perhaps at a more developed stage, even a formal 
theory. 
Therefore, despite the inevitable limitations of this research, this study is coherent with the 
methods employed and the philosophical posture. And it has endeavoured to respect the broad 
Action Research ethos of the DBA programme, while attempting to propose a theory of practical 
relevance for practitioners. At the same time, it seeks to contribute to scholarly knowledge. 
8.3	 Implications	for	Corporate	Governing	in		Practice	
1. To approach the governing function in practice, it is not the traditional industrial organization 
notion, which should be considered but the field as a contested space of incumbents, 
challengers and stakeholders. Such a conceptualisation gives a practical perspective to inform 
governing actions, by considering political actors, institutional entrepreneurs and social 
movements, the press, and diverse social networks, among others. 
2. Actors in governance need to realise that the fields they operate in are interconnected with 
diverse national and global fields. This implies not only moving from an introvert perspective, 
centred on the organization, towards regarding the social impact of their organizations, but 
also connecting themselves with macro events occurring in diverse parts of the world.  
3. The traditional business rationale for governance practice appears incomplete and urgently 
needs balancing in a generalised context of legitimacy, given the level of exposure, 
transparency and suspicion of elites (Mayol, 2016). 
4. The image of actions occurring “behind closed doors” (Carter & Lorsch, 2004) that used to be 
valid to reflect the traditional intimacy of the board discussions needs to be brought into the 
21st Century. Nowadays making transparent contingences is commonplace. Thus, legitimacy 
needs to be revered in the board and both within and without the organization. 
5. Reading, interpreting and learning-by-doing appear as key activities in promoting an 
organisation’s adaptation to institutional change. 
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6. Institutional entrepreneurs are the actors to watch, to learn from and, eventually, to follow as 
they provide insights into how best to manage in face of complexity, given that those actors 
are the ones taking stable fields out of their equilibrium and/or showing the way to restore said 
equilibrium. 
7. The appropriate management of these concepts has been shown to turn complexity into creative 
governing strategies. It can be a source of value-creation via exercises of deliberate exposure 
to stakeholders and “creative introspection” [SOP-2].  
8.4	 Implications	for	Future	Research		
This research is exploratory, qualitative and tentative and each of the propositions made can (and 
should) be tested by further studies. These propositions are deliberately set as falsifiable statements 
to facilitate such a task. 
In addition, there is an interesting opportunity of exploring the possibility of turning the emerging 
theory into a formal theory by extending and diversifying the settings and contexts of study 
(Glaser, 2007). For instance, other Latin American countries might be considered, or other 
emerging markets across the world or other historical periods in the currently developed countries, 
at previous stages of their development. It might also be interesting to study countries in recent 
political transition. 
The ideas developed in this research could be further and more closely and formally connected 
with the behavioural theory of corporate governance proposed by Westphal & Zajac (2013) and 
their colleagues. 
Another line of interesting research might be connecting this emerging theory of governing as 
minding institutional logics with the study of reflexive elites, as carried out by Maclean, Harvey 
and Chia on British and French elites (2010; 2012) and Nayak for the Indian business elite (Nayak, 
Maclean, Harvey and Chia (2007).  
Finally, extending the common understanding of governance to a broader vision of governing 
inspired in the notions proposed by Foucault (2000) would be conducive to encompassing the 
increased complexity of corporate governance practices in the current era of corporate turmoil. 
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8.5	 Reflections	on	Learning,	Action,	Implications	and	Contributions		
In this section I provide my own reflections on the whole thesis process. I have organized my 
reflections in an attempt to explain how my questions evolved throughout the process; how the  
learning developed during this research has been propelling new behaviours and informing my 
current professional initiatives; what (I believe) participants learnt from the exchanges and my 
perception of the ensuing changes in their behaviour. I also engage with my initial concerns 
referred in the Preface, and I report the emerging actions beginning to happen.	
a) The evolution of my questions: My initial set of questions evolved and changed as, through my 
readings, I became more familiar with Grounded Theory. I started with the research questions: 
What are the challenges faced by the main actors in the corporate arena deriving from socio-
political-economic institutional changes in the period 1973 to 2016? How did those actors 
address these challenges and what were their corresponding governance strategies? The 
changes were related to the Grounded Theory turn of my research. This is due primarily to the 
fact that GT does not work with formal research questions but more with research interests 
(Charmaz, 2006). GT incorporates implicit questions or aspects to make observations about, 
for example “what is going on?”, “what are the participants´ main concern?”, “what are 
participants doing to resolve their issues?”, “what process are they using to deal with their 
problems?”. Therefore, I adapted my questions to make them compatible with both GT and 
AR. My original research questions were influenced by my readings of Glaser and his 
colleagues and evolved into the following: 
• What	is	going	on	in	the	corporate	governance	(CG)	arena?	
• What	are	the	main	actors	in	the	governance	arena	doing	about	CG?	and	
• What	can	be	learned	about	CG?	
This evolution in my research questions represented a trade-off when combining both GT and 
AR. It was also consistent with my pragmatic philosophical posture.  
b) Taking stock of my own learning: This thesis is an account of an intensive learning journey, in 
which I deepened my understanding of prevalent governance theories and research 
methodologies.  And, through my exchanges with the participants, I was able to gain access to 
the inner-workings of the Chilean elites. However, the most rewarding aspect of this project 
came from the insights it gave me into Chile’s institutional working logic, namely in 
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deciphering how the country is ruled and gaining privileged knowledge of the practicalities of 
how organizations are really governed.  As a reflective scholar-practitioner, this conferred on 
me both professional and ethical responsibilities in attempting to balance business acumen and 
social sensitivity, with the rigours of scientific research.  
My learning also took place at the conceptual level. I discovered corporate governance as a 
social construction dynamically intertwining practices, dilemmas and theories (Bevir, 2011).  
This helps explain why I have tended to privilege the conceptualisation around the construct 
governing (as a counterpoint to governance) as it goes well beyond just business issues. This 
helped expand my comprehension of business organizations and begin seeing them as both 
private entities and public institutions embedded in society, which are, consequently, 
influenced by the economic, political, and sociocultural forces that shape their corporate 
destiny - as argued by Warren, (2003). In an emerging market setting, the adequate or 
inadequate corporate governance conduct of large business groups is key in shaping a nation’s 
destiny – especially given important roles private sector corporations play in providing 
employment and efficiently producing wealth for the society (Judge Douglas & Kutan, 2008). 
But those leading entities might also contribute to diminishing or widening socio-economic 
inequalities, preserving or altering the natural environment, and promoting or avoiding fraud 
and malfeasance. All these events influence the fundamental legitimacy of business in society. 
This is why, first, I make a point of arguing for the recognition of the institutional construction 
of corporate governing in Chile so as to emphasise its overarching scope - well beyond the 
traditional functional and structural aspects of corporate governance, which are well 
established in existing literature. To my mind, this has profound implications on our 
understanding and encourages me to believe we can expect an on-going stream of corporate 
problems that go well beyond the lack of “best practices”:  
Second: we people make the difference everywhere we intervene, as humans we are driven by 
our interests but also by meaning systems, and that that makes us human creates deviance in 
corporate and institutional systems. This flags just how different and path-dependent is the 
development process of each country, and how much institutions might differ from one nation 
-or field- to another.   As a country’s institutional logics develop, mix and evolve, they drive 
to different outcomes at different moments of time. 
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c) Enacting my own learning: In practical terms, putting my learning into practice requires me to 
communicate the ideas I have developed here across many varied audiences. The first step 
(currently ongoing) involves 1-on-1 meetings with my 12 participants to present final results 
in an ordered and coherent manner, as distinct from the partial snapshots of findings and 
reflections I shared with them in previous rounds of interviews. This not only serves to close 
the loop with them, but will also attempt to leverage their influence, knowledge-base and 
networks to foster a larger impact. My aim is to advocate for a quicker and broader exposure 
and then wider deployment of my governing imperatives. All this	will	be	channelled	further	through	conferences	I	am	looking	to	organise	with	the	Corporate	Governance	Centre	of	my	academic	house,	The	Catholic	University	of	Chile,	 in	partnership	with	the	Harvard	Club	of	Chile,	of	which	I	am	also	an	active	member,	together	with	two	of	my	participants	who	will	be	invited	to	commentators	to	maximise	the	attractiveness	of	these	events	and	so	secure	the	interest	of	relevant	media.	These	efforts	are	already	currently	supported	through	a	series	of	short	columns	I	am	writing	and	having	published	in	the	Chilean	press.		I	 also	 have	 a	 short-term	 plan	 to	 join	 a	 radio	 network	 as	 panellist.	 Naturally,	 the	experience	and	knowledge	developed	serves	to	enhance	my	role	as	board	member	and	professor,	 giving	me	 a	multidimensional	 platform	 to	 spread	 these	 ideas.	 In	 this	 case,	although	I	have	no	plans	to	be	an	institutional	entrepreneur	–	like	the	ones	studied	in	this	thesis	-	I	am	looking	to	generate	considerable	public	awareness	with	a	view	to	becoming	a	voice/leader	in	promoting	the	new	governing	practices.	I	also	have	an	ambition	to	push	the	frontier	of	the	concept	of	governance	in	the	academic	community	which	I	see	as	overly	too	confined	to	board	functions,	as	it	needs	to	get	closer	to	the	institutional	setting,	as	I	have	argued	in	the	previous	section. 
d) Participants Learning and Practices: The participants demonstrate a broad understanding of 
the new realities of governing. The following lists some of the observable (or declared) actions 
of a sample of participants: 
• BUI is currently involved in a new initiative attempting to link business and society using 
the platform provided through his participation on a major business association. He affirms 
that our interactions have been valuable in giving him time to stop, reflect and process his 
thoughts before going back into action with fresh ideas and renewed energy;  
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• REG recognized the value of the framework developed in this thesis as offering a practical 
framework to assessing social complexity. He is contributing as a service provider to 
empower compliance officers and help corporations take stock of their new regulatory 
imperatives. He is also active trying to establish a new centre for social and public debate; 
• SOP: acknowledged the value of the framework in studying and demonstrating in a 
dynamic manner how events occurred in Chile over a long period, as well as the 
consequent adjustment process of organizations. SOP manifests to be attempting to deal 
in his board practice with the difficulties derived from illegitimacy installed as “the natural 
condition” of most organizations and national institutions from the viewpoint of society. 
This implies preparing his organization to face major conflicts in political, social and 
media settings; 
• ENT: has formed an electronic platform to provide access to new actors to become 
involved in politics, arguing that his is the first political party “without ideology”. His 
attempt is to democratize politics. He sees it as a way of breaking with monopolies of the 
past and creating opportunities for people who do not belong to the Country Club. 
e) Ongoing Actions: Confronting the initial concerns that led me to choose this topic, there are 
several developments of interest and new lines of activity, which can (I believe) be tied - 
directly or indirectly - to this study, given the participation of some of my participants - and/or 
their direct partners and colleagues. These new activities, which I see are beginning to take 
shape are occurring at a general level.  In Chile, the main business association (CPC), the 
association of entrepreneurs (ASECH), Catholic University, B-Corporations System, and the 
Association of NGOs, have come together to create an initiative called 3Xi (“inspiring 
including, innovating ourselves” – see Appendix 8 The 3Xi Initiative). 
Working under the theme “Towards a culture of encountering”, this 3Xi initiative has brought 
together “diverse groups of people of action called on to contribute ideas and enrich the 
discussion and, coming together, take up the challenges of an integral and sustainable 
development”. To-date, 400 people have participated in five meetings, these include 
businessmen, entrepreneurs, representative of civil society and B-Corps, leaders of business 
associations, indigenous people, business executives, and innovation leaders. The goal is to get 
to know each other better and strengthen trust “to build a better Chile”. Further meetings are 
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planned and collaborative initiatives are being developed to improve the quality of life of 
Chileans. Those include free surgery for the poor; preparing forms for the inclusion of disabled 
people in companies; a network of innovation centres throughout Chile; as well as a project to 
clean the banks of the rive Mapocho and others to improve the life of vulnerable children (see 
a synthetic picture of the gatherings below). 
 
 
This initiative is without precedent in Chile and has sought to break down the traditional social 
and economic separation. Thus, it can be seen as an active recognition of the existence of a new 
institutional logic - without resigning from the previous ones - and the desire of private enterprises 
(and their leaders) to become acceptable members of society, and naturally to increase their 
legitimacy. It is also interesting to note that business leaders are playing down their economic 
supremacy, political power-base or technical superiority, but, conversely, recognising that 
companies need to learn from innovators, entrepreneurs, B-Corps, and NGOs, as well as to include 
Desde este encuentro #3xi 
queremos construir un 
Chile en base al diálogo 
fluido, honesto y 
respetuoso" @alemustakis, 
Pdta. #Asech en 3xi !
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within their concerns the need to care for vulnerable persons like indigenous, poor people and 
children. 
Although the 3Xi Initiative in no way can be presented as an outcome of this research, the 
emergence and strength of this initiative is a clear demonstration of the concerns of principal actors 
in the governance system: a (legitimate) attempt to understand the new institutional logic, to learn 
from institutional entrepreneurs and deal with the new challenges that they are facing - as found 
and conceptualised in this study. 
8.6 Policy	Propositions	for	Practitioners	
The implicit purpose of this thesis has been to work out valuable guidelines for practitioners. Thus, 
I briefly turn to implications for practitioners at three levels: micro (organization), intermediate 
(business associations and think tanks) and macro (government). 
a) Corporate Leaders: To navigate the complexity of dealing with multiple institutional logics 
this research argues for the convenience of having a three-pronged approach attacking 
simultaneously the priorities of excellence, legitimacy and sense-giving. This implies first, 
dealing with the managerial requests of performance, competitive survival and prosperity. 
Second, assuming governing policies oriented to ensure corporate transparency, 
responsibility and accountability. And third, digging into their foundational values to 
develop a shared understanding of their corporate purpose and committing the organization 
to become an appreciated social actor.  
b) Business Associations: Should elude their capture by the Country Club and aim at 
representing business-at-large. The conceptual priorities are of regulative nature: adopting 
voluntarily and in a proactive manner an Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) 
Code as basis of business conduct in society. The priorities are also normative: making the 
defence of appropriate corporate behaviour the basis of their public interventions and 
internal alignment -closing ears to misleading calls of friendship, convenience and 
cronyism, sheltering corporate deviance. And priorities are also cognitive: proposing a 
motivating storyline of fair play, fair trade, and social responsibility. All these priorities 
taken together should help building empathy between business and society, fostering a 
mobilizing social dialogue.  
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c) Policy Makers: A small country like Chile needs growth, progress, and innovation to 
achieve the full development to provide valuable opportunities for all its people. The 
business elite has been identified has the source of both advancement and obstruction (Ben 
Ross Schneider, op cit.). Therefore, the government should re-orient its regulatory systems 
and development agencies with a decisive pro-market attitude (distinct from a pro-business 
one). Regulators should have as goal not just stabilizing key sectors, like banking, pensions, 
health, education, insurance, capital market, among others, but also promoting competition 
and innovation, and welcome instead of avoiding disruption.  Therefore, fostering 
entrepreneurship in concentrated fields should be considered as part of their overseeing 
duties and they should be considered accountable for it. In the context of social dialogue, 
government should also become a promoter of community interchange and get included at 
some stage in initiatives like 3XI. Finally, the government as representative of the state 
should have as central role articulating an overarching national narrative capturing our 
unique chance of working together to build a better future for all; making individual effort 
and social solidarity the key ingredients of such dream. And it should endeavour in restoring 
and reinforcing public trust in Chilean institutions, leading the way to make Chile a more 
equitable, thriving and nurturing nation. 
8.7 Concluding	Remarks		
I would like to close this work by recognising both the difficulties of access and extended 
interviews and the rare opportunities of establishing sustained longitudinal relationships with elite 
practitioners (Maclean et al., 2012; Pettigrew, 1995) and the force this has given to this research. 
I would also like to remark on the distinctiveness of this research project as an attempt to capture 
sense-making process in flight (Pettigrew, 1995) as well as the value of combining an Action 
Research ethos with the possibilities offered by Grounded Theory methods, using process data 
(Langley, 1999; Isabella, 1990). In this case this combination facilitated: 
1. Dealing with a succession of incidents – scandals bringing changes in regulations, arousing 
public sensibilities and increasing the degree of intolerance of unprincipled board practices; 
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2. Encompassing various levels and units of analysis with ambiguous boundaries – in this case 
seeing a shift in the unit of analysis from scandals (as motivator of conversations) to the 
application of governing principles in practice; 
3. Considering diverse periods of time, despite inconstant accuracy, scope and significance – so 
as to assess and bring together diverse and heterogeneous cases, contexts and incidents, many 
of them held in participants´ memories, some past and others on-going; and 
4. Capturing eclectic sources and types of data – in this case: interrelations, judgments, 
appreciations, emotions, mind-sets and understandings deriving from each participant’s 
interpretations of incidents.  
As such, this research has helped me recognise different stages, marked by corporate scandals, and 
extract macro-level lessons, such as institutional perspectives and their impact on the governance 
“systems”, right down to a micro-level, through each participant’s realities and so scholarly dig 
into the understandings and feelings of diverse individuals and groups as they experience in first-
hand basis meaningful institutional processes. 
The outcome has been a process view of governing - a gerund - capturing both the potentialities 
of theory building from the ground up and reflecting, in the midst of action, on the spirit of Action 
Research, the leitmotiv of the DBA programme. 
My final reflections must be on my professional practice and the substantive issue of governing. 
This is the end of a long journey. Although I said in the introductory chapter that this all started in 
a board meeting in late 2014 when I decided to expose myself by openly criticizing a series of 
corporate governance scandals that had unsettled the Chilean small corporate governance world 
and discovered that many of my fellow directors shared my discomfort and concern. It also came 
back at the same board in October 2016 when I presented my findings and the thesis 
conceptualisation to get their feedback. Again, the result was warm, helpful and comforting, 
which, beyond the natural solidarity of peers, gives an idea of the workability of the conclusions, 
their fit with the concerns of practitioners, and perceived relevance of my emerging theory. 
As I review the ground covered in my research process, I am keen to put the acquired knowledge 
back into my professional practice. This is particularly evident, as I was recently appointed to the 
board of a prestigious, large, publicly held, professional service organization. As I retrace the 
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governing processes this organization has undergone since its foundation to the present day, the 
theory of minding the governing gap helps me make sense of  main challenges; serving as both a 
sensitizing process and a compass for setting priorities.  
Throughout this exercise I have noticed how the aim of enhancing performance has been reduced 
– in my mind - to around one third of the governing equation; equally relevant for good governance 
are achieving a good fit with the institutional logic, including respecting the requirements of 
responsibility, transparency and accountability to achieve the goal of  legitimacy.  Most relevantly, 
I perceive as highly critical, an active search for meaning and developing shared values to creating 
create a shared sense of purpose for the organization – feed-forwarding the two previous 
components. 
This short exercise reflects my own evolution as scholar–practitioner. I keep noticing how my 
economist´s positivist background has given way to doubt, favouring a greater openness and a 
critical stance as well as stimulating a broader outlook to encompass social, ethical and political 
perspectives in my professional practice. 
It has also helped me clarify the paradox observed in the introduction, i.e. noticing how virtuous 
and vicious governance coexist, and how corporate governing main challenge is to keep re-
interpreting the institutional scenario, re-learning and re-adjusting its basis for continual 
improvement in a continuous, never-ending, evolutionary process. 
I conclude recalling the wise advice offered by Vaclav Havel (1991) in his speech warning against 
the temptations of power: “I suspect myself”, which I adopt as a rule-of-thumb when minding my 
own governing gaps in practice. 
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APPENDIX	1	-	SUMMARY	OF	MAIN	SCANDALS	
(Own elaboration based on scandals identified by participants)  
 
	
#	
Period	of	
time	
Companies	
involved	
Main	issue	
(Code-Name	
used	in	text)		
Source	of	
detection	
Summary	of	the	situation-
problem			
(Penalisation)	
Pension	Funds´	(AFP	in	Spanish)	
(re)	actions	1	 1997				 Enersis,	Endesa-	España,	Endesa-Chile,	Chispas	and	AFPs	
Duty	of	loyalty	of	managers	in	context	of	takeover		(“Chispas”)		
Denunciation	by	minority	shareholders,	the	AFPs	and	SVS	(Securities	Commission)				
Secret	deal	between	top	management	team	of	Enersis	and	acquiring	SOE	Endesa-España	to	achieve	a	
de	facto	control	of	the	Endesa-Chile	paying	an	extraordinary	bid	premium	just	to	the	TMT.		(USD	90.8	million)						
“AFPs	criticised	the	agreement	between	managers	of	Enersis	and	Endesa-España	referred	to	the	takeover	of	Endesa	Chile.	AFPs	cited	an	extraordinary	shareholders´	meeting,	they	alerted	the	SVS	and	were	key	actors	to	modify	the	takeover´s	conditions.”	2	 1999	 Telefonica-España,	Terra,	Telefónica	CTC	(Chile),	Telefónica	Net	and	AFPs	
Duty	of	loyalty	of	managers.		Conflict	Holding	Company-Subsidiary		(“Terra”)				
Press			 Opposition	of	independent	directors	to	transaction	between	related	parties:	Telefonica-España,	controlling	parent	of	Terra,	which	bought	from	its	subsidiary	Telefónica-CTC,	Telefónica	Net	at	a	price	below	market	value.	
AFP	rejected	the	price	offered	seeing	it	as	under	the	market	value.	Board	members	elected	by	AFPs	opposed	the	deal,	the	AFPs	voted	against	the	transaction	at	the	shareholders	meeting	and	they	took	legal	measures	against	Telefónica	CTC.	3	 2004	 Telefonica-España,	Telefónica	CTC	(Chile),	Telefónica-Móviles	(Spain),	Telefónica	Celulares	and	AFPs	
Duty	of	loyalty	of	managers.		Conflict	Holding	Company-Subsidiary		(“Móviles”)				 	
Press			 Opposition	of	AFPs	to	transaction	between	related	parties:	Telefonica-Móviles,	which	attempted	to	buy	from	Telefónica-CTC,	Telefónica	Celulares,	at	a	price	estimated	insufficient.	
The	AFP	protested	requesting	an	extraordinary	shareholders	meeting	to	revise	the	terms	of	the	deal,	negotiating	an	increase	in	the	price	paid	of		 USD	50	millions	and	an	extraordinary	dividend	of	USD	800	millions.	4	 Decem-ber	2007	and	April	2009				
Farmacias	Ahumada,	Farmacias	(FASA)	Salcobrand,	Farmacias	Cruz	Verde	and	AFPs	
Pharmacy	chains	collusion.		Duty	of	care	of	directors		(“Farmacias”)	
Self-denunciation	by	FASA		 December	2008:	the	Economic	Prosecutor’s	Office	investigates	three	Chilean	pharmacy	chains	due	to	drug	price	collusion	practices.		March	2009:	the	Free	Competition	Court	accuses	the	three	chains	of	collusion	to	raise	the	prices	of	222	drugs	between	2007-2009.		(Penalty	$241,100)	
AFPs	presented	tough	criticism	to	the	board	of	FASA,	financial	states	were	not	approved	and	legal	measures	were	taken	by	the	Association	of	AFPs.							
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5	 2012	 Endesa-España,	Enersis	and	AFPs	
Principal-principal	conflict	of	interest.		Duties	of	loyalty.		(“Enersis”)	
Independent	directors	 Increase	of	capital	paid	with	assets	of	the	controlling	blockholder.	The	attempted		transaction	involved	related	parties	and	favoured	the	controlling	group	vis	a	vis	minority	shareholders	
Strong	dispute	with	AFPs	for	form	and	background	of	deal.	Finally,	the	valuation	of	the	assets	is	reduced	in	USD1.2	billion	and	the	conflicts	of	interest	mitigated.	6	 2005-2013	 Soquimich,	Potash	Corp	(USA),	Cascadas,	Larrain-Vial	(investment	bank)	and	AFPs	
Principal-Principal	conflict	of	interest.		Duties	of	Loyalty		(“Cascadas”)		
Moneda	Asset,	AFPs	and	Super-intendence	of	Values	&	Securities	(SVS)		
Abuses	of	blockholders	to	minority	shareholders	through	pyramids	(cascadas	or	waterfalls)	used	to	control	SQM	and	expropriate	small	shareholders.		2013:	SVS	ordered	reversing	controlling	cascadas	profits	for	USD	663	millions.		(total	penalty:	USD	164	millions	for	board	members	and	Larrain-Vial)			
2005:	AFPs	supported	changes	in	company	bylaws	to	limit	voting	power	of	related	parties	contravening	corporate	norms.			2006:	AFPs	successfully	rejected	shareholders	agreement	covenants	designed	to	control	SQM.				2012:	AFPs	requested	SVS	to	investigate	transactions	between	cascadas.		7	 2013-2015			
Caval,	Banco	de	Chile	and	Luksic	Group	 Politically	exposed	person	(PEP)	obtains	credit	through	the	direct	intervention	of		the	vice-chairman	of	the	bank/head	of	a	large	business	group.			(“Caval”)	
Press	 Chile´s	main	Bank	provided	loan	to	a	real	estate	deal	led	by	President	Bachelet´s	daughter	in	law.	Deal	questioned	due	to:		1)	transaction	that	allowed	buying	land	in	USD10,7	m.	and	selling	it	in	less	than	a	year	later	in	USD15.6	m.	taking	advantage	of	a	change	in	urban	plan;	2)	(Unusual)	direct	intervention	of	the	chairman	of	the	bank	in	a	credit	operation	and	-by	his	express	request-	the	son	of	president	Bachelet;	3)	(Uncommon)	approval	of	an	important	amount	of	credit	to	a	start-up	without	relevant	equity.				
Not	involved	
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Sources: Pardow (2012), FNE (2016), Donoso & López (2016), Association of AFP (2013), SVS (2014). 
  
8	 2015			 Penta,	UDI	political	party;	Piñera	Government.	
Fraud	to	the	Treasury;	bribery,	money	laundering	and		corruption	of	authorities.			(“Penta”)	
Whistle-blower	 Use	of	“ideologically	false”	honoraria	to	finance	elections	of	various	politicians	linked	to	right-wing	politicians	and	public	officers.			
Not	involved.	
9	 2015-2016	 Chicken	producers:	Agrosuper,	Superpollo	and	Ariztía,	and	Supermarket	chains:	Cencosud,	Walmart	and	Unimarc.		
Chicken	price	&	volume	collusion.			(“Pollos”)	
National	Economic	Fiscal	(FNE)	accusation		
Three	producers	of	chicken	and	three	supermarket	chains	successively	accused	of	acting	as	cartel	using	collusive	practices	to	coordinate	prices	and	production	between	2008	and	2011.	Both	jointly	representing	90%	of	their	industries.		
Not	involved.	
10	 2016			 CMPC	and	SCA	(Sweden)	 Price	collusion		(“Tissue”)	 Self-denunciation	by	CMPC		 Price	fixing	and	production	quotas	of	hygienic	paper	products.	The	cartel	represented	90%	of	the	market	and	operated	between	2000	and	2011.			(Penalty	$150	million)	
Not	involved	directly.	
11	 2016	 SQM	 Fraud	to	the	Treasury;	bribery,	money	laundering	and		corruption	of	authorities.		(“SQM”)	
Whistle-blower		 Use	of	“ideologically	false”	honoraria	to	finance	elections	of	various	politicians	linked	to	both	right	and	left	wing	politicians	and	public	officers.	
Not	directly	involved.	
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APPENDIX	2	–	QUESTIONS	
FIRST ROUND 
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SECOND ROUND 
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THIRD ROUND 
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APPENDIX	3	-	OPEN	CODING	–	ALL	CODES		
 
#	 CODE	 RESOURCES	 REFERENCES	 CREATED	
1	 Actors	 0	 0	 30-03-2015	19:25	
2	 Lawyers	o	executives	advisors	 2	 2	 08-04-2015	17:24	
3	 Shareholders	 7	 13	 01-04-2015	18:27	
4	 AFP	 8	 13	 02-04-2015	15:35	
5	 Controlling	Shareholders		 3	 3	 15-04-2015	14:15	
6	 Stockbrokers	or	Investment	Banks	 3	 5	 09-04-2015	18:33	
7	 Directors	independents	o	external	 3	 5	 09-04-2015	18:58	
8	 Directories	o	Corporate	Govern	 6	 15	 31-03-2015	20:51	
9	 Entrepreneurs	 1	 2	 10-06-2015	20:01	
10	 Industrialists	 7	 14	 30-03-2015	19:28	
11	 State	or	Government	 6	 14	 06-04-2015	17:49	
12	 Gatekeepers	 1	 1	 09-04-2015	18:40	
13	 Managers	 2	 4	 01-04-2015	19:15	
14	 Guilds	 1	 1	 14-04-2015	13:39	
15	 Justice	o	Judicial	Power	 2	 4	 17-04-2015	11:54	
16	 Regulatory	agencies		 1	 1	 14-04-2015	21:13	
17	 Press		 2	 4	 15-04-2015	14:23	
18	 Civil	Society	 3	 5	 14-04-2015	21:24	
19	 International	Society		 4	 7	 30-03-2015	19:38	
20	 Learning,	experiences,	corrections	 12	 126	 30-03-2015	19:56	
21	 Self	conscience	 10	 43	 14-04-2015	12:13	
22	 Regulatory	change	 0	 0	 30-03-2015	19:47	
27	 Causes	 1	 2	 30-03-2015	11:02	
41	 Context	Country	 0	 0	 30-03-2015	17:10	
42	 Crisis	 11	 23	 09-04-2015	17:08	
43	 Economic	development		 10	 39	 30-03-2015	17:11	
44	 Role	of	the	state	Chilean	market	 7	 18	 07-04-2015	20:42	
45	 Institutional	Dynamics	 0	 0	 14-04-2015	12:13	
49	 Scandals	 6	 9	 30-03-2015	10:34	
60	 Narrative	 10	 41	 30-03-2015	16:34	
61	 Norms,	standards	y	values	 10	 22	 30-03-2015	19:50	
62	 Process	of	social	change	 0	 0	 31-03-2015	19:31	
67	 Risks	of	temporary	solutions		 6	 13	 30-03-2015	20:02	
68	 Solutions	 0	 0	 30-03-2015	10:48	
69	 Change	in	comportment		 7	 14	 30-03-2015	20:40	
70	 Ethic	behaviour		 6	 14	 09-04-2015	18:00	
71	 Develop	talents	&	specialization	 3	 8	 10-06-2015	19:54	
72	 Formation	of	values	 2	 3	 30-03-2015	20:17	
73	 Introspection	&	reflexion	 7	 13	 08-04-2015	17:35	
74	 Necessity	of	actualization	 5	 6	 15-04-2015	18:34	
75	 Necessity	of	control	&	monitoring		 7	 14	 05-06-2015	0:47	
76	 Not	leave	the	market	alone	 2	 2	 14-04-2015	21:21	
77	 Appropriates	Penalties				 3	 3	 05-06-2015	18:46	
78	 Permanent	legal	actualization		 2	 4	 14-04-2015	21:19	
79	 Social	corporate	responsibility	 5	 6	 30-03-2015	20:16	
80	 Role	of	business	organizations		 1	 1	 30-03-2015	10:53	
81	 Stakes	 11	 44	 30-03-2015	16:26	
82	 Assumptions	 11	 46	 30-03-2015	11:16	
83	 Agency	-	individualism	 12	 153	 17-07-2015	12:54	
84	 Behaviours	 1	 1	 17-07-2015	12:55	
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Source: Codes exported from NVivo 11 
  
85	 A-	Ideal	 12	 124	 17-07-2015	12:55	
86	 B-	Cronyism	 12	 183	 17-07-2015	12:57	
87	 C-	Stakeholding	 12	 114	 17-07-2015	12:58	
88	 Structure	-	Establishment	 12	 57	 17-07-2015	12:54	
89	 GIVE	SENSE	 0	 0	 11-08-2015	20:29	
90	 Economic	growth		 3	 6	 11-08-2015	23:09	
91	 Social	demand	for	transparency	 3	 7	 11-08-2015	21:19	
92	 Strengthening	institutions		 4	 8	 16-08-2015	10:38	
93	 No	laissez	faire	 1	 1	 16-08-2015	11:39	
94	 Protection	of	the	economy	 4	 12	 11-08-2015	20:50	
95	 Responsibility	of		board		 4	 21	 11-08-2015	23:11	
96	 Re-establish	trust	 1	 2	 16-08-2015	10:37	
97	 Role	of	media	 1	 1	 16-08-2015	10:37	
98	 MAKE	SENSE	 0	 0	 11-08-2015	20:29	
99	 Change	in	cultural	values	 5	 21	 11-08-2015	21:10	
100	 Complexity	of	the	system	 3	 5	 16-08-2015	10:35	
101	 De-legitimation	of	system		 5	 21	 11-08-2015	20:56	
102	 Market	failure		 5	 12	 16-08-2015	10:32	
103	 Chilean	business	profile		 3	 4	 16-08-2015	10:23	
104	 Role	of	associations	 1	 1	 16-08-2015	10:23	
105	 De-legitimization	of	the	state		 3	 8	 11-08-2015	21:01	
106	 Scandals	as	frauds		 3	 9	 11-08-2015	20:32	
107	 Failure	of	boards		 6	 29	 15-08-2015	12:44	
108	 Lack	of	regulation		 5	 13	 15-08-2015	11:22	
109	 Functioning	of	institutions		 4	 7	 16-08-2015	10:25	
110	 Institutions	as	rules	 2	 3	 15-08-2015	12:15	
111	 Impact	in	society		 4	 12	 11-08-2015	20:44	
112	 Social	distrust	 5	 7	 16-08-2015	10:21	
113	 Media	&	communications	disorder		 2	 2	 16-08-2015	10:32	
114	 Economic	losses	of	scandals	 2	 3	 11-08-2015	20:40	
115	 Repercussion	in	Public	Opinion	 4	 7	 11-08-2015	20:42		
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APPENDIX	4	-	ATTEMPTS	TO	FIT	THE	6CS	SOCIOLOGICAL	FAMILY	
 
 
 
 
  
6	Cs	+	S	Families:	Basic	Social	Processes	
	
1.	Unit	of	Analysis	&	Basic	Social	Processes	
associated	to	the	status	quo:	se;ng	and	
ac=vi=es	taking	place:		
A	Ruling	Country	Club	
CONTEXT	
3.	Cogni&ve	process	media=ng	the	
undertaking	of	the	evolving	status	quo:	
Delayed	Insigh6ng			
CONDITION	
2.	challenging	the	status	quo:		
Empowering	Stakeholders	
CAUSES	
6.	paEerns	of	ac=ons	used	to	deal	
with	the	evolving	status	quo:	
Strategizing	the	
Disempowerment	
STRATEGIC	ACTIONS	
4.	Regula&ve	process						
co-evolving	with	
developments	in	status	
quo:	Upda@ng	Regula@on	
COVARIANCE	
5.	Norma&ve	process	accelera=ng	the	
evolu=on	of	the	status	quo	&	demanding	
deﬁni=ons	/	taking	posi=on:							
Transparen6ng	Incidents		
CONTINGENCIES	
Corporate		
Social	
Disempowering	
CONSEQUENCES	
Adapted	from	Glaser´s	(1978,	p.74)	
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APPENDIX	5	-	SAMPLE	CONCEPTUAL	MEMOS	
(EXPORTED FROM NVIVO) 
 
 
 
Title		 	 	 Rules	of	the	Game	among	Incumbents	and	Challengers	
Ref:	 	 	 Interview	with	REF-2	Date:		 	 	 07/08/15			Beyond	 the	 evolutionary	 process	 of	 development	 of	 an	 emerging	 market,	 it´s	 institutions	 and	 it´s	society,	REF	seems	to	be	referring	to	issues	created	by	the	clash	between	the	rules	of	game	followed	by	traditional	 players,	who	 play	 by	 the	 rules,	 and	 new	 actors:	 smaller	 investors,	 activist	 investors,	 new	managers,	 who	 don´t	 follow	 them.	 or	 perhaps	 they	 have	 other	 frames	 of	 reference?	 Or	 are	 they	inventing	their	own	rules?	Do	they	know	the	rules	they	are	supposed	to	play	by?	Is	this	a	question	of	interpretation	 or	 sensemaking	 (authoring	 their	 own	 rules,	 Maitlis	 &	 Christianson,	 2014).	 Are	 these	original	Chilean	rules	or	just	the	local	application	of	a	global	trend?		And	what	do	all	of	this	means	in	terms	of	sensegiving?	Can	we	say	that	the	old	boys	played	by	the	book?	Actually	some	of	them	did	not:	collusion,	fraud	one	of	them,	bad	practices	by	most	and	just	plain	lousy	work	as	board	members	by	the	majority	Therefore,	perhaps	there	is	a	case	of	outmoded	practices	out	of	synch	with	modernity,	left	and	right,...	literally.		
Title		 	 	 Corporate	Governance	&	Institutional	Evolution	
Ref:	 	 	 Self-reflection	
Date:		 	 	 07/08/15			Corporate	governance	cannot	be	separated	from	the	institutional	evolution	in	an	emerging	market	like	Chile.	As	such,	CG	requires	taking	a	systemic	perspective,	perhaps	considering	CG	a	field	in	which	we	find:	
	
	 	 	 	 	 			INCUMBENTS	
	 	 	 	 								 (RULE	PLAYERS)	
	
POLITICAL		 	 	 							GOVERNANCE	ARENA	 	 	 GATEKEEPERS		
ACTORS			 																	 (RULE	SHAPING)							 (MEDIA,	REGULATOR,COURTS		
(RULE	MAKERS)	 	 													 	 	 	 	 	(RULE	ENFORCERS)	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 INSURGENTS	
	 	 	 (SMALL	INVESTORS,	ACTIVIST	INVESTORS,	ENTREPRENEURS)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 (RULE	TAKERS)	
	
	
Each	actor	is	making	his/her	sensemaking	and	sensegiving.	Thus,	it	seems	puerile	and	senseless	
to	focus	in	the	4	CG	suspects,	given	the	broad	context	in	which	CG	is	evolving.	
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Title		 	 	 Problems:	What,	Whose,	Why?	
Ref:	 	 	 Self-reflection	
Date:		 	 	 23/08/15		
What		problem	do	participants	have	with	the	Corporate	Governance	Scandals?	with	the	guilty	ones?	with	bad	practices?	some,	indeed	-they	do	not	want	to	be	confused	with	the	ones	cheating	-they	do	not	want	the	Chilean	population	to	keep	businesses	in	low	esteem	-they	don´t	want	Chilean	society	turning	against	the	free	market	system	-they	don´t	want	a	bad	image	for	the	business	class	-they	don´t	want	some	spoiling	the	capital	market	-they	don´t	want	a	statist	system	to	take	over	the	free	enterprise	system	-they	do	not	want	wrong	laws,	made	in	hasten	debilitating	chances	to	reach	a	developed	level	-they	don´t	want	institutions	to	loose	credibility	and	affect	the	development	and	wellbeing	of	the	country		
Whose	problems	are	these?	-they	seem	to	feel	they	are	part	of	the	system	and	thus	probably	feel	the	problem	to	be	their	own	-however,	most	do	alright	and	do	not	seem	to	have	any	direct	problem	with	it	all	and	could	continue	happily	doing	their	own	thing.	-yes,	but	most	have	social	roles	and	one	could	hypothesise	that	they	attempt	to	influence	positively	the	society	they	live	in		Why	are	they	concerned?	-patriotism	-self-interest	-state	of	busines	-business	as	usual?	
Are	they	doing	something	about	it?	something:		-rapprochement	of	business	people	and	politicians,		-raising	the	standards	of	governance	-doing	business	while	doing	good	(or	viceversa)	-	improving	their	practices	-	been	more	cautious	-Trying	to	understand	more	the	side	of	society/workers		
Are	there	any	patterns	that	can	be	discerned?	-	not	sure,	but	perhaps	mainly	making	sense	that	the	situation	has	changed	and	that	there	is	no	business	as	usual	any	longer	-attempting	to	give	-larger,	deeper,	more	professional-	sense	to	their	professional	practices	-they	are	concerned	for	the	institutions			
Is	there	anything	they	are	not	looking	at?	-perhaps	the	rule	setting-playing-taking-enforcing	circular	game	that	make	the	institutions	go	round	or	establishes	it´s	equilibrium.	
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Title    Chile in a Governance Crisis? 
Ref:   Self-reflection 
Date:    23/08/15  
Most participants seem to be referring to an ongoing governance crisis context. So, some questions 
arise:  
• why at this time and place? 
• who sets the policies for dealing with it? 
• what were the limitations that participants face for dealing with the crisis? 
• what are all the problems? 
• How do participants overcome the obstacles or manage the problems to increase their chances 
of achieving their goals? what are their goals? 
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APPENDIX	6	-	CHILEAN	CONTEXT	
1.		 General	Overview		
Since the beginning of the 21st Century Chile has had an important and increasing number of 
corporate governance scandals, featuring high profile industrialists and politicians from all 
sectors. A palpable consequence has been the sharp drop in public trust in private enterprise 
(Centro de Estudios Públicos; 2015), propelling a drive towards a systematic questioning of large 
businesses, wealthy families and, in knowledgeable circles, the corporate governance of 
organizations and institutions. 
Cases of collusion, fraud, corporate abuses and traffic of influence are common-place in day-to-
day conversations, and affaires and the associated names have become household hate- figures-of-
speech (Undurraga, 2015; for a list and short summary of the cases see Appendix 1). And even 
the formerly prestigious Santiago Stock Exchange has been the subject of criticism, driving a series 
of measures, including a recent board reshuffle, ending 25 years of Chairman immovability; a 
thorough revision of stock broker procedures to deal with conflicts of interest; and expectations of 
new ad hoc. Regulations. These developments have given shape to the idea that Chilean corporate 
governance is under critical pressure. 
Let’s briefly review Chilean history, with special emphasis on the period covered in this research: 
the last 50 years, marked by contrasting institutional changes. 
The Chilean state played a relevant role as founder of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) for 
three decades, from the early 1940s until the end of the 1960s. And its role expanded explosively 
during the brief socialist government of Salvador Allende (1970-1973) through the nationalisation 
of hundreds of private companies. This process was reversed following the coup d’état led by 
general Augusto Pinochet in 1973. The military regime organised two vast (re)privatization 
processes that led to the formation of many business groups, led by former executives, most of 
which - according to informal accounts collected by this researcher from well-informed observers 
who requested anonymity - were hand-picked by the regime. 
Since the mid-1980s, there has been a clear separation between private sector and the state.  The 
latter has seen its participation in the economy "reduced” to a subsidiary role in most sectors, thus 
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Chile no longer displays the typical pattern of state-influence found in Mediterranean countries 
exhibiting dirigisme approaches (Aguilera, 2003). 
Chilean corporate ownership is highly concentrated and characterized by the influence of large 
business groups that collectively control “directly or indirectly … over 90% of the total assets of 
listed companies” (Lefort, 2010. p. 397). In an earlier study, Lefort (2005) finds that 80% of listed 
firms are family-owned businesses. The remaining company controllers are (primarily) European 
multinational corporations, with a concentration of investments in the utilities sector. International 
banks are also very active in the national landscape. This is partly due to strict banking regulations 
since the debt crisis of 1982, since time local business groups have been prohibited from borrowing 
from banks they control. Since the late 1980s the AFPs have been permitted to invest a growing 
proportion of private pension fund assets in the local equity market (and subsequently 
internationally). As a result, the AFPs have become active proponents of corporate governance, 
nominating independent directors, as well as promoting other restrictions on companies seeking 
pension fund investments (Lefort, 2010). 
In consequence, the vast majority of listed companies have controlling block-holders. Thus, the 
classic agent-principal vertical conflict typically found in the USA and UK is uncommon and 
corporate governance issues centre around majority-minority stockholders, known as horizontal 
conflicts (Lefort, 2010).  
2.	 Events	in	the	Period	Analysed		
I now summarise the socio-political-economic events of the last 45 years, which present the sharp 
institutional variation alluded to in Chapter 1. 
Stage I – Era of Militarily-Enforced Economic Rationality (1973-1989) 
During the Pinochet-led military regime radical free economic policies were imposed and 
sustained without counterbalance for 17 years by the so-called ‘Chicago Boys’, a group of young 
Chilean economists trained predominantly in Chicago University, but also in other US centres, 
such as Harvard, MIT and UCLA. 
At the corporate level, the markets experienced the strengthening, diversification and growing 
dominance of most economic sectors by elite business groups (Peres & Garrido, 1998). At a 
perceptual level, industrialists were seen to control the markets – that turned onto uncertainty at 
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the end of the period, given the expected change in the political scenario brought by the incoming 
democracy in 1989 (Libertad y Desarrollo, 1999). 
Stage II – Era of Elite Alignment (1990-2012) 
With the return of democracy, the predominance of the economic logic was consciously 
maintained for the next 23 years by the incoming five administrations that adopted and reinforced 
the inherited economic system as the motor of Chilean development (Ossandón & Tironi, 2013; 
Atria, Larraín, Benavente, Couso & Joignant, 2013). So, the previously established inter-
institutional arrangements continued to operate with increased momentum and increasingly 
powerful defenders. This coalition between political and business groups can be related to Scott 
(1987, p. 23)’s natural system, defined as: “collectivities whose participants share a common 
interest in the survival of the system and who engage in collective activities, informally structures, 
to secure this end”.   
Indeed, the tacit alignment between social democrat, centre-left, political leaders and right-wing 
business elites that occurred from the first years of democracy, devolved into explicit engagements 
to maintain a highly convenient system operating in a seamless manner. “There was license to 
win” [LAW-1]. And during this period the seeds of many future scandals, illegal or unethical 
collusions, featuring politicians, managers and industrialists were sown [REF-2]. According to one 
of the participants, some privileged groups felt they could choose which laws applied to them and 
which did not [PEN-1]. 
This selective, exclusivist and highly fitting system showed its first cracks in 2006, and another, 
deeper one, in 2011: massive protests, first by secondary school students and next by university 
students, strongly supported by the public opinion, erupted on to the streets,  originating an era of 
ferment and eroding the established paradigm (Kuhn, 2012). An alternative, critical logic was 
forced by the Chilean youth, all of them born in democracy, which took an unfamiliar, 
confrontational posture towards the government and business elites, demanding an overhaul to 
education and other public and social national policies (Barrionuevo, 2011). Students diverged 
from previous generations’ traditional submission to authority and they acted as activists, creating 
social disruption and thus playing the role of institutional entrepreneurs described in Battilana et 
al. (2009). They were able to generate crises that evidenced major social inconsistencies and 
frictions (Hardy & Maguire, 2008).  
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These events began unlocking the prevailing institutional inertia (Hoffman, 1999), opening a 
critical debate about existing practices and raising awareness of possible alternatives. These 
destabilizing incidents (McAdam & Scott, 2005) were compounded by the first household-related 
corporate scandals, affecting middle-low social classes and other vulnerable people (see Appendix 
1) The basic social process (Glaser, 1978) during this stage could be conceptualised as 
accommodating. However, the growing social unease – and economic perplexity - with the 
perceived unfair distribution of wealth and unequal opportunities gave way to the return of the 
charismatic President Bachelet in 2013, with an influential slogan against inequality, a more 
radical new coalition of left wing political parties and a dominance in Congress.  
Stage III – Era of Open Misalignments (2013-2016) 
The basic social process during this stage could be characterised as institutional entrepreneurship. 
Indeed, many actors showed some level of enterprising at the institutional level: 
• First, the government, with a re-foundational agenda, uncompromisingly committed to 
eliminate social privileges and to level the playing field – even perhaps to the price of 
disturbing the growth path of the country and the civic alliance weaved since the return of 
democracy (Bachelet, 2013).  
• Second, a new breed of entrepreneurs, unhappy with “the Chicago boys turned into 
incumbents” [ENT-1] that brought from successive pilgrimages to Stanford (García, 2010) a 
new confidence, a sense of higher calling, as builder of a fairer marketplace and a sense-making 
of the unique window of opportunity for entrepreneurship, provided by the digitalisation 
process of the world. 
• Third, regulatory agencies, including; a consumer protection overseer; an anti-trust agency; a 
banking regulator; the national securities commission; and a group of public prosecutors; 
taking several high-profile initiatives and sanctioning well-known business actors – hitherto 
seen as virtually untouchable. These actors have taken leading roles, arguably inspired by a 
series of events, including the social turmoil against corporate abuses, a newly found autonomy 
and increased confidence (Parrado, 2016) and, arguably actively instigated by the government 
against its opposition, the new standards promoted when Chile joined the OECD (in November 
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2010), their own professional ambitions and perhaps a new sense of mission inspired by social 
movements and social networks. 
Other institutional entrepreneurs have been the thousands of citizens protesting about the low 
retirement pensions and actively manifesting against the AFPs managing the private pension funds 
under the individual capitalization system. These protests mobilised the government to promote a 
national consensus to introduce an additional element of solidarity, beyond the basic subsidy 
pension currently provided by the State. 
Ironically, the least entrepreneurial at this juncture have been the traditional business groups as 
they have played ‘wait and see’ regarding the government’s new policy and reform proposal – 
making some political observers wonder if this modus no operandi was a way of showing their 
discontent with the lack of mutual understanding with the new government (Tironi, 1999 cited by 
Undurraga, 2011). Consistent with this, the former government diagnosed that incumbents would 
hardly be the motor moving the country forward (Minister of Economy Juan Andrés Fontaine, 
field interview), given their comfortable status and the massive wealth accumulated in the previous 
thirty prosperous years; thus, during its tenure promoted new entrepreneurs as role models. 
Thus, this stage reflects Scott (1987, p. 23)’s open system definition: “coalitions of shifting interest 
groups that develop goals by negotiation; the structure of the coalition, its activities, and its 
outcomes are strongly influenced by environmental factors”. Indeed, the last two governments of 
completely opposite political orientations (centre-right and left, sequentially), tended to coincide 
in their diagnosis – although not at all in their policies - suggesting that the Chilean establishment 
required an upheaval. The former visioning new entrepreneurs as the drivers of a second wave of 
growth; the latter setting in motion the wheels of a more egalitarian society, designed to include 
traditionally excluded groups, and even attempting to break free from the traditionally untouchable 
budgetary limitations and construct their vision. An influential observer describes such attempt as 
“pushing beyond the frontier of plausibility” - beyond the economic balance, devotedly respected 
by the six previous administrations, that governed Chile the last forty years (Peña, 2016).  
Therefore, the previous informal private-public alignment of interests associated with a natural 
system, as described by Scott (1987) gave way to shifting goals and incorporated new actors, for 
the first time including in the debate peripheral groups - previously far from the preoccupations of 
dominant coalitions. Indeed, the most vocal and successful (Garretón, 2015) opponent of 
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government reforms has been the newly formed association of entrepreneurs of Chile (ASECH), 
working in close coordination with the traditional business community, clustered around the 
classical large business association (SOFOFA) [GUI-3]. 
This period has been compounded by a stampede of new corporate and political scandals (see 
scandals in this period in Appendix 1).  
The Institutional Construction of Corporate Governance in Chile – G. Jiménez-Seminario 	
	 145	
APPENDIX	7	–	FROM	OPEN	CODES	TO	THE	EMERGING	FRAMEWORK	
In this section I trace the link between the open codes and the ideas driving into Framework 7. I 
do so by connecting each one of the main open codes to higher-order substantive codes. I use the 
6Cs as the ordering system for the substantive codes and I distinguish between the three historical 
phases studied in this research. I also present the literature with which these findings were 
compared and enriched to derive the theoretical concepts presented in Figure 7, under the tenet of 
literature as data.  
Links between (re-ordered) Open Codes and Substantive Codes used in the Minding the Governing 
Gaps Framework: 
Table 7.1 
 
OPEN CODES SUBSTANTIVE CODES 6C CATEGORY LITERATURE AS DATA
1 Closed economy
2 Patriarchal society
3 Traditional families
4 State control of the economy
5 No competitive firms
6 Class privileges
7 Conflicts of interest
8 Taken for granted conditions
9 Lack of professionalism
10 Subsidiary Role of the State
11 Milton Friedman influence
12 Chicago boys
13 Agency - individualism
14 Free competition
15 Open markets
16 Lack of regulation
17 Lack of enforcement
18 Minimal Penalties
19 Laissez Faire
20 Adolescent (institutions) country
21 Nascent capital market
22 Financial Crisis 1981-82
23 Privatizations
24 Felt validated by their success
25 No social santioning
26 No ethical formation
27 Economic growth
28 Social progress
29 Increased unequality
30 Cultural (individualism) change
31 Progressive Modernization
Zingales (2009; 2012)
New Institutional 
Economics (North & 
colleagues)
New Institutional 
Economics (North & 
colleagues)
D. Pro-Business Regulation 
E. Exploitation of underdogs
F. Economic progress
Rational System  (Scott, 
2007)
Economic Anthropology 
(Bourdieu, 2005)
New Institutional 
Economics  (North & 
colleagues)
CONTEXT
CONDITION
CAUSES
COVARIANCE
CONTINGENCIES
CONSEQUENCES
E
F
A. Protected Play-field  
B. Country Club
C. Chicago Boys agencyPH
A
S
E
 
1
A
Code #
B
C
D
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The open codes linked to the second phase of the study are the following: 
Table 7.2 
 
Below I present the links between the open codes and the substantive codes associated to the third 
phase of the research. 
  
OPEN CODES SUBSTANTIVE CODES CONCEPTS LITERATURE AS DATA
32 Globalisation process
33 License to win
34 Amoral logic
35 Eveything is negotiable
36 Increasing role of State
37 Icarus syndrome
38 Disconnection from society
39 Chicago Boys as incumbents
40 Milton Friedman´s simplified logic
41 Lack of contact with reality
42 Spanish SOEs penetration of LA
43 Spain´s government role
44 Role of Spaniards
45 Spain´s Political Transition Model
46 Spanish culture
47 Regulatory change
48 Progressive actualization
49 Increase in control & monitoring
50 Not leaving the market alone
51 Appropriates Penalties
52 Permanent legal update
53 Crony Capitalism
54 Corruption
55 Bribery
56 Bending the rules
57 Feeling above the law
58 Bad functioning of institutions
59 Failure of boards
60 Market failure
61 Perception of injustice
62 Increasing social malaise
P
H
A
S
E
 
2
Varieties of institutional 
systems (Fainshmidt, 
Judge, Aguilera & Smith, 
2016)
Crony Capitalism CONTINGENCIES
Resource-Dependence 
Theory  (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003; 1978)
Economic progress & Social 
malaise CONSEQUENCES
Crises of Corporate 
Governance (Lorsch & 
colleagues)
Political-Business Alignment CONTEXT Natural System  (Scott, 2007)
Country Club CONDITION
Resource-Dependence 
Theory (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003; 1978)
Spain´s SOEs agency CAUSES
Corporate networks in 
Spain (Baena, 2002; 
Rubio & Garrúes, 2015; 
Bucheli & Salvaj, 2014)
I
J
K
L
OECD-required regulatory 
changes COVARIANCE
H
Code #
G
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Table 7.3 
 
The following conceptual summary was obtained combining and synthesizing the three phases 
around the 6Cs sociological family: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPEN CODES SUBSTANTIVE CODES CONCEPTS LITERATURE AS DATA
63 Business lack of adaptation
64 Public distrust
65 Demand for accountability
66 Social demand for transparency
67 Legitimacy questioned
68 Tarnished identities
69 Peers fallen
70 Searching for answers
71 Taking stock of responsibility
72 Taking distance
73 Empowered social actors 
74 Students´ethical complaints
75 Entrepreneurs´ Association
76 Social interactions
77 Collaboration initiatives
78 Agenda of State agencies 
79 More strict laws
80 Stronger enforcement
81 Harsher penalties
82 Institutions working
83 Active business associations 
84 Media overflow
85 Social networks amplifying events
86 Loss of reputation
87 Debating role of the State
88 Deal-making in the margins
89 Questioning of elites
90 Economic cost of scandals
91 Introspection & reflexion
92 Increased complexity
93 Cultural change
P
H
A
S
E
 
3
 Increased exposure CONTINGENCIES Institutional Logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991)
Major governing complexity CONSEQUENCES Institutional Logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991)
Social Actors agency CAUSES
Intitutional 
Entrepreneurship 
(Pacheco et al., 2010)
Pro-Citizen Regulation COVARIANCE
Institutional Theory / 
Behavioural Theory of 
Corporate Governance 
(Westphal & Zajac, 2013)
Empowered, distrusting 
society CONTEXT
Open System   (Scott, 
2007)
Elites searching for clues CONDITION
Corporate Deviance 
(Aguilera, Judge & 
Terjesen, 2018) 
R
Code #
M
N
O
P
Q
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Table 7.4 
 
Role of the Literature in the Meaning-Making process 
The literature helped to refine, contrast, enrich and complete the substantive codes proposed. The 
following are some pictures of the interactive reflection process followed, which iterated between 
the data and the literature. 
 
6Cs PHASE I Conceptualised PHASE II Conceptualised PHASE III Conceptualised
CONTEXT
Economic Institutional Governance 
Logic
Political Institutional Governance 
Logic
Social Institutional Governance 
Logic
CONDITION
Traditional industrialists & Family 
Businesses Business Groups, Chicago Boys
Business Groups, Chicago Boys, 
Political Actors
CAUSES
Institutional entrepreneurship by 
Chicago Boys
Institutional entrepreneurship by 
Spanish SOEs & Political Actors
Institutional entrepreneurship by 
Social Actors
COVARIANCE
Pro-Business Regulation - derived 
from M.Friedman theories
Pro-Market Regulation - derived 
from OECD & Globalisation
Activist Regulation - derived from 
new laws & social sensibiities
CONTINGENCIES
Collusions, Frauds, Stakeholders´ 
Abuses, Environmental damages
Crony Capitalism, Corruption, 
Bribery
Increase exposure to Stakeholders 
demands, complains & abuses
CONSEQUENCES
Governing Gap: Surviving, 
achieving efficiency, growing, 
maximising value for shareholders
Governing Gap: Coopting, 
controlling, aligning the powers-that-
be influencing business
Governing Gap: Achieving 
Legitimacy vis à vis an open, 
transparent, distrusting & 
interconnected society
Modelling the Macro-Institutional Setting based
in Institutional Theory
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The articles by Aguilera and her colleagues were particularly useful to both position the Chilean 
Institutional System in a global context and to explore in more detail the notion of corporate 
deviance -an action pattern consistent with the conceptualization of the findings. It also 
emphasized the relevance of regulatory enforcement as a key driver of corporate conformance.  
The process allowed to conceptualize in more detail the three institutional logics present in the 
period under study, as summarized in the following comparative table. The summary was also 
informed by and based on Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury (2012) and in Reay & Jones (2016) 
suggestions to capture qualitatively institutional logics through “pattern inducing” techniques. 
This is based on the interpretivist approach, which assumes that “meaning is tightly intertwined 
with context” and that the only possibility for effectively “capturing a social or cultural 
phenomenon is to look at it from the “inside” (p.449). 
 
Comparison of Findings with Organizations & Movements
McAdam & Scott (2002, 2005)
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Comparison of Findings with notions of Corporate Deviance
(Aguilera, Judge & Terjesen, 2018) and Varieties of Institutional Systems
Fainshmidt, Judge, Aguilera & Smith, 2016)
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS
INSTITUTIONAL LOGIC ECONOMIC POLITICAL SOCIAL
METAPHOR MARKET IS WISE & 
EFFICIENT
NEGOTIATE TO MOVE 
FORWARD
PROTEST TO VISIBILISE
SOURCE OF 
LEGITIMACY
WRITTEN LAWS & 
REGULATIONS
AGREEMENTS & CUSTOMS STAKEHOLDER  
PARTICIPATION
SOURCE OF 
AUTHORITY
MILITARY
AUTHORITIES
DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITIES STAKEHOLDER 
ACCEPTANCE
SOURCE OF     
IDENTITY
IDENTITY BASED IN 
SOCIAL EXTRACTION /
ORIGIN
IDENTITY INFORMED BY 
NETWORKS OF INTEREST 
GROUPS
IDENTITY INFORMED BY 
SCOPE OF SOCIAL
INTERACTIONS
BASIS OF 
NORMS
SELF-INTEREST NEGOTIATION FAIR PLAY
BASIS OF 
ATTENTION
MARKET POSITION POSITION VIS A VIS POLITICAL 
ACTORS
POSITION VIS A VIS 
STAKEHOLDERS
BASIS OF S
TRATEGY
PROFIT & GROWTH 
PERSPECTIVES
POLITICAL VIABILITY & 
SUPPORT
SOCIAL LEGITIMACY
INFORMAL CONTROL 
MECHANISMS
RIGHT-WING PRESS & 
GOVERNMENT DICTUMS
GOVERN´T CALLS, CONGRESS
PRESS & BUS. ASSOCIATIONS
FREE PRESS & SOCIAL 
MEDIA
GOVERNING 
STRATEGY
ALIGNED WITH LIBERAL 
MARKET CAPITALISM
ALIGNED WITH DEVELOPMENT
CAPITALISM
ALIGNED WITH SOCIAL 
RIGHTS CAPITALISM
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Finally, some propositions were the key complements required to complete the conceptualization 
presented in Figure 7. Chief among them were Haunschild & Chandler (2008)’s contributions 
about institutional-level learning as a source of institutional change, which allowed to recognize 
more formally the role of learning. Pertti and Qadir (2014) informed the concept of an epistemic 
community, generating a notion of an epistemic governance guiding the meaning-making of main 
actors in the governance arena. Westphal and Zajac (2013) and their colleagues writing about a 
behavioural theory of governance gave the scholarly background to propose a social construction 
of the action of governing as minding the corporate governing gap. 
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APPENDIX	8	–	3XI	INITIATIVE	
Press Release of the Meeting of the Chairs of CPC and ASECH, entrepreneurs, innovators 
and NGOs conforming the 3xi initiative with the newly-elected president of Chile, 
Sebastián Piñera 
 
19 de enero de 2018 
Informarle al presidente electo en qué consiste y qué hace 3xi, junto con ponerse a su disposición para colaborar en 
proyectos sociales, y el fomento del encuentro y el diálogo entre los chilenos. Ese fue el objetivo de la reunión que 
sostuvo Sebastián Piñera esta mañana con Alfredo Moreno, presidente de la CPC; Alejandra Mustakis, presidenta 
de ASECH; Juan Pablo Larenas, fundador de Sistema B; Alfonso Gómez, presidente ejecutivo del Centro de 
Innovación UC; Alejandra Pizarro, directora ejecutiva de la Comunidad de Organizaciones Solidarias; Claudia 
Marfin, de Virtus Partners; y Jaime Riesco, gerente de 3xi. 
A la salida del encuentro, Alfredo Moreno destacó que fue una conversación muy productiva, en la que le dieron a 
conocer al presidente electo los proyectos en que 3xi está trabajando junto al sector público, en materia de salud, 
educación, parques, discapacidad, etc. “El presidente estaba muy al tanto de todos estos temas y, al igual como lo 
hicimos con la presidenta Bachelet, nos pusimos a su disposición como 3xi para seguir colaborando en el futuro en 
iniciativas sociales que solucionen problemas que afectan a los chilenos”, señaló el presidente de la CPC. 
Qué es 3xi 
3xi es una iniciativa conjunta de la Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio (CPC), la Asociación de 
Emprendedores de Chile (ASECH), Sistema B, la Comunidad de Organizaciones Solidarias y el Centro de Innovación 
UC. En la organización también participa Virtus Partners como socio de este importante esfuerzo, tanto en el diseño 
como en la articulación de las reuniones. 
Bajo el lema “Hacia una cultura del encuentro”, ha ido reuniendo a diversos grupos de personas de acción, 
convocadas en torno al ideal de aportar ideas y enriquecer la discusión que permita abordar los desafíos de un 
desarrollo integral y sustentable, como tarea de todos. 
Durante 2017, se realizaron 5 encuentros en el marco de la iniciativa 3xi. En ellos han participado en total más de 
400 personas entre empresarios, emprendedores, representantes de organizaciones de la sociedad civil y de empresas 
B, dirigentes gremiales, representantes de pueblos originarios, ejecutivos de empresas y líderes en innovación. El 
objetivo: conocerse unos a otros y fortalecer los lazos de confianza, con el fin de crear un Chile mejor. Para seguir 
dándole forma a este propósito, durante 2018 se realizarán otros 5 encuentros 3xi, 
Fruto de los encuentros y bajo el espíritu 3xi, durante los últimos meses se han venido desarrollando diversas 
iniciativas, todas con el foco puesto en la colaboración conjunta para lograr mejoras en la calidad de vida de las 
personas. Destacan, por ejemplo, la operación gratuita por parte de clínicas privadas a personas que padecen 
catarata severa; la elaboración del material y seminario para preparar a las empresas en la inclusión de personas 
con discapacidad al mundo laboral; la constitución de una red de centros e iniciativas de innovación de Chile (RICH); 
el proyecto Mapocho Limpio, para transformar la ribera sur poniente del río, en un espacio público limpio y de 
calidad; Juntos por la Infancia, que busca mejorar integralmente las condiciones de vida de los niños más vulnerables 
de nuestro país; entre otros.   
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